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Abstract
This dissertation contends speech is indispensable to politics. It begins with Aristotle, whose
conception of political speech grounds our modern understanding. I argue the Aristotelian position
is colonizing insofar as it essentializes speech as sound. The consequence is that speech becomes
phonocentric, privileging a particular mode of communication. This raises the issue of Deaf
subjects who engage politics in non-phonocentric ways. That is, their speech is seen in what I
contend is a visual vernacular. Subsequently, I turn to the issue of race. If Deaf subjects raise
questions about what it means to speak, Black subjects, who speak audibly and are still unheard,
raise a correspondent question: What does it mean to be heard? Within Euromodernity, I contend
political speech becomes essentialized and racialized. Here, particular human beings (whites) are
deemed as deserving of being heard, while others (Blacks) are silenced and thus, rendered
speechless.
In response to these conditions, I argue Black and Deaf subjects do speak and their speech
challenges existing hegemonic, colonized forms. Black and Deaf political speech allow for the
creation of Black and Deaf lifeworlds, an articulation of their own ways of existing in the social
world. The result is a project actualizing freedom. Ultimately, I posit a creolizing of political
speech, a mixing of Deaf and Black existential articulations, such that what engenders is a
reconceptualizing of political speech towards a meeting of wills, ideas, and ways of being,
grounded in generality. Under such a project, political lives and futures for the colonized emerge.
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Introduction

No leader can successfully lead this race of ours
without giving an interpretation of the awakened
spirit of the New Negro, who does not seek
industrial opportunity alone, but a political voice.
— Marcus Garvey (1922)
Because they think they are white, however
vociferous they may be and however
multitudinous, they are as speechless as Lot’s
wife—looking backward, changed into a pillar of
salt.
— James Baldwin (1984)
We should try ourselves to forget that they are
deaf. We should teach them to forget that they are
deaf. We should speak to them naturally…
— Alexander Graham Bell (1884)

This critical study explores why speech is essential to doing politics. It does so by revisiting classic
discussions of political speech in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon, among
others to illuminate what it means to speak politically and what are the requirements for being
heard. Specifically, I ask, if one’s communication cannot be recognized as speech, can one be a
political subject or is one reduced to an object of other people’s decision-making and action? After
all, in order to have a role in a polity one must participate in debates over what should be shared
values, norms, and priorities. On one plane, my aim in undertaking this line of questioning is to
determine whether there are losses in understanding and to political life through reducing speech
to audibility or to what can be heard in a phonocentric sense. I intend to explore this through a
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focused study of deaf people—who do not engage in audible speech and are often therefore thought
to be non-speaking.
Once considered speechless subjects, the auditory often think of the deaf also as nonpolitical or people who must be spoken for. Drawing on the studies of language, speech,
communication, and politics undertaken within deaf communities, I advance a reconceptualization
of political speech beyond narrower conceptions of the spoken word. Having critically considered
the nature of speech, I then turn to what it means to be heard. I do this through a study of language,
speech, and politics in black communities in the Caribbean and the United States which, though
mainly capable of speaking in a conventional sense, and in this sense not defined by what is
considered a physical disability, have historically been unheard. I conducted my research of
existing work on the speech and audibility of black and deaf communities through a series of openended interviews with members of the deaf, black, and deaf black communities in Hartford and
Bloomfield, Connecticut (the former is a central location in the history of U.S. deaf politics while
the latter is home to one of the largest expatriate Jamaican communities in the world) and Kingston,
Jamaica.

Speech Beyond Audibility

In Old English, the etymology of the word speak leads to sprecan/specan meaning “to speak, to
utter words; to make a speech.” However, other etymological archeology unveils that specan was
not the primary word for speak, but rather it was, maþelian from mæþel meaning “assembly,
council,” which denotes, “to meet.” That is to say, in the original Greek formulation, to speak was
more than an individual-focused activity of utterance (specan). It was a meeting (maþelian). And
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so, to speak was to meet. This association between speaking and meeting continued in other
civilizations. Similar to the Greek, “the [Akan] phrase bo dwa means to cause a crowd to assemble
for a formal speech event” (Yankah 1995: 52). In other words, for the Akan, speech is
fundamentally relational in its orientation: “Opportunities for speaking abound in Akan
society…[t]he label mpanin kasa marks a style of speaking…[t]his mode of speaking typically
situates the speaker within the public domain (dwamu) or formal assembly, where socio-political
issues are debated before a consensus is reached” (Yankah 1995: 53). One historical meaning of
speech then does not center the sounds exchanged by those who participate in phonocentric
language. Instead it describes the realization of intersubjective spaces in which people are seen by
virtue of being heard. All speech is accessible and all forms of speech are understood since when
this is not the case, speech, so understood, is absent.
There are many potential political implications: a dialogic process of speaking with, at least
in the moment when speech occurs, includes meaningful belonging. This would also imply that if
we conjoin “political” and “speech,” political speech is only in evidence under conditions that
allow for a meeting of people exchanging ideas, engaging in consensus, dissensus, disputes, and
broadly, contestations—if not constructions: rhetorical, actional or otherwise—about their
inhabited socio-political world and the lives they actualize within it. Political subjects, it would
follow, are agential people at least in so far as they participate directly in such public meeting.
These definitions suggest that engaging in political speech involves positioning one’s self in and
assuming a role in the constitution of a political world. But, critically, what does this result in for
Deaf subjects and black subjects?
Scholars of Deaf communities describe their members as residing on the periphery of
political speech because their voices are seen rather than heard. The form of their communication
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renders their expression not only inaudible but also unheard. While the majority of black people
do engage in phonetic speech, when they are seen as speakers, their illicit appearance tends to
eclipse the content of what they are saying. While their voices could be heard, they are not listened
to. In both cases, the meeting described in the etymologies of speech does not occur. I re-examine
in this study classic discussions of political speech through investigating how black and deaf
communities have articulated the relationship between expression and political life.

More

specifically, doing so returns us to the original understanding of speech as a form of meeting that
is eminently relational and intersubjective. This more expansive view has consequences for who
can function as human subjects and for the nature of political community.

Defective Political Subjects

Lewis Gordon observes that the ancient Greeks believed that since political life is necessary for
the construction of the polis1 to reject the political life—a public domain—and resign oneself to
the private sphere is to be an idiōtēs (a private person), which is the source of the word idiot.
Gordon adds that the linguistic archelogy of idiōtēs extends to the ancient Egyptian term idi,
meaning deaf. Therefore, to be anti-/apolitical or deliberately to avoid partaking in the construction
of public life was to be an idiot, which was akin to someone who did not hear, to be deaf. 2
Strikingly, being unable to hear does not necessarily make one either anti-political or an idiot,
since one could reach to the public sphere without the faculty of hearing, yet being an idiot is
explained through recourse to deafness. This reality raises substantive questions: Does this still

See Aristotle’s Politics; On Rhetoric, Plato’s The Republic; Apology.
See Lewis Gordon’s,
‘Thoughts on Afropessimism,” Contemporary Political Theory.
1
2
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entail that political speech, as understood through the hegemonic history of ideas that gives us
avowed legitimate constructions of what it means to be a human being, fundamentally excludes
deaf people? Is the implication that deaf people cannot engage in political speech or is there
expanded ground for a different line of argument: that Deafness in the ancient worlds of Greece
and Egypt was thought better to describe people who could participate but opted not to than those
who engaged in non-phonetic modes of expression and exchange? If this is the case, what are we
to make of people who did not hear in the conventional sense but remained politically involved
and engaged? Or, when they tried to enter, did they instead encounter a world of idiots or people
unable to grasp the political speech they engaged? Indeed, what seems to be a fecund avenue of
inquiry is one that identifies missing links and reveals porous lines of reasoning. What results from
these questions is addressing the political lacunae, which begins by correcting the epistemological
prism through which Western political theory understands questions of Deaf subjectivity and the
meaning of the political.
Sign language notwithstanding, the deaf subject, in more recent history, is one constructed
as both a non-hearing and non-speaking subject. “The older terms for [the deaf] were deaf-mute
and Silent…Mute or Silent people are those who, for the most part, do not speak” (Lane 2008:
284). A further exploration into the etymology of “mute” reveals the Old French, muet, meaning
“dumb,” the Latin, mutus, meaning “silent, speechless, dumb.” In other words, associated
meanings indicate that the presumed inability to hear sound that marks the deaf person extends to
their supposed inability to speak. Absent speech, they are silent subjects and therefore nonpolitical subjects. In other words, even if the original etymologies framed people who opted out of
political engagement as the deaf, the conflation of those who do not hear phonocentric sound with
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those who are mute or silent emerged with a particular conception of the human subject, and of
politics, fashioned in and through audism. Hauser et al (2010: 490) note:

Audism begins with a specific theory of humanness. For example, bodies that hear
normally are the prototypical human bodies. In audism, the body is a starting point
for social classification. The perception that there is a difference based on the body
(i.e., the perceived imperfection of deaf bodies) is a concept common to audism,
racism, and sexism. This perception leads to the assumption that deaf bodies are
unwanted, inferior, and subject to repair. To the extent that deaf people do not hear
and do not speak, they are seen as less intelligent, less capable, and less human.

Audism plays a central role in the creation of the hegemonic conception of the deaf subject
as a defective version of human being, an idea with which deaf people have had inevitably to
contend.
Hilde Haualand acknowledges that language makes human beings human and allows them
to connect to each other (2008: 111). At the same time, she cautions that people often confuse
speech with language. She writes, “Assertions of the ‘natural’ status of speech thus provokes
several questions. Why is the audible perceived as the natural form of communication?” She
maintains, “Speech has an attribute that is inherently a part of it—namely sound—that makes it
different from sign language” (Ibid). She then erects this syllogism: if language is human and
speech is audibility, and language is speech, then deaf people do not speak and therefore are not
human.
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Paddy Ladd extends this analysis through exploring the disfiguring of deaf speech as part
and parcel of larger colonial processes. He writes, “most people conceive colonialism as formed
around economic power visited upon cultures less able to defend themselves, [however,] there is
undeniably a case to be made of the concept of linguistic colonialism” (2003). He describes
linguistic colonialism as consisting in the requirement that all languages, including sign language,
construct their word order following the rules of spoken English. The aim, of course, is to make a
language not designed for the deaf but one that is accessible for hearing people to use. The result
is that “signing became a matter of tagging signed items onto speech or English-mouthing” (2003:
178). For the deaf to speak, even in their own tongue, they had to do so hearingly or in ways that
echoed and emulated one historically specific version of speaking and of speech. This suggests a
larger question: Has our conception of speech moved from a description of when human meeting
in fact occurs to a narrow and particular model of how this has been achieved in one place and
time? Are we mistaking speech itself for one peculiar instantiation of it?
Borrowing directly from Frantz Fanon, Ladd recounts the way that audist conceptions of
the human person and his or her speech were institutionalized in educational policies regarding the
deaf. Specifically, over the course of two centuries of Deaf education, which employed and
engaged Deaf educators, Deaf communities and their sign languages were replaced “with an
exclusively Hearing-led system promoting the use of speech, lip-reading and hearing aids to
remove the ‘need for’ Deaf communities to exist” (Ladd, 2003: xviii). The elimination of funding
and popular support for deaf institutions, particularly schools, was the oralist modus vivendi. It
framed the erasure of a deaf state of being as progress. Ladd continues, “Hearing people have long
sought measures that would reduce the number of Deaf people, ultimately eliminating this form of
human variation and with it eliminating the Deaf world,” so much so that chairman U.S. National
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Institutes of Health planning group concedes, “I am dedicated to curing deafness” (Lane, 2008:
286). Curing deafness, which assumes that the condition is a form of pathology, is proposed
through the erasure of this form of “defectiveness” from the human genus. Such a proposal in
effect presupposes nothing would be loss in the elimination of deaf people. If so, it would also
entail the assumption that deaf people have nothing to say and, broadly situated, are incapable of
political speech.
This oralist posture to “fix” through erasure and eventual eradication rested upon continued
juridical conceptions of deaf identity as illicit. Hauser et al (2010) have observed that deaf people
often sought and seek deaf partners for the expressed reason of continuing deaf life and deaf
tradition, as well as preferring to occupy a deaf world. However, such choices have come under
scrutiny with legislators in England expressing the view “that deliberately attempting to create a
deaf child is unethical and should be illegal” (Lane, 2008: 286). In so arguing, they, of course,
have international precedent as “the twentieth century witnessed movements in the United States
and Germany, for example, to sterilize Deaf people by law and to encourage them to seek voluntary
sterilization or abstain from childbearing” (ibid).
In exploring the consequences for black life of persistent anti-black racism, Martin Luther
King Jr. (MLK, hereafter) outlined the concept of “nobodyness.” He wrote: “For years the Negro
has been taught that he is nobody, that his color is a sign of biological depravity, that his being has
been stamped with an indelible imprint of inferiority, that his whole history has been soiled with
the filth of worthlessness” (King, 2010: 39). Such a (black) nobody certainly could not speak
politically and, of course, unable to speak and be heard, anything could be ascribed to him—as
what he says is not equal to what is said about him. In this instance, that nobodyness is
worthlessness and an absolute lack of standing. A clear parallel can be applied in a deaf context
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in which those who “hear” become the standard form of what it is to be somebody. Absent this,
deaf political speech becomes an impossibility with the consequence that only the hearing speak.

When “Deaf Mutes” Speak
But the deaf do and have engaged in speech that is political. One example is the concept of deaf
gain. Orienting a humanistic deaf epistemology, deaf gain begins as a counter to the position of
hearing “loss,” suggesting that the world of the deaf offers important contributions to humanity
(Bauman and Murray, 2009). Specifically, deaf gain describes the uniquely “intersubjective”
quality of deaf life, suggesting that there is a qualitatively different and positive form of deep
engagement marked by “a generous way of being-in-the-world in which deaf individuals hold each
other in a visual embrace of well-being and safety” (Bauman and Murray, 2004: xxvi). Deafhood,
which defines “the existential state of Deaf ‘being-in-the-world’… is not seen as a finite state but
as a process by which Deaf individuals come to actualize their Deaf identity, positing that those
individuals construct that identity around several differently ordered sets of priorities and
principles” (Ladd, 2003: xviii).
This account of the ways that Deaf communication encourages particularly rich forms of
intersubjective encounter harkens back to understanding speech as a meeting. To grasp how and
its implications, however, we cannot cede speech or speaking to audibility and to the hegemonic
nodes of the hearing world. I contend that we can develop the language and concepts necessary to
do this through exploration of the nature of the relationality evident within deaf communities and
insisting that this is its own form of speaking community. Sign language is a language and one that
Deaf people speak. At the same time, as suggested by Bauman and Murray, the need to hold the
person with whom one communicates in “a visual embrace” should not only be understood in
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compensatory terms. As such, not being able to rely solely on one’s ears—that is, expanding
sensory communication beyond an aural standard—is important to the achievement of actual
meeting.
Indeed, Haualand describes the sense of transnational belonging created for the Deaf and
hard-of-hearing by being able to “meet other people with whom one can communicate freely”
(2008: 119).

She emphasizes the “embodied experience” that emergences when “the

communicative basis for constructing communities is put in the foreground” (ibid). The speech
evident here is not auditory in any conventional sense, however. It must be recognized as marked
by human, embodied meeting. What is more, when such meeting constitutes communities and
identities, setting in motion ways of constructing modes and norms of a shared deaf existence,
surely such exchanges are political? What would follow if this “deaf public voice” consisting “in
very large part, of deaf people doing the talking (theorists, artists, and lay people)” (Bechter, 2008:
72) was listened to? After all, the deaf world, as imagined and experienced by deaf people, is one
in which speech and its political form are vital.
At the same time, I must emphasize that, as is true of all political communities, there is
contestation and dissent internal to the Deaf. Deafhood, as I have described it, is not without its
critics. There are deaf people who understand their deafness primarily in terms of disability and
who, if asked, would wish to spare their children or other people’s children of this condition. In
addition, there are writers, like Annelies Kusters and Maartje De Meulder, who avow deafness but
charge its activists as caught in forms of essentialism akin to the early waves of feminism. They
suggest that many advocates of deafhood biologize the condition of being deaf and treat
interpretations of this experience as singular, as if there were one way of being a deaf person. For
instance, they suggest that children of deaf adults or people with only slight hearing loss might be
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excluded by the idea that to be deaf is to use sign language (Kusters and Meulder, 2013: 432-433).
This is all to say, political speech cannot guarantee unanimity. It is precisely this: working with
those barbs of contention—a deliberative doing; listening to and engaging with dissent.

Political Speech Against Speechlessness: A Turn Toward Blackness

One would assume that majority “hearing” black communities would not face the dilemmas we
have been describing with regard to the Deaf. However, the repeated reflections on the nature of
speech in historical black political thought suggests otherwise. Consider Martinican revolutionary
psychiatrist and political theorist Frantz Fanon’s diagnosis: “To speak means to be in a position to
use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to
assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization” (1967: 8). Fanon writes fully aware of
the questioning of African-descended subjects as those able to shoulder the weight of historicity.
He is, for instance, familiar with Hegel’s assessment that: “Africa … need not be mentioned again.
For it is an unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own” (2011: 91).
Guyanese political historian, Walter Rodney raises the question of cause and effect when writing
that “to be colonized is to be removed from history” (1983: 255). He continues: “The negative
impact of colonialism in political terms was quite dramatic. Overnight, African political states lost
their power, independence and meaning” (ibid). The implications, drawing on Fanon, would be
that African people and by extension, the African diaspora, who are now known as black people
could make sounds but neither be the source of their own full-fledged language nor proper
custodians of the tongues of others. Without language, presumably one does not speak.
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It is from this vantage point that we can understand South African anti-apartheid
revolutionary Steve Biko’s “Frank Talk.” 3 More than Biko’s nom de plume, it was, too, a signature
of his ontological orientation and epistemic anchor. When Aristotle discussed the importance of
rhetoric being a truth-finding enterprise, as when Fanon maintained that truth undoes colonialism,
Biko followed in a similar vein—he valorized truth, for it had enormous political purchase. “This
is the first truth, bitter as it may seem,” which he identifies as blacks having “become a shell, a
shadow of man…he looks with awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as
the ‘inevitable position’” (Biko, 2002: 28-29). Biko’s theory of Black consciousness aims at
undoing that falsehood through truthful black speech that the content, form, and implications of
which are all political. He writes, “Black Consciousness seeks to talk to the black man in a
language that is his own” (1987: 32). For Biko to speak politically is to turn away from
voicelessness and in so doing, to challenge prevailing discursive boundaries which are also
political boundaries. As Lewis Gordon (2008: 87) writes:
It is not possible for people within the city [the polis] to live without disagreement,
however, which means that opposition, short of war (between states), is needed.
The shift to the discursive, recognized in ancient times through to the present as
“speech,” initiated or produced new forms of relations, identities, and ways of life
that became known as politics. The question asked by…Biko…is the role of politics
in the context of political formation. In other words, what should one do when the
place of discursive opposition has been barred to some people?

It should be noted here that “Frank” is from the Old Latin francus, which means “freedom.” Freedom Talk, as it
were, explicated the thematic anchoring of Biko’s activism and orientation toward political life. In other words, there
cannot be freedom without truth. Frank Talk was, by all appearance, a political project on voicing the conditions—
materially, ontologically and epistemologically—of Blacks.
3
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In Gordon’s formulation, what creates political relations is the commitment to resolve
internal disputes through speech, language, and other forms of semiological communicative
practices rather than through warfare (see Gordon 2018). By implication, to be outside of the
domain of speech is also to lack political standing or political relations. In addition, it means that
forms of opposition carry great risk, as they become the potential prelude to conflict and force.
However, Biko is clear: he can call for and nurture Black consciousness, which “seeks to infuse
the black community [with] a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems,
their culture, their religion and their outlook to life” (2002: 49); however, this does not assure a
hearing with the political relations and norms that follow. Black consciousness is political speech
against political speechlessness, but for whom is it audible?
If definitions of speech carry with them accounts of who can do politics, they also relatedly
indicate who is a who. Joining the accounts of philosophical anthropology in our earlier discussion
of audism to the one of colonialism here, the answer seems to be that only an idealized form of
whiteness, as a power regime, “speaks” in our social world. However, we can then ask, if the only
default communicative practice centers audible speech and it excludes Deaf people, can it be
considered political speech proper? Its non-relationality to the Deaf world manifests when such a
speech is audibly exchanged, for its audibility cannot engage Deaf people. Apartheid, as
understood in the writings of Biko, is fundamentally against this grain of politics because of its
anti-human and anti-discursive commitments. In Gordon’s words, “Why was the response to
[Biko], as the embodiment of speech, the brutal assertion of the state?” (Gordon, 2002: 88). Gordon
claims Biko’s assassination was, in the vernacular, an effort to shut him up, that is, to muzzle Black
speech, understood in this context as a critique of the racist state; for these reasons, “the apartheid
state was not only a war on people of color, it was also a war on politics” (ibid). Scholarly work
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on the expression of Deaf and Black4 people suggests a push for the cessation of this war on politics
and a repoliticization of depoliticized politics through fundamental challenges to existing
discursive limits.

Methodological Considerations
To reconsider and potentially reconceptualize the nature of political speech, we must employ some
of the radical principles of phenomenology. It is crucial to do so because for us really to grasp the
meaning of speech and politics, neither can be treated as an absolute or unquestioned notion or one
inflexible to change based on evidential demands. absolute) account. Once in place, a natural
attitude toward these concepts would entrap us a priori notions of their legitimacy. “The natural
attitude” is the phenomenological term for taking for granted the world as given. Doing so would
thus involve treating one historically contingent expression of received ideas about speech as
intractable and above critical examination. It would be deemed true without evaluation. For our
purposes, we are likely to do a disservice to politics, speech, and political speech if we presuppose
their bounds and possibilities. This is what Lane means when she writes: “I propose, therefore, to
suspend common sense on this issue long enough to explore the concepts of deaf and disability”
(2008: 277). In phenomenological language, the commonsensical understanding of deafness as
disability needs suspension.
The phenomenologist neither foretells the questions nor the answers, but instead engages
in an enterprise in which he questions the very questions themselves. According to Edmund
Husserl, for instance, evidence, in its appearance, facilitates other appearances (Husserl, 1960:

Throughout this project, I will refer to “b/Blackness” in two distinct, separate ways. The first, “Black,” refers to the
people as humanized political agents, while “black,” indicating its adjectival use, as in a black door, refers the mere
racial designation of being black.
4
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section 24). This insight is evident in Africana phenomenology, which Paget Henry describes as
“clarifying the systemic error producing foundations of the European humanities and social
sciences that have had to legitimate and make appear as correct this [the construction of ‘negroes’
and ‘niggers’] racist reduction of African humanity” (Henry, 2016: 31). This is to say, Africana
phenomenology is uniquely situated to consider what happens to the relationship of speaking to
speech, language and politics in racial contexts, where “the African has ceased to be a Yoruba or
Akan and has become a ‘black,’ or a ‘nigger’” (32). Has this history rendered the previously
speaking black person a black mute, producing “boys” and “girls” who need to speak up but instead
collapse into silence under the weight of their masters’ voice? Africana phenomenology thus offers
avenues to reflect on systemic racialized results.
The fruits of these phenomenological engagements inform the interviews that I conducted
with black, deaf, and black deaf participants and informed how I weave together their own
accounts of the meaning of speech and politics and how they engage in political speech. The format
of interviewing I utilized ranged from email correspondences to face-to-face interviews.
Interviewing embraces an organic, bottom-up approach to the study of speech and politics. This is
important because “interviewing is often the best-suited method for establishing the importance of
agency or ideational factors such as culture, norms, ethics, perception, learning and cognition”
(Rathbun, 2008: 609). It is an effective method for illuminating how participants negotiate
centripetal forces that are made manifest on political actors within a social world. In this research
context, those forces are often the hegemonic norms of hearingness and whiteness. Rubin and
Rubin (1995) also emphasize the indispensability of listening, if the researcher is to understand
the subjective experiences of participants. Listening, I contend, is a key attribute of speaking, as I
understand it, since it is part of what enables speech to amount to a meeting. Of course, in this
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context, where sign language is a primary medium, it also metaphorical in that it also means
reading what the participants signed.
Finally, I analyze existing scholarship in Deaf and Africana traditions that investigates or
comments on the nature of speech and politics. Yanow (2003) contends that interpretivism is the
general methodological framework on which sits phenomenology and the study of the Lebenswelt
(“lifeworld,” the world of embedded social and political meaning). This general interpretivist
methodological formula then concretizes the ground for a critical investigation of discursive norms
that shape the hearing and muting of peripheral voices, thereby narrowing and calcifying the nature
of political speech.

Assessing Significance and Contribution
Socrates, in The Apology, warned that a failure to listen leads to an undoing of the very pillars of
politics. He states, “Do not make disturbances, men of Athens, but abide by what I begged of you,
not to make disturbances at the things I say, but to listen.” He continues, “For know well that if
you kill me, since I am the sort of man that I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves”
(29c–30c). It appears that what constitutes politics, behind the curtains of history, is intimately
tethered to the act of hearing. But what happens when “hearing” people will not listen either
because they refuse to recognize some forms of language as speech or because they have decided,
in a priori fashion, that the content is unwelcome? Can the unheard be political and act politically?
If the unheard become a majority, can those who “speak” and “listen” be said to comply with the
requirements of either? What are the political implications?
Fanon decreed, “We cannot go resolutely forward unless we first realize our alienation”
(2004: 163). This Fanonian forwardness is a coming to terms with the ontology of our given selves
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in their actual condition. Similarly, Anna Julia Cooper points to the import of an “unacknowledged
factor,” in her case, what it is to be “confronted by both a woman question and a race problem,
and as yet an unknown or an unacknowledged factor in both” (1988: 134). Addressing “alienation”
requires finding “unacknowledged factors,” even as they sit in earshot. In the case of the deaf, we
have yet to consider fully what their speech and its marginalization means for our understanding
of the political domain and the conception of subjects within it. Similarly, while commented on
frequently in historical black texts, muteness remains primarily an unacknowledged factor in the
predicament of black would-be speech. In the former case, it would appear that to be heard is to
be seen, as the visual language of the deaf is treated as something less than speaking. Since it
cannot be heard in an audible sense, deaf subjects become both silent and invisible in the wider
auditory world. However, as it relates to black subjects, the opposite seems to be the case: to be
heard is to be seen, for the voice has become the eyes of politics. In the wider, predominantly nonblack society’s refusal to hear black people as saying something legitimate, they are also rendered
mute and unseen5. A question remains: is it seeing that the speaker is black that makes anti-black
people close their ears, even as they claim that it is what is said that determines their response?
I bring my research on deafness and blackness into conversation in an effort to explore
sites of their meaningful convergence and points where they significantly diverge. Considering
them together proved especially helpful for considering the conception of the human being at the
core of working notions of politics as well as those of speech. Working at their intersection also
benefited my discussions of speech, disability, hearing, deafness, and politics—and together, the
nature of the political actor as (s)he navigates these terrains.

5

It should be clear that I am not referring, in the case of Black majority countries, such as Jamaica or Liberia, wherein
Blacks govern, as instantiating forms of imposed Black speechlessness. In such societies, what manifests is black antiblackness. In Jamaica’s case, colorism complicates the racialization of political speech not explored in this project.
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Summary
I begin by returning to an etymological account of speech and then survey existing arguments and
assumptions about what is thought to constitute speech and political speech, drawing on the classic
discussions of Socrates and Aristotle. I offer criticisms of these existing positions and introduce
how political subjects were designated via the ability to engage in political speech and what it has
meant to be speechless subjects, identifying, in the process, a philosophical anthropology or
conception of the human being that has historically defined the polity.
I then examine the extent to which deaf subjects are, and can be, political subjects given
the historical and ongoing centrality of speech to politics and prevailing hearing-centered
definitions of speech. I demonstrate, through a genealogy of audism, that as Deaf communities
cannot hear in the way that the non-Deaf do, they have been rendered pathologically deaf, by which
I mean defective and in need of erasure. Under this analysis, the deaf became mute and supposedly
could not articulate an agential voice. I engage scholars of Deaf history and identity, including
Paddy Ladd, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and Hilde Haualand to determine how deaf people have
responded to an imposing colonial order about who is the “deaf-mute,” as well as assessing deaf
discourses pertaining to the “authentic” deaf subject.
Next, I turn to black political speech in the Euro-modern world that is foundationally antiblack, with the expectation that the relationship of black people to political speech will be
illuminated by the resources of the previous chapter. Invoking ideas from Steve Biko, Anna Julia
Cooper, Frantz Fanon, Lewis R. Gordon, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I
explore the nexus between political speech and race to consider how what is considered illicit
speech (that is, black speech) is muted and what would be required to make it audible. With nondeaf black subjects, the challenge is not a physical ability to hear but a willingness of others to
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listen to content that is expected to be, and often is, unwelcome and regularly, emphatically
silenced. This analysis is followed by an account of speech, political speech, and political subjects
through an existential phenomenological exploration and analysis of twenty interviews conducted
with black, deaf, and black deaf subjects in Kingston, Jamaica and Hartford and Bloomfield,
Connecticut.
I conclude through arguing that deaf and black ideas about these core concepts explode
existing parameters in ways that are generative for the non-Deaf and non-black as well. If political
subjects are created and also denied, where the denial is based on producing muteness, overcoming
these dehumanizing designations requires reconceptualizing and reconstituting speech itself and
thus, formulating its political currents—that is, political speech.
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Part I
The Speaking Deaf
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Chapter 1
The “Deaf Problem”

The colonization of deafness and
people who are deaf curiously
persists in the shifting economies of
identity.
—Owen Wrigley (1996)
“Voice” has a dual meaning, most
obviously as the modality of
expression in spoken language, but
also as being heard.
—Padden and Humphries (2005)

The deaf problem is decidedly a hearing problem. But the deaf question is one for both deaf and
hearing. The former is a problematization of deafness by the power nodes of audism. The latter is
an existential question that impacts the terrain of sociality itself. The very basis of social relations
hinges on their expressive character. One’s imposed muteness—a denial of speech to make sense
of one’s political future—is an assured condemnation to political atrophy. If, as this project attests,
Euromodernity’s undertone demands the activation of certain a priori claims about speech, namely
who is licensed to speak and, correspondingly, who gets heard under such regimes of licensing,
then it behooves us to examine, on a literal level, those deemed “deaf.” This chapter makes several
interrogations: what happens when we naturalize one’s hearing status as having a distinct valence
that hierarchizes personhood and, thus, denies contributions to a shared political imaginary?
Moreover, to what extent do the deaf community inform and enrich our considerations of political
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speech, by broadening and contesting its parameters? In a word, what is it “the deaf-mute” have
to say?
I begin with raising the question of speech as a sui generis political enterprise. From there,
I provide a historiographical outline of debates surrounding the question of who is deaf, and once
determined, examine ways in which deafness is bounded in a liminal space of sub-human
personhood. Subsequently, I offer subversive discourses that dislodge the audist account of deaf
subjectivity, opening the question of deafness as voiced by the deaf community. In so doing, I
offer in this chapter avenues for generative discussions, through a series of metacritiques, about
what it means to build a liberatory deaf life-world. The result is to bring into conversation the
intersection of black and deaf identity, as the black deaf contests Anglo-deaf conceptions of
speech. Finally, I examine contributions to speech that arise as a result of the creolization of deaf
and hearing speech and, thus, inaugurate a reconceptualization of political speech.
On the Natures of Speech
The denial of speech via the rendering of subjects speechless becomes a political assault on the
personhood of those muted. But equally victimized, we will see, is the body politic, as a silencing
of one is a silencing of all. No doubt, speech subsumes itself under the larger umbrella of
communication. One can communicate through cries, the sort that Anna Julia Cooper references
in the opening pages of A Voice from the South (1988: i):
One muffled strain in the Silent South, a jarring chord and a
vague and uncomprehended cadenza has been and still is the
Negro. And of that muffled chord, the one mute and voiceless
note has been the sadly expectant Black woman,
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An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light;
And with no language—but a cry

The cry, for Cooper, speaks to the yearning of the black woman to have words, yet even short of
that, she still has a say but is only left with a cry. A cry that validates the humanity that has been
denied. Here, the Black woman communicates with what she has been given—though she longs
for a language of her own—the struggles to give voice to her muteness and in so doing, undoes
the voiceless that has come to totalize and consume her sense of self. Speech, then, is not merely
a cry. Take for example, Frederick Douglass’ famous fight with the slave breaker, Reverend
Covey. In telling this tale, Douglass noted that while Covey and he were locked in a battle of
strength, one that the former could not win, Covey decided to enlist Caroline, one of his female
slaves to aid him in subduing the rebelling Douglass (2003: 179):
As soon as she [Caroline] came into the yard, Covey attempted to rally her to his aid.
Strangely—and, I may add, fortunately—Caroline was in no humor to take a hand in any
such sport. We were all in open rebellion, that morning.
In this instance, Covey communicated his instructions yet he did not engage in political speech
proper. He attempted to silence Douglass through physical domination. Speech, when it is wedded
to the political, creates a union of humanistic expression. Speech partakes in the affairs of the
polity. But for it to be political, it must animate the political concerns that lay manifest in the social
world. This is to say communication can be apolitical, but speech vivified by politics is decidedly
not. Speech, as it follows, when it wrestles with power, becomes intrinsically and uniquely a
political affair.
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For this reason, political speech is governed by an ethic of Rousseauian generality. In
contouring and cementing the foundations of generality, Rousseau writes, “[The general will] is
always right and always tends to the public good” (2006: 172). In other areas, he deems the general
will as “the common good” (2006: 122). He describes this generality as belonging to a social
fabric, one he dubs “the social tie” (123), which binds the people and their interests together in a
unifying center. Yet, he warns that this social fabric could be rend by the sharp, slicing impulses
of private wills. At this moment, private wills subdue the general will, which displaces the latter.
This moment implicates political speech, “when the meanest interest impudently flaunts the sacred
name of the public good, then the general will is silenced; everyone, animated by secret motives,
ceases to speak as a citizen any more than as if the state had never existed” (ibid, emphasis mine).
Therefore, when one is silenced by private racial interests in the case of blacks, or silenced
by private hearing interests in that of the Deaf, the generality of speech then becomes immiserated.
What results, then, if communication becomes, as a matter of course, merely the project of issuing
hegemonic commands and coordinating obedience to those commands?
To speak as a citizen is to have a generalized grammar, it is to account for the agential
expressions of the self-and-other. Failures in this regard amounts to no more than the muddled din
that reverberates within Euromodernity’s undertone. In other words, too often, to be, we are told
what to be, by inflecting another’s existential grammar. It is the unctuous rejoinder of Mammy’s
“yes Ma’am,” to her white employer. In the Deaf world, it is deaf deference to hearing occupation
in deaf schools of thought. And, sometimes, these two worlds collide, as white deaf slave masters
or mistresses demanded a visual submissive nod from the enslaved in lieu of, “yes Sir.” Here, the
grammar of white deafness supervenes over and above hearing blackness.
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An immediate consequence, as Rousseau suggests, is the dissolution of the polity, as “if
the state had never existed” (2006: 228). Yet, Rousseau reminds us that even a silenced generality
is far removed from a dissipated one: “Does it follow from this that the general will is annihilated
or corrupted? No, that is always unchanging, incorruptible and pure, but it is subordinated to other
wills which prevail over it” (2006: 124). And so, while norms of operating in the world may render
black and deaf subjects speechless, they, nevertheless, are not without speech.
Discourses on Deafness
In what follows, I outline the various discourses on deafness to contour the differentiated
dimensions of deaf historiography, all from the standpoint of subject formation.
(a) Theological Origins: Primordial Deafness
The term “logos” (lógos) is of Greek origin, meaning “word.” Among the pre-Socratics,
Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus ostensibly first utilized the word to indicate the unifying
principle of cosmic intelligibility and metaphysics. The word was later imbricated with more stated
rational sentiments, as the Stoics adopted it. Logos, then, became reason; and so, to be rational
became its seminal character. Heraclitus referred to lógos as sublimated as a form of the mind of
God. Others, such as the Jewish Philo of Alexandria, used with prolixity the logos as a critical
element of his thought. But, perhaps strikingly, in a departure away from philosophy and toward
theology—or perhaps, philosophical theology—the Word became beautified as God. JudeoChristian theology announces the Word as akin to—nay, is—the godhead. The writer of the Gospel
of John prophesized, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God…the Word became flesh.”
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And so we have it, in the word lies the Word. The word becomes salvific. It anoints and it
saves. In the same fashion the word became flesh. It is, in the transition to Euromodernity, also
transmogrified as a Euro-logos, meaning the Word becomes the word of the metropole, the
occidental word; the Word became reified as racialized whiteness. But, here, too, the Word
becomes audiological and reified as Hearing, “the subhuman status of mutes was part of the Mosaic
code, and it was reinforced by the biblical exaltation of the voice and ear as the one and true way
in which man and God could communicate (‘In the beginning was the Word’)” (Sacks, 2000:13).
In Christian and Jewish theology, this amounted to the written Gospels and the written Torah,
respectively. Therefore, to be deaf was to be wordless and forsaken. To be outside of relations with
God was to be deemed non-human, or something less thereof. As a corollary, deafness signified
social death—damnation. Politics, and the rational impulse that underwrote it, were only phantom
possibilities, ones forever outside the signing hands of the deaf.
Jonathan Rée catalogued the words of the world’s first voice-doctor, Johann Conrad
Amman in 1690, who noted “even God…had to make use of his voice in order to create the world,
and Christ too was obliged to use vocal means when performing his miracles. Since the voice was
the embodiment of divine power, Amman said, ‘creatures formed in God’s image out, of necessity,
to be able to speak, and in this respect resemble their Creator’” (1999: 89). Mutism was, as a matter
of course, immanently entrapping, for if God spoke to create, the man who could not speak could
not create. Speech became the sine qua non of divine creation. Political projects, then, fashioned
from the imagination of minds, the argument goes, had to be voiced. The telos of deafness steered
in the direction of the existential graveyard. It was social death.
As such, this rendering of a deified word meant true political possibilities were necessarily
denied because politics is functionally a human enterprise. Divine co-optation only meant a
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backdoor to hierarchization as the “Godhead” needs to be super-ordained by something/someone
else (hearingness). Lewis Gordon identifies just this and locates this moment as an example of the
theodicean grammar, which he defines as “efforts to expurgate the human being from human
phenomena, from human relations” (2012: 6). Gordon’s analysis of theodicean grammar is reified
in the specificities of the lógos, and so this homicide of humanism takes place in the square of
politics—wherein deaf people are made to be an ontological carcass: a life deadened by the
apolitical. To prevent this, oralism was imposed, not to broaden the epistemological parameters of
speech itself, but to further restrict and constrict—to calcify speech as necessarily phonocentric.
“The oralists” frame of reference may be seen to be ultimately a religious one: in this view,
conversion of the Deaf is not only desirable but, as speech was God-given, that which separated
man from beast, it is a sin to permit the deaf to remain silent” (Wrigley, 1996: 226).
Euromodernity’s undertone, then, understood speech as having a theological telos, one that
assured keepers of the vault of reason. The deaf could not access reason because they were
wordless, speechless. Politics was denied them, as idiots (idiōtēs) had nothing to say. Deemed to
be outside of relations with man and God, the deaf had to be “saved.” In a word, hearingness
became the Word. A new cosmic order of theodicean grammar now punctuates deaf existence. To
be deaf was to be sinful, by the virtue of the lack of auditory speech (Wrigley 1996) or to be subhuman (Sacks 2000); in this sense, deafness became desecration. Hearingness could make whole
the punctured ears—it could save and consecrate.
(b) The Medical Model: Scientific Salvation?
“For speech was the source of civilization; and, as Immanuel Kant put it at about the same time,
the dumb could never attain the faculty of Reason itself, but only, at best, a mere ‘analogy of
Reason’” (Rée, 1999: 93). Rée begins a portrait of the pathologizing of deafness through the
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telescope of a historical account. Deafness was thought so problematic that it orbited outside the
gravitational pull of the human world. Alexander Graham Bell offered in response an apocalyptic
jeremiad of deaf posterity noting, in part, that sign language acquisition leads to the supposed
perilous formation of a deaf social world, “the practice of the sign language hinders the acquisition
of the English language. It makes deaf-mutes associate together in adult life, and avoid the society
of hearing people. It thus causes the intermarriage of deaf-mutes and the propagation of their
physical defect” (1884: 58). This leads to the emergence of “a deaf race in our midst” (1884: 66).
To remedy this defect, Bell invented audiological instruments so as to eliminate such abnormality.
For this reason, Bell espoused oralism, a system of imposed oral speech on Deaf people by
marginalizing commitments to indigenous deaf communicative practices—that is, sign language.
There was also the metastization of anti-deaf ethics through a transnational survey of global
economies of deafness: “The twentieth century witnessed movements in the United States and
Germany, for example, to sterilize Deaf people by law and to encourage them to seek voluntary
sterilization or abstain from childbearing” (Lane, 2008: 286). In contemporary times, vestiges of
such an approach to audiological deafness persist with incredible virulence. The Chairman of a
U.S. National Institute of Health planning group, Dr. Charles Berlin, noted in New York Times
interview: “I am dedicated to curing deafness” (Barringer, 1993).
This “curing” of deafness and the pathologizing that attends it spell, in no uncertain terms,
the defectiveness of what emanates from deaf precincts. Inherent in the medical model is a deaf
aporia. It becomes aporetic because to define such a state is “to be at a loss.” The deaf subject is
herself at a loss, albeit a hearing loss, which is treated by the hearing as if it must translate into a
speech, reasoning, and civilizational loss. And so, the deaf must audiologically speak to be wholly
human, but the deaf cannot speak in that sense. The word “must” here functions as an ontological
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direction—an existential demand: to be yet simultaneously cannot be. Deaf speech acquires
incoherence; it is not fully what it needs to be nor can it assume hearing expression. Ostensibly,
the idea of deaf political speech is a negation of itself. Indeed, the Deaf, according to this logic,
merely gesture but never speak. For in the Aristotelian arithmetic, the calculation is this: to do
politics, one must embody reason. This reason then allows for the materializing of politics, as
reason becomes communicable. Its communicability concretizes the ground on which the
commitments, ethics, and values of the collective are expressed and, subsequently, shared.
Dumbness, embodied in deaf people—hence “the deaf mute”6—becomes an ontological cancer; it
atrophies the political nucleus of deaf lifeworlds. The promise of hearingness, not necessarily as
an audiological beingness but instead as an ontological elevation, is both illusory and elusive. Its
medical prognosis is often an elixir of falsities.
“Blindness separates you from things, but deafness separates you from people.” This oftcited quote, according to Teresa Blankmeyer Burke (2014: 11), has been attributed to both
Immanuel Kant and Helen Keller. Yet, whatever we make of its provenance, we are yet confronted
with the enormity of its message. Alfred Schultz (1976: 30) observed, “My experience of a fellowman in the We-relations stands in a multiple context of meaning: it is experience of a human being,
it is experience of a typical actor on the social scene, it is experience of this particular fellow-man,
and it is experience of this particular fellow-man in this particular situation, Here and Now.” Such
an experience of the other constitutes the mechanics of the social world and our constructed, lived
social reality. This “we-relation,” is a crucial rubric in the social barometer. Our we-relation is the
site from which we are connected to the social world. The intersubjective reality grounds our
humanity. Therefore, deafness, according to the cited logic, rends the fabric of social relations

6

In other spaces, such as Jamaica, deafness is often equated to dumbness. The Deaf person is viewed as “the dumb.”

29 | P a g e

between the deaf and the hearing. Specifically, deafness is the cause, and deafness, too, becomes
the effect. This sociology of deafness becomes one of non-relational fissures; this dislocation
identifies its malady. In this orientation, the deaf is mute, for one cannot speak outside the directed
consciousness of human relations. The medical model so diagnoses this affliction of self. Keller
notably allied with Bell, perhaps unwittingly, to parade the cause for audible deaf speech; she was
given succor from Bell in relation to her elocution: that is, she, despite her dual condition of being
blind and deaf, could speak “properly” enough with the aided specialized training of Bell. She
stood, informally, as a paragon of an assimilated deaf person to the world of the hearing, to the
land of audible discourse (see Rée, 1999: 223-4).
The cartography of deafness in the world is indeed vast. The World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates that there are 380 million people who have “disabling hearing loss,” loosely
considered deaf; this is 5% of the world’s population (2016). Yet this category, indeed, an identity,
of being deaf is an ongoing, formative one. In short, having “disabling hearing loss” (from
complete deafness, to the in-between spaces: partial deafness, hard-of-hearing, etc.) does not make
one deaf per se, or rather Deaf (with the capital “D” signifying cultural deafness—or deaf gain—
not medicalized pathologizing or hearing loss). “The Deaf world has its own examples [of
factions]. We have traditionalists who are invariably referred to as the Big D. These are
folks…who are from Deaf families and attended Deaf schools…, membership within this group
requires not only ASL skills, but shared values, beliefs and experiences” (Dunn, 2008: 243-244).
Dunn continues, “members of this group tend to have a strong sense of identity as Deaf members
of society and so not consider themselves disabled but rather refer to themselves as a culturallinguistic minority” (ibid). And so, to the culturally Deaf, “disabling hearing loss” is not Deafness
proper.
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This distinction between audiological deafness and cultural Deafness begins to map the
terrain of d/Deaf identity, broadly conceived. The argument follows thus: audiological deafness
is a discursive formation of deaf subjectivity through the imposition of hearing norms and ways of
being. At the core of this construction lies loss, defectiveness, and pathology superimposed over
the body. In such a formulation, correction ensues. Deafness—the capital D appellation—begins
when the ink of Deaf epistemology writes the narrative of the Deaf world. Understandably, those
who have written, Deaf and otherwise, to reproduce this discursive practice, and its discursive end
of subject (re)formation, have been so committed in a larger effort to center Deaf epistemological
accounts.
Toward this end, others within this community define disability as “norms of technologies
of normalization,” based on the demands of a particular era (Lane, 2008: 278). Lane observes that
very short people become “disabled” when “very short people cannot readily reach keyboards,
objects on standard countertops, parts of machinery, and so on” (ibid). Similarly, very tall people
become “disabled” when they cannot fit into airplanes, or cars to drive. A capitalist economic
orientation, Lane posits, influences these technological requirements, especially as they pertain to
commerce and industry. For these reasons, “today’s disability may be tomorrow’s normal variation
and vice versa” and thus, deafness as disability is culturally constructed, one that reifies biases of
the dominant (hearing) culture. In the final analysis, Lane contends, “Deaf people reject the
suggestion that they have an impairment or a disability” (2008: 285).
What, then, is disabling deafness? Brenda Jo Brueggemann offers this analysis: “in the
commonplace book of ‘deafness’ things are not always clearly or singularly defined, designated,
determined as ‘just,’ or ‘pure,’ or ‘only’ deafness. And however much some deaf people may want
to resist being labeled as ‘disabled,’ the fact remains that they are often labelled as such” (2008:
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179). Brueggemann cautions that such a distancing between deaf and disability may unwittingly
cause “further violence to those others with whom ‘authorities’ have placed us (deaf people) in
categorical similarity” (ibid). Brueggemann leaves us with this question: “who—or what—are deaf
people so afraid of when they resist placement in the commonplace of ‘disability’” (ibid)? In effect,
she interrogates undertones of both essentialism and the postulate of an authentic deaf personhood
by posing: what if those lines between deaf and Deaf—biological and cultural—are not mapped,
policed and footnoted? Lane deconstructs disability and Brueggemann problematizes that
deconstruction.
Rebecca Sanchez follows in the critical footsteps of Brueggemann by insisting Lane’s de
facto social model of disability sees it as “largely a question of [social] design. An individual with
a mobility impairment, for example, only becomes disabled when confronted with a set of stairs.
If we lived in a world that was designed to accommodate a wider range of physical and mental
abilities rather than one that restricted access, the theory goes, disability would all but vanish”
(2015: 6). Sanchez objects to this rationalization on the premise that it has a malodorous scent of
ideal theorizing, meaning it is abstracted and far removed from lived experience and thus, Sanchez
laments, “Following the logic of the social model to its conclusion, one is left with the rather
unsettling notion that there is no physical difference at all” (2015: 7). The social model fails to
account for grim lived experience and such a failure induces violence on such people: “If an
individual’s vision is measured at 20/600, no amount of accommodation is going to make her able
to read a book in standard print, and to deny this does violence to the lived reality of her body,
suggesting that her experiences are not valid or significant” (Sanchez, 2015: 7). She claims that
Disability Studies interrogates norms that cohere around what it means to be disabled; likewise
Deaf Studies problematizes prevailing linguistic practices. Disability studies applied within Deaf
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Studies then asks not why d/Deaf people are not disabled but, instead, whether d/Deafness is
disability—what, in other words, does it mean to be so diagnosed? The former question seeks
alienation from disability discourse; the latter problematizes the logics of alienation.
Following in the same theoretical vein, Lennard Davis, though he believes deafness is not
a form of disability, cautions that “Many Deaf people have said, ‘I’m not disabled like a crippled
person or a mentally retarded person.’ But the problem with that refutation is that it uses ableist
conceptions”; that is, such refutations rest on the assumption that disability is itself necessarily
human brokenness and perpetuates social stigmatization (Davis, 2008: 323). As Davis observes,
deaf people argue that there is nothing disabling about not hearing. That refutation need not rest
on ableist rhetoric. Rather than seeing themselves as “flawed”—deaf bodies marred by the “scar”
of hearing loss—instead they see themselves as occupying a different social space, one wherein
the eyes become the ears, as the ocularcentric and phonocentric couple, giving birth to a new sense
of self. And, therefore, deafness does not denote an inability to hear, but to hear differently. It is
precisely this understanding Oliver Sacks had in mind when he wrote his book Seeing Voices. In
it, Sacks quotes a deaf person who notes: “My deafness was made more difficult to perceive
because from the very first my eyes had unconsciously begun to translate motion into
sound…Once and for all I understood that when I could not see I could not hear” (Sacks, 2000: 56).
It is precisely this visual voice that allows us to interrogate speech: For the Deaf, seeing is
a type of hearing (and for the blind, hearing a type of seeing). In the end, speech must account for
these emerging modalities; it must shed its dead skin of phonocentrism—the valorization of
sound—and instead be supplanted by a relational account where the visual voice speaks in
embodied registers, as “Sign [language] for the deaf is a unique adaptation to another sensory
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mode; but it is also, and equally, an embodiment of their personal and cultural identity…. Deafness
as such is not the affliction; affliction enters with the breakdown of communication and language”
(Sacks, 2000: 94, 97). When this embodied relation is enacted, the question of disability would
become less about human capacity, as it would be about human positionality and communicative
existence. On the latter score, politics becomes animated as a way of broaching insidious forms of
hierarchization that not only define the human subject but also index the defective Other as
disabled. It is here that deafness could speak, voiced with a strong political inflection.
(c) Defining Deafness: Toward A Socio-Cultural Schema
What does it mean to be deaf? In colloquial speech, people often ask, “Are you deaf?” to indicate
a staunch unwillingness to listen. Similarly, for a well-intentioned exhortation to be wantonly
ignored, people complain that such advice “falls on deaf ears.” To be both “deaf and dumb” is to
be unable to speak and hear—a rendering of powerlessness. This idiomatic listing is hardly
exhaustive. Though the point seems to be clear: to be deaf is not complimentary in the least. We
signify this through the literal grammar of speech itself, but also by the metaphorical grammar of
a political statement. To be heard is generative of social relations, knowledge discourses and
political action. But, for one to be heard one must speak. The former must precede the latter. In
this sense, ways of speaking, of determining what qualifies as speech, become lines of critical
inquiry. That is to say, what happens when the who overdetermines the communicative mode;
when the who eclipses the what and militate against it? For the who could determine and diminish
the speech.
Political speech brings with it the power for positioning one’s self within a political world.
To do so, to “position,” there must be a disruption—an interposition—a way into the dialogic
formula. To interpose is to insert, to intervene, to place oneself between. If an unwillingness to
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hear entails hierarchized relations (to position oneself above another), then the interposition, to
insert one’s social position into a political discourse, manifests the possibilities of speech, one that
is non-hierarchical and consequently, an open site for socio-political relations. For these reasons,
speech then is also an act of interposition, of intervening. What makes it political is that its contents
contend with the material realities of lived experiences.
This brings us back to the question of deafness: if deafness represents an inability to hear,
there can be no discourse among the deaf. Unless, of course, the modes of hearing begin to
augment, for the problem is not that deaf people cannot hear, but rather that the hearing ostensibly
do not listen. On this score, Frank Bechter argued that is vital to disrupt the din of hegemonic
hearingness, as such a voice “would express what deaf signers value. It would not contort itself to
fit the value schemes of [hearing] others, but rather, as a voice to be reckoned with, it would
discover, claim and convey that which is intrinsic to deaf value schemes” (2008: 72). This
reckoning of the Deaf public voice is an introduction of Deaf consciousness—a realization of the
self as seen through Deaf eyes: “deaf consciousness [allows] for achieving a deeper and broader
understanding of deaf peoples ‘being-in-the-world’” (Ladd and Lane, 2013: 578).7 This public
voice—with a deep politicized tenor—equips deaf peoples with knowledge of lived experiences,
“we learn about the nature of the world in which we live, the political world, a world we all need
to learn about” (Bechter, 2008: 67).
The staunch refusal to listen, as a pathological condition, labels not deaf people, but
instead, the hegemonic hearing. Imagine, for a moment, a hearing person yelling at a Deaf person

Ladd and Lane make a conscious effort to inflect Steve Biko’s designation of Black Consciousness in order to
demonstrate the constitution of deaf politicality, “In th[e] process of reconstruction through redefinition, colonized
and other minority groups have sought labels for those visions. ‘Black consciousness’ is one such term…the term
‘Deafhood’ can be utilized in just this way” (2013, 572).
7
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when informed of their deafness. The pathology is the ethical and political refusal, not the
embodied condition of lacking hearing capacities. Correspondingly, with its medicalization,
deafness, as deaf people often say, is not in itself pathogenic. That is, hearing loss can instead be
deaf gain. Pathology identifies a valorization of one’s elevated position by a refusal to be in relation
through listening; it describes a speaking down to and therefore is outside the parameters of
relationality. Audism, functionally, represents ways in which the hearing can be pathological while
Deaf people become, in a word, healthily hearing. Audism, derives from the Latin root, “audire”
meaning “to hear.” Its more seminal etymological root, “au” means “to perceive.” Therefore,
audism, as a classificatory system of adequate humanness, understands and defines through that
understanding, the human being as one who perceives—who knows—through hearing. Audism,
takes a reductive turn by collapsing the human condition to a certain genus of human being, the
hearing (audible) being and so, eliminates the deaf subject as being someone else. In so doing,
audism allows for the normative centering of the audible, of the auditory. Such a classification
implicates politics.
Hearingness as Coloniality?
Like racism is to black people, or sexism is to women, audism is to deaf people. In a reductive
fashion, audism restricts humanness to the capacity to hear. This hearing-oriented understanding
of the human condition renders phonocentric speech central to politics. Aristotle, in his Politics,
argued that “it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political
animal” (1253a2-3). “Political” because man8 is capable of social relations with himself, others,
and the state. It is through this interaction that political association becomes possible and

I intentionally refer to the gendered term “man” here to highlight that in the Aristotelian formula, women could not
engage in politics because while they could hear and reason, no one would listen and so, it was as though they were
mute.
8
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governance is thus constituted. But, unlike other animals—creatures of the wild nature—man is
capable of speech (not merely sound): “For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose;
and man alone of the animals possesses speech” (Politics 1253a1-18). It is speech that allows us
to communicate ethical imperatives that underwrite the very precepts of law and justice. At this
juncture, politics becomes speech; the political animal is instantiated as the speaking animal.
Therefore, those without speech were akin to animals, sound-making but not speech-creating
subjects and as such, sans politics. They were, in a word, wordless.
The question of deafness is not without racial logics. Nor, is deafness reduced to an
exclusive Anglo-formation or one that is entirely delimited by the English language. For instance,
in Spanish: “El es sordo” translates as “He is deaf”. The Spanish “sordo” originates from the Latin
“sordidus” meaning “dirty, filthy, foul, vile, mean, base”; from sordere “be dirty, be shabby,”
related to sordes “dirt, filth,” from PIE *swrd-e-, from root *swordo- “black, dirty” (source also
of Old English sweart “black”). Note that in Latin, the same sentence is “Qui surdus est.”
Moreover, in Kiswhahili—known also as Swahili, a Bantu language mapping a vast swath of
terrain, including Kenya, Tanzania, Kenya, et al—it is: “Yeye ni kiziwi.” Compare: “Anasikiliza”
(“He listens”). And: “Yeye ni bubu” (“He is mute”). This is to say, Euromodernity introduces a
particular decadent racial logic to deafness, and broadly, it also confers onto deafness itself, a
conception of defective, soiled humanity. This etymological mapping illustrates that in other
languages, not rooted in the Latin, with its the early Romance and Germanic linguistic variants,
deafness was not conceived in and through the logics of deformity or baseness. Critically, too, this
also verifies that even prior to formal racialization, there was an already extant symbolic
interpretation in the economy of hearing and race.
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On these grounds, for hearing blacks, though they speak audibly, they are not recognized
in most Euromodern societies as “political animals” but rather animals, with voice but without
speech, in classic Aristotelian fashion. White Deaf, though human, are not seen as political because
they lack speech and are thus similarly stunted by animality. This is what H-Dirksen L. Bauman
meant when he observed, “Historically, we humans have identified ourselves as the speaking
animal; if one cannot speak, then he or she is akin to human in body but to animal in mind. In this
orientation, we see ourselves as becoming human through speech” (2004: 242). Audism, then,
makes a political purchase of this naturalism. Phonocentrism positions auditory speech over and
above all other modes of language (Bauman 2004). But, language itself, its etymological
construction, is a product of phonocentric origins, for the word derives from the Latin, langue,
meaning “tongue.” If to be human is to speak—to leverage one’s tongue—in auditory ways,
politics appears for the deaf community as only chimera—a fiction, unreal and ultimately,
unattainable. Under this paradigmatic view, deaf political projects geared toward agential direction
(to create worlds of, and for, themselves, though not exclusively9), what Ladd & Lane (2013)
names “Deaf-World,” become an uninhabited world—lost to the deaf political imagination.
This axial audist turn affects three spheres of deaf political reality. Audism, according to
Baum (2004), has individual, institutional, and metaphysical dimensions. On the first score, audist
attitudes are exhibited through individualized relations with Deaf people (e.g., bullying,
discrimination, etc.). The individual is cannibalized often by the eating away of a sense of self
manifested through deaf personhood. The individual becomes both the object and subject of an
audist atrophy—self-decay through hearing-imposed normativity. The deaf political horizon, at

9

A CODA, meaning Child of Deaf Adult, could be either Deaf or hearing. Hearing CODAs are often viewed as being
a part of Deaf worlds, if they know and embrace Deaf culture, including, for some, fluency in sign language, despite
the fact that they are, functionally speaking, hearing.
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the level of subjectivity, becomes mute, for the deaf subject is pushed outside of equal relations
(with herself and others) and therefore made speechless, incapable of articulating a political voice.
This axial turn continues its motion, but wheeled at a different angle: the institution. Institutional
audism designates the structural conditioning of audism through social and political practices of
the hearing world; it is “the corporate institution for dealing with deaf people…[It] is the hearing
way of dominating, restructuring, and exercising authority over the deaf community” (Lane, 1992:
43). At issue here is the institutional production of nonbelonging and invisibility of Deaf subjects.
At this institutional or systemic level, colonial tropes are in play. Ladd and Lane (2013: 572)
discuss that colonialism is a useful epistemic lens under which we could assess the trauma of
devastation that such a system wreaked upon deaf personhood:
colonialism was not only the most appropriate term to use for deconstructing that
oppression and identifying its systemic nature, but that it was also a term with
generative power in helping us understand the effects of colonialist systems on Deaf
cultures themselves—in both their acquiescence and reaction against those systems.
These systems take several forms, but that most significant is in education,
specifically in the Oralist system, which has held global hegemonic power...
The oralist practice pre-established the normative ways in which speech could occur. The
syllogism was clear, though flawed: orality is speech and speech is orality. In this formula, cause
became effect and effect became cause. Sign language, the voice of the deaf, was partially
displaced and in some quarters, entirely prohibited. Sacks argued that oralism resulted in the abject
deterioration in educational opportunities for deaf communities (2000: 25). This corroding of deaf
people’s social infrastructure meant that as their social worlds were deliberately closed they were
also politically muzzled, which straightjacketed deaf resistance. For agency only becomes
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generative the extent to which it articulates a self-and-other oriented actualization. It is the making
of history through a series of actional becomings. Yet, the oralist pedagogy was but one
sublimation of colonialist manacles; others existed and persisted.
With the advent of technological innovation, scientific enlightenment provided new means
and modes of silencing. The medical model soon diagnosed deafness as pathology. Lewis Gordon
describes this as a movement from theo-naturalism (nature as ordained by God) to “scientific
naturalism” (nature understood through laws of its own). The latter lacked the “purpose” of which
Aristotle wrote, which occasioned, in the Euromodern world, a crisis of knowledge catalyzed by
what he calls “struggles with and against reality” (2012: 7). Under such a circumstance, some
scientists and philosophers attempt to make science its own foundation, which created the paradox
of science having to reach beyond science to ground itself. The demand, however, for that
grounding to be scientific begged the question of whether it must be so. In effect, then, Gordon
argued, such aspiration has an epistemological colonial a priori of attempting to subordinate reality
to the normative expectations of science as conceived in the Euromodern era. This, he contends,
is an ongoing scientific misstep, “the problem of science exceeding its scope,” as its basic impulse
is naturalizing human phenomena under the dictates of proffered scientific models. In the case of
deafness, that involves entrapping the essence of deafness as pathology (unnatural), contrasting it
against the wholly asymmetrical hearing subject. This is what Wrigley (1996: 80) means when he
asserts, “[The] medical model has remained the dominant framework by which the hearing world
knows the deaf individual as ‘defective,’ a body less than complete.” Natural deafness, deafness
as it naturally appears in the social world, one distinguished by Deaf culture as an ontological
reality, a way of being that understands Deaf subjectivity fully in human terms. Its fractured image,
unnatural deafness, a pathological iteration, sees itself as almost fully human: defective. This
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unnaturalness is a consequence of audism—hearing normativity that sediments the phono at the
core of humanism.
Audism as a form of colonial discourse is, as a manner of speaking, a needle and thread
fixture sewn upon deaf lips. Yet deaf decolonial cries attempt to halt the churning wheels of
oppression; they are voices against voicelessness. Decoloniality represents innumerable
possibilities for erecting deaf political projects. Sign language is one such articulation because it
is “a visually linguistic modality, a way of being that valorizes radically different linguistic
channels or modalities, overtly threaten crucial anchors of language and social meaning” (1996:
85). It is this re-articulation of speech that lends itself to a political formation. This visual voice
challenges the very fixed epistemes of knowledge centers. It is a re-situating of the modes of reason
itself. In such a scenario, reconceptualizing speech necessarily begets a liberating of once
conquered spaces of being.
Take, for example, the protest that occurred at Gallaudet University in 1988, the world’s
only deaf tertiary institution. Though its existence extends beyond 120 years, all its presidents and
majority of the school’s board were hearing, despite the overwhelming deaf population. Hearing
regimentation over deaf lives was the norm and Gallaudet’s leadership at the time epitomized this
actuality. As a consequence, the deaf fought to a have a say in their own education. In response to
this protest, the chairman of the board then, who herself was non-deaf, remonstrated, “the deaf are
not yet ready to function in the hearing world” (cited in Sacks 2000:100). This audist attitude was
rank with paternalism. It sought to position hearingness as hegemonic and deafness as requiring
instruction. This audist gatekeeping of opportunities instantiates the colonial posture of divide and
conquer. It signaled the policing of deaf political zones. By demanding a new way of being, of
living, and of social meaning, the deaf spoke in very strident tones, ones that required a relational
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collectivity, a unity of purpose and a resolve of deaf consciousness. It is this crux of relational
metaphysics that Deaf-Worlds were visually voiced.
Finally, Baum saw the axis of audism spin in a final direction, one he named “metaphysical
audism” (2004), which he observes “by metaphysical audism then, I mean simply ‘the orientation
that links human identity and being with language defined as speech’” (2004: 242). What Baum
intends to problematize is personhood defined singularly by auditory speech. The metaphysics
identified becomes the essence, that essence is auditory speech. But, as Gordon (2012) illuminates,
the essence cannot be an inward necessity (though in Aristotelian fashion it started as such), nor
for that matter is it an outward one; it is, instead, a socially-produced matrix of meaning thematized
over a specific period of time.
Brenda Brueggemann offers this reflection, that is, thinking of deafness as occupying a
“hyphenated between space” (2008: 187):
I come, I suppose, thinking between—thinking in another kind of between space
between think-deaf and think-hearing: think-eye. For the deaf space is a visual
space, an “eye” space—and also too, an I-space. We still have a lot to learn from
each “I” and from each “eye.” Perspective (the “eye”) really matters; the personal
(the “I”) experience really matters as well.
The potential problem here is that the sense of definitiveness, locked-into-ness or calcification in
one or another state of being, while knowingly occupying multiple spheres of life and situating
varying degrees of deafness (as an hard-of-hearing person), is not fully resolved by occupying a
“hyphenated between space,” as such a space is still located somewhere. Nevertheless, this
apparent existential phenomenological assertion, reflexive thinking or situated beingness from the
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vantage point of the human subject, is exactly what Brueggemann announces: it is “to learn from
each ‘I’ and from each ‘eye’”—this is an intersubjective orientation toward a pregnant political
project. “This little between space can be, in fact, rather expansive. It is a space of potent
possibilities, contained and yet kaleidoscopic in its perspectives” (ibid). Decoloniality then turn on
a relational axis that disrupts and displaces an audist enterprise. Audism “oralizes” deaf speech,
which imposes speechlessness upon them; as such, deaf decolonization signals a disruptive turn:
sign language destabilizes a phonocentric episteme. Sign language notwithstanding, deaf ethnicity,
as a cultural refutation against hearingness, functions as a dual assault on audist ontological
registers—that the only world the deaf should prepare themselves to occupy is a hearing one, as
deaf worlds, social worlds of particularized political expressions, are themselves fables, only
imaginable and never realizable.
Deaf ethnicity centers this political calculus, one that understands relations as generative,
“It leads to the seeking out of Deaf epistemologies and ontologies. It…allows Deaf communities
to articulate their many commonalities and differences” (Ladd and Lane, 2013: 574). The political
project is re-orienting speech from a position of superordination (god-related) to simply horizontal
belonging (human-related). Deaf epistemologies, as it were, stand as political speech because they
are expressly signposting deaf agential direction. It is a coming to terms with the deaf state-ofbeing, one that is materially responsive. This, potentially, is a faltering of the Euromodern
undertone and progresses toward a movement to (deaf) transmodernity. On this, Nelson
Maldonado-Torres (2007: 262) adds, “The transition from modernity to transmodernity lies first
and foremost in the political and epistemic intervention” but that transformation necessitates a
political voice unto which such a revolution is thought possible. A revolution of norms and a
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valuing of values, leading to a reconfiguration of the political. Audism in the transmodern realm
would instantiate abnormality rather than the normality it now occupies.
In this section, we have examined the question of the “Deaf problem,” that is, the
problematization of Deafness, ways it has become a “problem” for the hearing world, so much so
that deafness is diagnosed as pathology, both in its medical and socio-political dimensions. This
then raises the problem of audism, and interrogates if audiology, in its historical or modern
formulations, functions as a form of scientific audism. Certainly, the explored theological formula,
where the spoken word becomes constituted within the human being, opens the door for the
possibility of the “saving” of deafness from itself—indeed, it amounts to a rescuing by
hearingness. These issues then situate another political problem, one of the potential colonization
of deafness, of its ways of being. The thrust, in part, to deaf ethnicity begins by making a claim to
Deaf epistemological practices. In what follows, I raise questions about the colonization of
deafness both as an external and internal phenomenon.
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Chapter 2
On the Coloniality of Deafness

Since the work of Aníbal Quijano in the later twentieth century, the brand of Southern thought
now known as decolonial theory has gained eminence. Its proponents argue that colonialism also
produced a coloniality, which they regard as a mode of being or ongoing systemic practice of
colonial relations. While decolonization could lead to the formal independence of a country or a
people, it does not necessarily entail the elimination of coloniality. To eliminate or transform that
requires a different kind of thought and practice, which they call decoloniality. I examine in this
chapter Deaf decolonial theory and some of the criticisms it raises. This will set the stage for our
examining one of the quintessential elements of Euromodern colonialism—namely, its production
and philosophical anthropology of racism.

Colonial Decoloniality? A Partial Refutation
By any measure, the question of deaf/hearing, colonized/colonizer is hardly a settled one. In
response to Baum (2004) and others who intimate a direct binary opposition between deafness and
colonialism, Myers and Fernandes (2010) contend that the reverse is true. This pitting, as they see
it, of deaf people against hearing exemplifies a foray into the politics of division, “relegating Deaf
people to the status of a colonized minority and hearing people to a colonizing one...reflects an
impoverished definition of what Deaf people can be…Audism is quite a force without casting it in
the dynamic of colonialism” (2010: 42). They continue that such categorizations of colonizer and
colonized entrap deaf people within the very categories they attempt to resist. This, they voice, is
the wrinkled contradiction that inheres in the colonial narrative. Such a narrative establishes the
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Manichean duality it wishes to dismantle—this binarism of hearing against deaf is in fact a
theoretical excess. No doubt, they argue, audism exists and discrimination is evident, but to proffer
a colonial explanation is a futile exercise in ahistorical theorizing. Such a project, risks in the end,
opportunities for unity and so they interrogate, “How does a story of colonialism leave room for
mutual respect between ASL users and English users, or even among different deaf people, deaf
people of color, and White deaf, for instance? Ostensibly, the intent of using both phonocentrism
and colonialism is recognizing sign as equal to speech; however, does denigration of English as
the oppressor language encourage such equality?” (Myers and Fernandes, 2010: 41).
Myers and Fernandes’ point of objection must be given further critical examination.
Ultimately, their claim is that the “colonialism” argument fails to account for communication
between the deaf and the hearing. Though not expressed in explicit terms, Myers and Fernandes
offer a critique of a form of essentialism that lies beneath claims of coloniality. One could argue
that Myers and Fernandes are not necessarily arguing there exists harmony in Deaf and hearing
relations; rather, they simply argue that disharmony is not identical with decoloniality because
coloniality is a misdiagnosis of the situation. Such misdiagnosis might mean the proposed solution,
decoloniality, is nostrum, one deeply inadequate at the task at hand.
Yet, could Myers and Fernandes (2010) valorize an a priori “mutual respect” between deaf
and hearing in their critique of what they dub the “story of colonialism”? It is not inconceivable to
imagine that the experiences of Deaf communities, or the systematic oralist pedagogy, evinces
evidence that colonial relations between speech and hearing identity imposes upon deaf people the
appellation “defective” and consequently, forecloses horizons of possibilities. That has been the
position of some Deaf scholars, namely Paddy Ladd (2003; 2013). This is not to say, however, that
all deaf/hearing relations must be understood within a colonial frame. Admittedly, deaf
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subjugation can and does exist in societies without colonialism. To dismiss wholly, without a
critical examination, the possibility of colonized relations could result in an oppressive end: the
continued subjugation of deafness for the satisfaction of having a gold-plated social politesse.
Espousing mutual respect, not entirely without legitimacy or salience, could occasion uncritical
attitudes it hopes to establish. Facile denunciations appear to ground and fuel an orientation toward
the field faced by those who speak in Euromodernity’s undertone. For mutual respect and unity is
begotten through humanized, intersubjective relations, not before. It is exactly this natural attitude
of supposed harmony (or disharmony, for that matter) between deaf and hearing that must undergo
a phenomenological suspension and be demonstrably evidential and subsequently, made
accountable, in ethical terms, to that evidence. A phenomenological account allows for that
discovery without assuming an end-result. This a posteriori, the litany of evidence cited above,
illustrates clear linkages between colonial power nodes that co-constitute the relationship between
deaf and hearing.
It is truly a mischaracterization to suggest that exposing emerging impulses of (hearing)
coloniality is “reactive” and not instead, “proactive”; that it is divisive and not unifying (Myers
and Fernandes, 2010: 30; 41-42). Torres-Maldonado offers this insightful take: “[decoloniality]
opposes the paradigm of war which has driven modernity for more than five hundred years, with
a radical shift in the social and political agent, the attitude of the knower, and the position in regards
to whatever threatens the preservation of being” (2007: 262). Identifying colonial power markers
is not an act of finality. Rather, the pendulum of liberation swings in the direction of decoloniality,
that is an intended proactivity in reconstituting new terms, values and norms under which
humanized social relations manifest, such that political speech, in its decolonial formula, leads to
liberatory world-creation. Deaf preservation of being can only be possible to the extent that the
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deaf speaks—in this sense, the Aristotelian formula is correct; it only errs when it reduces speech
to orality, or as I have theorized, to a phonocentric philosophical anthropology. Tiptoeing around
delicate hearing sensibilities is the problem, seldom the solution. Deaf epistemology is political
discourse against dehumanization. For as a discursive practice, deafness constitutes itself (beingin-the-world); it re-imagines its horizons at the same time it announces them. Its discursivity is
concomitantly constitutive as it is descriptive.
Overall, a universal appeal to “mutual respect” and the negotiation of desired terms of
relations invariably raises questions of political legitimacy. Jane Anna Gordon announces that “the
basis of whiteness is a subordinated black life-world, the denial of its reality as a legitimate
alternative point of view for consciousness” (2006: 4). The white world rests on, at first sight,
black people caricatured by white eyes. But a second move, a second sight is stymied, i.e., the
white does not see the black through the eyes of the black other. Must not the hearing, then, hear
the world through deaf eyes? Mustn’t the hearing legitimize a deaf life-world? This blindness via
a lack of self-reflexive seeing allows Gordon to conclude, “Efforts to forge political identities out
of contexts of illegitimacy may be mythic” (2006: 15). The question so becomes: who stands to
benefit from formal relations of mutual respect? The ill-gotten gains reaped by political
illegitimacy (of voices) only result in deaf ontological causalities.
Due to a disaffection with the colonial “story,” some scholars take a poststructural turn,
that is, broadly understood, a critique of structuralism and a movement toward deconstructive
theory. These critics contend the problem is not colonialism as such, but the very category of
deafness itself. Lennard Davis reasons that the category of deafness, like all other social identities,
“is that usually being part of an ethnic group defines one in a totalizing way” (2008: 321). In effect,
Davis contends that deafness collapses into essentialism, or admittedly, the problematic strategic
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essentialism endorsed by Ladd and Lane (2013: 574). Similar to other poststructuralists, whether
Judith Butler on gender and its performativity, Davis asserts that sketching the lines of deafness
too rigidly, a seemingly inevitable entrapment, offers purists considerations that exclude (other
forms of deaf people) and as such, diminish opportunities for coalition-building. While those
concerns are certainly real and pressing, deaf eliminativism, however, through “post-deafness,”
needn’t be the bleached cure-all. As discussed above, deafness, on a phenomenological axis, could
turn on deaf lived experiences—the situatedness of deaf lives within a social world. Post-deafness,
a turn toward self-negation, or essentialism in another form, cannot lend itself to ensuring political
speech, when we are uncertain whom is it that needs to speak and why.

Colonial Decoloniality? A Partial Defense
The discussion above is not to suggest that Deafhood as theorized by Ladd (2013) and
Metaphysical Audism espoused by Baum (2004) are without fundamental problems. Rather it only
intimates that a critical attitude to “the story of colonialism” raises potential challenges to the
narrative of coloniality, as it views such problematization of norms of hearingness as inadequate
or at worse, inaccurate. That notwithstanding, decolonial relations, or if preferred, human relations
between systems of normative hearing domain and Deaf communities can only emerge when the
former is dismantled; it cannot precede it. That said, Ladd’s discussion of Deafhood leaves much
to be desired. In defining Deafhood, Ladd argues, “Deafhood…contained possibilities for
envisioning a larger sense of what Deaf could mean, one that could move beyond the confines of
post-colonial Deaf discourses.” He continues, “The term ‘Deafhood’ can therefore be utilized as a
shorthand for the process of discovering those potentialities, which leads to the question—what
does it mean to be ‘Deaf’”? (2013: 573-4).
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This raises the question of essentialism, specifically: who can be deaf? Is ASL acquisition
necessary? What about CODAs, those who are hearing but born and raised in deaf families; are
they licensed to invoke Deafhood? Is Deafhood only accessible to the cultural Deaf and not the
audiological deaf? Moreover, in other spaces, Ladd defines what that Deaf potential means,
“Deafhood comes from maintaining a clear focus on the seed itself,” where “the seed” refers
ostensibly to bodied deaf essence (2003: 407). Kusters and De Meulder (2013: 432) inveighs
against this formulation, “Deafhood is a certain ontological experience that relates to being
biologically deaf. Such a focus on a ‘core’ or a ‘seed’ has maintained in feminist essentialism.”
They continue, “the suggested direction in which to move onward from this seed—the ‘deaf
becoming’—is the ‘actualization’ of the deaf biological state, by the use of sign language and
socialization with other deaf people.” (ibid). This, of course, calcifies the “Deaf line,” that is, its
essentialist core demarcates caverns of openness and closure, allowing for intra-d/Deaf separatism
and exclusions by demanding allegiance to the Deaf Way.
Inherent in these queries is the ethic of Deaf performativity, a definite consequence of
essentialist discourse. Furthermore, it raises questions of how one must experience deafness. In
responding to these question, Ladd et al asserts, “We must, however, ensure that the Deafhood
concept is not reduced to essentialism, i.e., to assuming that minority group characteristics are
fixed traits held in common by all members” yet, in the same breath, borrowing from Spivak
(1997), espouses the conceits of strategic essentialism and maintains that the essentialist core
within Deafhood is “at the least strategically viable for the foreseeable future” (2003: 217), because
it is “necessary for groups to identify certain commonalities in their experiences and in their
cultures in order to construct a larger, idealized selfhood, which then empowers them toward a reenvisioning of their societies” (Ibid: 574). Here, Ladd places the essence, however strategically,
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inward through the signification of deaf commonalities. This reifies not only the question of Deaf
ethnicity, but also Deaf authenticity. It forecloses the possibilities of those so defined as Deaf, as
its facticity predetermines the scope of deaf possibilities. Put plainly, the deaf subject is delimited
and stunted by an immanent closure of self. Here, the Deaf is not becoming, as such, it becomes,
indicated by an existential period. To suggest Deafhood is to deny other modalities of being
d/Deaf.
This is not to say the pursuit of Deafhood, in its yearning for a decolonial and emancipatory
end, is itself a problematic project in the ways suggested by Myers and Fernandes (2009). Rather,
that Deafhood, in order for it to voice a Deaf life-world, should orient its focus on a relational
metaphysics and not the strategic metaphysics of substance that his theory assumes. As Lewis
Gordon explains, it is not the appeal to essence that itself is problematic: “The appeal to
essence…needn’t collapse into the foreclosed ascription of essentialism.” Using the
methodological anchor of phenomenology, Gordon suspends the ontological claim. “‘Essence,’
from this perspective offers no appeal to an isolated substance; it appeals, instead, to a relationship”
(Gordon, 2012: 3). As I have outlined in the preceding chapter, any consideration of speech must
center its relational impulse. The geo-political etymology of speech across Euro and Afro domains,
from the Greek maþelian from mæþel meaning “assembly, council,” denoting “to meet” to the
Akan dwamu, an intersubjective gathering dedicated to meeting to discuss relational politics. In a
phenomenological turn, speech as orality, or more significantly, the speech as embodying
phonocentrism, undergoes suspension. Through intentionality, that is, via its political
articulation—for politics is a doing—speech becomes the relation crux from which a community,
in this case, a deaf one, begins to build the edifice of deaf-life worlds, by suspending ex ante
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considerations of deafness. This relational dimension allows for a multi-modal approach, divorcing
deaf lived experience from a uni-modal, essentialist account.
Fashioning Deaf Worlds Against Audist Accounts
In 1930 Albert Ballin, in his autobiographical account, The Deaf Mute Howls, noted that he lost
his earing at the tender age of three due to the scarlet fever. As he explored his inhabited social
milieu as a deaf person living in a decidedly hearing world, he came to recognize the fragilities of
deaf existence: that deaf personhood will be silenced, not by their inability to speak in conventional
ways, but by the conventions of audism that that decreed the deaf person was, in fact, outside the
very bounds of the polity. “Until today he has been a much misunderstood human being, something
quite different from the rest of mankind. Even now he is shunned and isolated as a useless member
of society, a pariah” (Ballin, 1998: 1). The linguistic anthropology indicates that “isolate” is a
French derivative, isolé. The French, similarly, is taken from the Latin, insulates, meaning “made
into an island.” Therefore, to be deaf was to be insular—separate and outside the community of
relations. Therefore, the project of the audism was to demarcate this “isolated” and “shunned”
community. Not only was the deaf person outside the proper bounds of politics, as established
within the polis, she was, similarly, deemed to be something else—one without function. The
audist accoutrements of power formulated the deaf subject as an anthropological excess. Yet, the
deaf saw herself as being responsible for her own sense of self and accounting for her own
situatedness and so, she, in the language of Ballin, “howls.” On this, he writes, “Long, loud and
cantankerous is the howl raised by the deaf-mute! It has to be if he wishes to be heard and listened
to” (ibid). This desire to partake in the succulent fruits of politics meant a howling, a violent
resistance against norms of audism. It is this “cantankerous” din of resistance that registers deaf
defiance against the strictures of social separatism.
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Audism is the political belief that the deaf cannot speak; oralism is the social practice of
trying to make the deaf “speak” an audist language. For this reason, Ballin recounts oralist
practices of imposing hearing identity upon deaf people was a paradoxical attempt to make use of
“the useless.” Therefore, oralism functioned as one of many appendages of the machinery of audist
coloniality: “Oralists in their efforts to suppress the use of signs practically bind the arms of the
child, thereby gagging it, so it may not express itself naturally. But even these methods cannot
abolish the use of the sign language” (Ballin, 1998: 26, emphasis mine). Deaf speech, seen through
the visuality of sign language, is endemic to deaf spaces and as such, its visual voice cannot be
blindly gagged. Deaf speech is immanent within the deaf self. For these reasons, during the Deaf
President Now protest at Gallaudet University that demanded a deaf president for the first time in
the institution’s over a hundred years existence. Elizabeth Zinser, a hearing candidate selected to
be the next president, shortly into her tenure, had to tender her letter of resignation after mounting,
unmitigated protests by deaf students. Their demand, eponymously, was their protest: Deaf
President Now. As such, the rank symbolism of audist coloniality embodied Zinser’s candidacy
and then, short-lived presidency. Joseph Shapiro, quoted a deaf student who expressed to a
reporter, “We want to be free from hearing oppression. We don’t want to live off the hearing world,
we want to live as independent people” (Shapiro, 1993: 80). In her resignation, Zinser issued this
response, “‘In the minds of some, I have become an obstacle to the future of the university. And
because I care very, very deeply about Gallaudet’s future, I am removing the obstacle.’” In the
end, she insisted, the “‘best choice [for president] was a hearing candidate’” (Ibid: 83-84).
Epistemic colonialism insists that the vanguards of knowledge are themselves, concurrently, the
protectorates of the territory of self. The hearing world attempts to fashions deaf politicality: there
cannot be a deaf subject without the paternal hearing self—establishing a relation of predation and
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conquest. Under this epistemic rubric, the “best choice” for deaf agency will always be a hearing
agent. Hence, Zinser’s statement that the deaf are ill-equipped to manage their own political affairs,
reconstituting in them, pariahs of the political order.
Parents of a deaf student at Gallaudet announced, “The era of hearing people deciding what
is ‘best’ for deaf people has come to an end.”10 This statement, along with the Deaf President Now
protest, was precisely the howling that Ballin presciently heralded. Deaf political speech demands
its hearing; any attempts to bind its expression would not result in capitulation of political zones—
as accepting the state of statelessness, but rather a liberatory movement in re-claiming deaf
lifeworlds as legitimate, alternate existential expressions.
Multi-Modality as Inflecting Deaf Political Speech
Brenda Jo Brueggemann posits: “This think-between space between ‘deaf’ and “Deaf” is a rock
and a hard place for Deaf Studies. I wonder what happens if we squeeze (more) in there? What if
we don’t ‘draw the line’ on, around, through or under where someone is (and isn’t) ‘culturally
deaf’ or not?” Brueggemann ends by asking a question that stands as its own answer: “Can we
create a new geometry, a new space for ‘deaf’ (and thus ‘Deaf’ as well) to be in…?” (2008: 180).
It is for the reasons admonished by Brueggemann that others have sought to destabilize normative
conceptions of d/D designations by refusing to discursively reproduce them. Kusters and De
Meulder (2013: 437) explain:
We are reluctant, however, to adopt the politicized and divisive capital “D” with
regard to deaf individuals. In our eyes, ‘deaf’ with a small ‘d’ does not merely point
at an audiological pathology in opposition to “Deaf,” as is often argued, but should
Gallaudet University, “Notable Quotes,” Accessed: Dec. 03. 2017. http://www.gallaudet.edu/about/history-andtraditions/deaf-president-now/profiles-and-viewpoints/notable-quotes
10
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instead be understood as a biological condition to which being a signing person is
complementary.
Toward these ends, Annelies Kusters (2017) examines the multi-modal approach to deaf and
hearing communication in India. She contends that there is a vast use of different semiotic
resources such as gestures, head nods, posture, and dress. Kusters, in a conclusory note,
acknowledged: “interlocutors thus orient towards the ongoing interaction and negotiate the
constraints and possibilities imposed not only by different modalities but also by different sensorial
access to these modalities” (2017: 300). Others (Norris 2011; Friedner 2017) have followed suit
in claiming multi-modality as doing precisely what Brueggemann suggests: an expansive
imaginary of a deaf-centric being-in-the-world.
In the end, I have posited that to broaden the scope of multi-modality is to anchor
epistemological and ontological claims, wherein multi-modal connotes varied ways of embodying
deafness that are not internally opposed to each other. That is, the deaf line, as the Du Boisian
color line realized with racial parameters, does not sever or delimit horizons of deaf potentiality,
but rather allows for deaf agential direction. That is, the Deaf not only speak broadly, in articulating
their own political calculus, but engage in political speech among each other. Political speech spins
on the axis of relations, and in so doing accents a Rousseauian generality. The general will, of
course, while not beholden to private interests, is nevertheless sensitive to the demand of its body
politic, “As soon as the multitude is thus united in one body, it is impossible to harm one of the
members without attacking the body…” (Rousseau, 2002:

165). Therefore, intra-deaf

disenfranchisement by delegating ontological lines on which others should live mutes political
speech but cannot undo it, as political speech is borne from the unalterable impulse of generality.
In order to animate the intersectional concerns that attend deaf existence, I will now turn to the
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question of race—that is, the experience of the Black Deaf, which subsequently racializes
deafness, situating it within the remit of Euromodernity.
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Part II
The Speechless Black
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Chapter 3
Color Deafness

The multi-modal understanding discussed near the end of Part I may, in equal measure, be applied
to racial sensibilities. The deaf community, of course, is hardly monolithic. It, too, is fractured by
a racial schism. Gallaudet University, the nation’s, and the world’s, premiere deaf tertiary
institution invested in systemic discrimination along with the entire White, hearing community, by
refusing to open its doors to Black deaf students until 1952. Furthermore, the U.S. National Deaf
Association denied membership to the Black Deaf from 1925 to 1964 (Ladd 2013; McCaskill,
Lucas, Bayley and Hill 2011). Anti-deaf animus and anti-black racism assailed black deaf
communities, who were supposedly too deaf to be political actors and too black to be rational
agents. It is for this reason a discussion of color blindness must ensue. The color-blind rhetoric,
also known as racial nominalism, says we do not see color—nor should we. We judge only on
merit not on melanin. Such color-blind tropes litter the contemporary political square. Lady Justice
towers above institutions of justice; she is blindfolded so as to not see partiality but to render
invisible considerations of race and creed, wealth or penury. Yet, this blind-folded justice could
not stop the stampede of enslavement, Jim Crow, and black penalization. When the problem is
black illicit appearance, we may look to color-blindness. But, our concern here is who is heard
and, relatedly, who gets to speak by virtue of being heard. Black voicelessness within the deaf
community ineluctably lends our ear to the issue of color-deafness. By color-deafness, I mean a
marked refusal to hear racial tones, or specifically black (or non-white) voices. Instead, there is a
retreat to a larger, ephemeral vocabulary of a faux-universalism concerning the impartial treatment
given to all forms of human speech. Under this regime, color-deafness is decidedly pathogenic.
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What binds color-blind and color-deafness together is an ethic of erasure: of visibility or of
audibility. Color-deafness animates questions about that which goes unacknowledged, or rather,
as the case may be, unheard. W.E.B Du Bois’ discussion of double consciousness, seeing the world
through the twoness of self, illuminates the condition of the subjugated subject. The black subject
sees himself through his own eyes, and again, through the eyes of his white other. Yet, the question
of the Black Deaf advances a similar move to a distinct type of double consciousness, for she
“hears,” that is, she “experiences” the world doubly, as she is aware of the hegemonic “tone,”
which is a decidedly phonocentric one, but another tone, one beneath it, the “undertone,” which
characterizes a distinct way of “hearing” the world as Black and Deaf, that is, it is a way of
experiencing white deafness. This, I dub audio double consciousness. Color-deafness illuminates
the condition of audio double consciousness because it uncovers the undertone of “hearing” the
world as Afro-Deaf. By “hearing” I am suggesting an imposed way of speaking and by extension,
of being, one that is other-imposed, where, within the subject-object relation, the subject becomes
objectified, her agency thwarted, her voice muted. The Afro-Deaf becomes objectified along lines
of Deafness and Blackness.
There have been a few select discussions of color-deafness within the academic
mainstream, but the concept remains largely undertheorized. One notable example is Max
Shulman (2016) who examined theatrical black voices on the radio during the 1940s, an era of
deep-seated anti-black animus in American history that saw the disenfranchisement of black
industry. In order for black voices to appear on radio airwaves, transmitted into largely white
homes, those voices had to be filtered through color-deaf ears. In a word, to be heard, the black
voice had to sound white: “the actors would be accepted as black artists as long as they did not
attempt to make their blackness a factor in their performances” (Shulman, 2016: 463). The reality,
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however, is that wherever there are black folks, there will always follow black voices. As in
hearing communities, so too does this ring true in deaf ones. In commenting on the historical
discrimination that inflicted black deaf communities because of Jim Crow policies of the early
twentieth

century,

Padden

and

Humphries

(2005:

47)

acknowledged,

“Racializing

deafness…within an already small population of children, was to institute a crippling legacy of
economic and social inquiry” upon the black deaf.
All spheres of black deaf life, from social to legal, were scarred by the blade of anti-black
animus, including Gallaudet University, which segregated their black and white deaf students
(Padden and Humphries, 2005: 47). While both black and white deaf shared a common deaf
identity, their disparate racial treatment meant disparate histories. There is, for instance, structural
variations between black ASL and mainstream (or White) ASL such as: lexical disparities,
differentiated use of body language and spatiality, among others (Lucas, Bayley, McCaskill and
Hill 2015). For these reasons, Myers and Fernandes (2010: 23) purport that ASL is racialized and
potentially hegemonic:
We assume ASL is the language of White people…The language and culture of
White Deaf Americans have been the standard against which deaf Americans of
color…are measured. Deaf people of color…who become accepted as members of
Deaf culture have to demonstrate ability to use the standard or universal White Deaf
ASL.
The existence of black ASL is an articulation of agential direction for the Afro-deaf
community. Other scholars such as Padd and Lane (2013) point to intra-deaf racial oppression that
leads to the multi-layered stigmatization of being a minority within a minority. This, they posit, is
a result of the colonial apparatus operating internally. Ultimately, this racial divide and the
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linguistic co-optation that result mean that for the black deaf, that in order to be heard, they must
speak in a white register: ASL. Black ASL is seen as sub-standard and lacks integration into the
larger ASL linguistic model. In this model, color-deafness, within the deaf community, works thus:
To have a visual voice, we pay no attention to who says what, instead we insist upon an exclusive
linguistic standard. Yet, when that standard is racialized as white, its default register is whitely
inflected; correspondingly, what results is color-deafness—to be deaf, as it were, to the black
voice, irrespective of its linguistic instantiation. Here, speech is colored by black and white
considerations. This, no doubt, summons questions as to whom gets to speak and political volume
that attends such speech. At this juncture, could the white deaf community create conditions that
lead to a racialized permutation of audism—afro-audism?
Such possibilities are hardly exaggerated. Because audism relies on phono-philosophical
anthropology, “phono” within deaf communities would not signal auditory speech in the ways that
it would in the hearing world. Instead, it occupies a differentiated theoretical ground. The prefix
“phono” is derived from the Greek phōnḗ, meaning voice (or broadly, sound). For the hearing, it
is an auditory sounding, but in deaf worlds, it indicates a racial sounding—a visual (whiten) voice.
On this latter ground, phono is transmuted as an Anglo-racial sounding and thus, occasioning Afroaudism: the imposition of white deaf speech upon black deaf subjects. This implicates politics and
speech. In the former case, black deaf subjects are rendered apolitical because of a cessation of the
humanistic meeting of self and other—or in Jane Anna Gordon’s thought (2006), not visually
voicing one’s self through the speaking eyes of another (second sight). Finally, in the latter, speech
becomes mimicry (a process of sounding-like); it relegates speaking with to being spoken for.

Embodied Moments: Toward Creolizing Speech
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Black American Sign Language (BASL) is sometimes viewed by some segments of the deaf
population to be an unholy mixture of American Sign Language (ASL), black deaf cultural
linguistic tropes, and black spoken/hearing vernacular. The reality of BASL is that it accounts for
the intersubjective relations that exist among black, deaf, and white worlds of socio-political
meanings, for while ASL is indigenously deaf, it is also racialized as white. The black deaf subject
thus occupies at least two identities: deafness and blackness. Black political speech, in the main,
is perhaps fundamentally hearing. Deaf political speech, broadly understood, is conceivably white.
Thus, audism structures the core of black political speech, such that black political speech is not
constitutionally anti-audist. The extent, then, to which a deaf black subject may speak—that is, her
reflective expressions—mandates interaction with both worlds: one of black hearingness and deaf
whiteness. To decipher this reality, what emanates for black deaf people is a creolizing political
speech, which bears the signature of black oral vernacular and ASL. At this juncture, Jane Gordon
reminds us, “groups located differently together try to forge more viable collectivities that
necessitate contesting existing symbols in ways that produce newer ones. In other words,
creolization is progressive not when we are deliberately rejecting being straitjacketed by any and
all existing practices” (Gordon, 2014:71). BASL represents instances of this transgression of both
black hearing and white deaf normative practices, predicated on a coherent linguistic turn.
But beyond the literal linguistic mode through which speech itself is creolized, creolizing
political speech gestures toward similar epistemological sensibilities: what does it mean that deaf
speech and hearing speech contend in the same space? Perhaps, the evidence lies with CODAs—
hearing Children of Deaf Adults—who must fall within that in-between speech Deaf (culturally)
but not deaf (audiologically). Lennard Davis, who occupies such a space, notes this intricacy: “the
hearing world assumes [deafness is silence]. But this is an audist assumption because deafness is
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not at all silent—deaf people experience life filled with speech. But what they speak is sign
language.” He concludes, “the language of the deaf mediates between speech and silence…Sign
language, is not a feint but a bodily presence. The materiality of the sign is there is the sense that
it is made by using the body’s gestural repertoire…[s]ign language is composed not of graphic
traces but of movement of the body through space” (Davis, 1995: 893-4). On this basis, creolizing
speech means then the locus of speech occupies its embodied direction. Wherein, there is a
movement from merely bodily gestures as seen in ASL and sonic modulations as heard in audible
speech, toward something new: to embodied expressions. Speech, it follows, as embodied
expression, puts into conversation the relational account needed to hear one’s embodied
movements. In other words, speech becomes a meeting of ideas expressed through an embodied
register. This embodied register allows for a seeing of speech in ways that its conventional audible
register renders it invisible and hearing of speech in which its sometimes visual register renders it
inaudible. At this pregnant moment, the emphasis isn’t merely hearing the black, but also seeing
him by the virtue of him being heard. That is, he is fully heard when he is both seen and heard. As
his Afro-voice visualizes his existence as much as it announces it.
This embodied dimension to speech itself brings into clear focus an intersubjective account,
where there is movement along the subject-object paradigm. In this account, the object or the other
is not fatally calcified as alterity. It negotiates social spaces, where it suspends imposed categories;
it allows for the anonymity of the self. Anonymity, broadly understood, refers to the role or
communicative practice emerging from typicality. In other words, communication is possible
because the typical is possible. For an act to be typical, it should be repeatable (Maurice Natanson,
1970). Others could participate, engage, and join a discourse of continued shared meaning. Sign
Language exists because others can learn the signs, which means there must be sufficient typicality
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and thus anonymity for the meaning to emerge free of who signifies it. Thus, where there is
anonymity of the self, it should not matter whether the signer is white, brown, or black. The
critique, however, is that racism makes the racialized signer matter to the point of closing off the
typicality of the communicative act. In other words, it blocks black signification from anonymity
and thus prevents its infused social meaning. This then allows for Black political speech to be
ignored or, as I have suggested, rejected by rendering the subject speechless.
An embodied register opens the field of communicative acts, where the anonymity of the
self becomes possible, allowing for meaning generation. Ultimately, such embodied expressions
center humanistic relations, as it assures participation and dialogue about pressing socio-political
issues. An embodied register is politically inflected. There is a maturity of ideas that manifests
when a space is shared, contested, and negotiated. It is here that speech itself becomes a product
of creolization—where it becomes wholly humanistic in its expressions. In cementing this
humanistic ground, politics becomes animated and political speech manifests.
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Chapter 4
Black Ineffability

After the valuation, then came the division. I
have no language to express the high
excitement and deep anxiety which were felt
among us poor slaves during this time. Our
fate for life was now to be decided. We had
no more voice in that decision than the brutes
among whom we were ranked. A single word
from the white men was enough—against all
our wishes, prayers, and entreaties—to
sunder forever the dearest friends, dearest
kindred, and strongest ties known to human
beings.
—Frederick Douglass (1845)
The World is amazed at the desire of the New
Negro, for with his strong voice he is
demanding a place in the affairs of the world.
—Marcus Garvey (1922)
Every dialect is a way of thinking…And the
fact that the newly returned Negro adopts a
language different from that of the group into
which he was born is evidence of a
dislocation, a separation.
—Frantz Fanon (1952)
Now has come the time when we as blacks
must articulate what we want, and put it
across to the white man, and from a position
of strength begin to say ---"Gentlemen, this is
what we want."
—Steve Bantu Biko (1979)
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How may audibly speaking subjects be rendered speechless? If, as we saw in the preceding
chapters, the question of speech was understood as a narrowing or collapsing of modalities, that
reduce speech to a particular form, say, “sound” (at the expense of other forms) and, hence, the
production and imposition of “speechless” Deaf subjects, what, then, accounts for audible subjects,
whose speech comports within the normative epistemic frames, but who are nonetheless rendered
similarly speechless? In other words, if the problem of speechlessness is merely diagnosable as a
conscription of multi-modal avenues of speech (ocularcentric vs phonocentric), then it seems that
Deaf personhood represents the only casualty in the denial of political speech. Yet, the genealogy
of oppression proves otherwise.
Euromodernity inaugurates hierarchized racial relations among human beings. Such a
racialization meant some, greater kinds of people would have a presumed legitimacy over other,
lesser kinds of people. Euromodernity set into motion, the racialization of human history.
Historical epochs and processes such as slavery, colonization, Jim Crow, among others, became
edicts and edifices that centered the Euromodern teleology. Euromodernity saw itself as the end,
or even, the completion, of an unfolding history; it signaled a maturation of the genealogical fruit,
one fully grown and ripened. All that have been thought, philosophized and theorized occurred
under the imprimatur of the West. The Age of Enlightenment, understood as the Age of Reason,
meant knowledge and progress were distinctly European and Euro-American affairs. This result,
ineluctably, was the elision of other human beings and non-Euromodern modes of reason. In
essence, what occasioned was a quarantining of truth itself.
Such elisions materialized processes and realities of erasure. Put simply, non-European
peoples did not belong. This idea and ideal concretized the ground for introducing a form of
relations that was, in a sense, non-relational. This led to a rupture in sociality, wherein human
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relations were dichotomized according to the schema of belonging and non-belonging. The quest
to verify this postulate became the raison d'etre of the human sciences. Scientific racism saw itself
as validating methodologies of racial empiricism. This meant racialized biological anthropology
(blacks were unevolved or slower evolving apes) and craniometry (the measuring of the cranium
to confirm that cranial capacity was isomorphic with rational capacity, and that Negroid peoples
had a lesser of both in relation to Europeans) were pseudo-scientific proclamations in service to
Euromodern hegemony.
Yet, in order to give a veneer of legitimacy to the illegitimate—indeed, paradoxically, it
became a form of legitimized illegitimacy—the attempt to eliminate non-European, or broadly,
non-white peoples settled as its pledged modus operandi. This disavowal of intersubjective human
relations would result in the diminished influence on the political, by Black people. In a word, it
intended the denial, or an attempt to deny, Black subjects relating to political modes of being.
Politics, as a form of doing, demands both a connection to the past and future. It signifies
contesting, negotiating and altering pre-given terms of human living. In this sense, a political
project is inescapably future-oriented. Euromodernity sought to deny Black claims to a political
future, claims wherein Black worlds could appear, and as such, such attempts at denial enacted a
telos of racial elimination. One was to be erased from the past by limiting non-white contributions
to human history, for the project of whiteness, so it was presumed, singularly made exclusive
claims to historical continuity. This is precisely why Lewis Gordon argued, “Fanon, for instance,
understood that a movement from the imposed identity of the black required a form of historical
agency in which the Black would emerge as a possible positive lived reality of the future, which
could characterize as Afro-modern” (2018: 336). I submit, political speech, in its Afrocentric
form, becomes a historical agent. To render Black political speech unheard is to erase the Black
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subject as a legitimate political actor and therefore, negate her humanity. Black political speech
challenges Euromodernity and its insistence of a relations of non-relations.
Having introduced the avowals of Euromodernity and explicating its unintelligibility in the
political world, in what follows, I contend the question of race, specifically, Blackness, is similarly
implicated through processes of denial, silencing and dehumanization in ways that mirror Deaf
displacement. I argue that Blackness becomes a fungible criterion, alongside Deafness, in the
denial of political speech. Surely, this is not to say Black subjects do not engage in petite political
speech—for they do, particularly among themselves. Rather, I contend Black political speech, writ
large, is denied in the public constitution of the political, evidenced by historical processes of
Black subjugation: slavery, colonization, Apartheid, Jim Crow, neo-colonization, among others.
Petite political speech does not see itself as a lesser form of political speech, one diminutive in
quality and essence—nay. Instead, it names a more limited register in and through its sociopolitical expression. I have argued political speech must be reconceptualized, through decolonial
means and ends, (re)directed by a liberatory telos. Its liberation lies within its reciprocal
relationality, and therefore, expressible via a shared communicability.
No doubt the history of anti-black racism is one that defines a project of silencing. Such
silencing takes places through forms of oppressive violence. Oppressive violence is constituted
along two distinct planes: corporeal violence—a physical war on Blacks—and epistemic violence:
a waged assault on truth and knowledge itself. I argue that in both ways, Blacks are structured as
speechless subjects. In order to render speaking subjects speechless, one viable route is a need to
attack the body to physically induce silencing. Conversely, epistemic violence denotes a corrupting
alternation of knowledge and a distortion of truth, wherein the category of epistemology is enlisted
for hegemonic whiteness. Both anti-black corporeal violence and epistemic violence are by68 | P a g e

products of anti-black racism. They, therefore, do not stand as separate, non-interlaced elements
of oppressive violence; on the contrary, corporeal violence and epistemic violence are coconstitutive, one animating and substantiating the other. This interplay of oppressive violence aims
to and often successfully delimits the reach of Black political speech and ensures a limited,
diminished politicality. Decolonizing political speech undoes this violence epistemologically and
corporeally. Indeed, Frederick Douglass risked death through wrestling with and against Covey in
order to begin the process of de-brutification. The dialectics of freedom and unfreedom, speech in
the face of speechlessness, allow for concrete liberatory ends.
I ultimately elucidate the socio-historical denial of political speech to Black subjects so as
to interrogate the imposition of hegemonic whiteness (or, white normativity), as a “legitimate”
political standard. Moreover, I place Euromodernity’s undertone within a larger cartographic
interplay of anti-black racism and white oppression. From there, I explore the intricate interplay
between corporeal violence and epistemic violence in rendering Black subjects speechless through
the denial of political speech, writ large. The chapter closes with a discussion of the destabilizing
effect of Black political speech on this Euro-American linguistic frame and substituting in its place,
of a more humanized formula that grounds intersubjective meetings. The effect of doing so
engenders political actors who freely fashion for themselves attainable political futures. Black
praxis, here, reconceptualizes political speech not as being beholden to a Euro-modern undertone
but instead, it takes the form of relational essence, or what I dub, broadly, as a transmodern tone.
Thus, this chapter locates Black lifeworlds, via a catalogue of its transformative praxis, as birthing
not only political futures for Blacks but more broadly, for human beings. This discursive appraisal
of modern political speech centers contingency as essential for shared communicability.
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Raising the Spectre of Oppressive Violence and Afro-Speechlessness
It may be said that oppression, in its birth, also incontrovertibly announces its imminent death. It
dies, not only because all that exists, ab initio, must find an end, but also oppression, in its
dialectical struggle, agonally contends itself against its allied opposite: liberation. Perhaps, then,
paradoxically, voicelessness gives breath to voice, as do chains give way to their breaking.
The collective struggle of the Black masses, since the inauguration of the Euro-modern
age, is itself, and perhaps, originally so, a declaration of itself as that: struggle—one against
control, brutalization and dehumanization. The histories of slavery, colonialism and an anti-black
world order aim to limit and restrict, all under the imprimatur of white hegemony. Oppression, so
understood, has a particular telos. It directs itself toward closure. Its Latin roots, opprimere denotes
“action of weighing on someone’s mind or spirits.” Its nominative form, oppressio, denotes “a
pressing down; violence.” Oppression, under this view, is not merely an act of preventing, a
preemptive strike against another or others. It is that, no doubt. But it is also the denial of the self
as the self. It is a violent pressing down against a natural existential articulation. To oppress a
being, a human being, is to tightly and harshly entrap her—to withhold her. In this respect,
oppression can also engender conditions of speechlessness. To be rendered speechless is not a
designation about one’s absence or lack of the capacity to use words and language but merely a
violent withholding of it. It is a turning speech against the speaker by making it perilous to express
one’s one of view or eradicating the conditions for being heard. This oppressive violence then does
the work of imposing a truncated politicality upon Black subjects. Here, political speech becomes
nominal, inchoate and stillborn. Oppressive violence weighs heavily and occlusively against
relational, existential articulations of self and other.
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The genealogy of Black struggles against oppression must then be a re-articulation of what
it means to appear as human, as expressed by oppressed peoples themselves. Here, we recognize
the dialectics of visibility and communicability, invisibility and incommunicability. That is, for
blacks to be seen as Blacks, they must be heard.11 In other words, Black appearance both mandates
and succeeds its expressivity. Certainly, one could view the problematique of black speechlessness
as a Euro-modern undertone that understands Black speech as unintelligible to that particularized,
yet real, politically constituted world. This is the view of Sina Kramer: “Constitutive exclusions
occur when a system of thought or a political body defines itself by excluding some difference
which is intolerable to it. This excluded difference nevertheless remains within the system or body
that has excluded it; it continues to do that defining or constituting work from within, but under an
epistemological block” (2017: 5). While the unintelligibility of Black speech would allow for
Blacks to be “excluded within,” to use Kramer’s language, said unintelligibility raises, at a
fundamental level, epistemological questions. But the problem described here also goes well
beyond that which is epistemic. “Excluded speech,” so termed, is also relational, ethical12 and
therefore, an existential block as it is epistemological. Yet, epistemic violence raises not merely
the question of unintelligibility from the position of rationality or more precisely, who may be
deemed an intelligible actor; I contend its epistemic implication ramifies relational and existential
dimensions of depoliticized speechlessness.
Anna Julia Cooper explores precisely these dimensions when she notes: “One muffled
strain in the Silent South, a jarring chord and a vague and uncomprehended cadenza has been and

11

Whereas for Deaf people, to be heard, they must be seen.
The question of politics, denoted in this project as a doing, raises the concept of actionality. Actions, in themselves,
are never isolated nor asocial. One’s actions, more often than not, create intersubjective ripples in the sea of sociality.
Hence, actions introduce the question of responsibility. To whom and what are we responsible? Ethics, as being dutybound, suggest a co-responsibility for living in a world that dictate the terms by and under which we are governed.
Political speech is ethical because it implicates ways of governance.
12
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still is the Negro. And of that muffled chord, the one mute and voiceless note has been the sadly
expectant Black Woman” (1988: i). Here, Cooper identifies two problems: the first, that when
Black men speak what results is unintelligibility—their “jarring chords” are dismissed as mindless,
desultory social incantations. The Black woman, however, has yet to raise a voice for it to be
condemned as unintelligible: “One important witness has not yet been heard from. The summing
up of the evidence deposed, and the charge to the jury have been made—but no word from the
Black woman” (1988: ii). Yet, in her very discourse, the words of a Black woman, Cooper offers
her judgments and makes an existential summon. She does this by asking: what are we worth? In
answering this reflexive question, she maintains Blacks must determine our own self-value
singularly, as a subject and collectively, as a people. Yet to make that determination, labor must
anchor any such efforts. If, as a collective, Blacks want to be heard, they must labor to do so.
Therefore, to be a subject who is heard requires possession of political speech, which
explains the indivisible bond between its denial and the conditions necessary for being heard. This
is so for what sediments a reconceptualized political speech is its mandate of ethical relations. That
is, if speech is reconceptualized as a relational meeting, then any such meeting affecting human
affairs, wherein power is implicated, invokes the political. Speechlessness, as its non-relational
obverse, violently rends and upends this relational meeting. And, it does so through forceful
foreclosure. Oppressive violence, either in its corporeal or epistemic signatures, occasions
speechlessness, as it envisions Black subjects as ontological impediments to its own solipsistic and
insular expression and thus, commits itself to their silencing. Oppressive violence as a form of
racialized speechlessness is denoted by its singularity of purpose and stands as an inviolable turn
toward the ontological. Anti-black racism, in the domain of political speech, produces oppressive
violence, as anti-black racism inaugurates the forceful suspension of relational ethics. It is, in a
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turn of phrase, a devaluing of (Black) values. Thus, its ends are anchored in the unbridled
perseveration of hegemonic whiteness, such that the Black subject, in only being, becomes
violative of this white normative ideal.
Oppressive violence militarizes the suspension of humanistic ethics. Lewis Gordon (2007:
128-9) details the nexus between political life and suspended ethics as violence:
We find, then, another dimension of the ethical in relation to the political, for the
political construction of egalitarian orders entails, as well, the basis for new ethical
relations. In other words, the construction of a standard that enables ethical life
requires a transformation of political life as well from the violence on which it was
born to the suspension of violence itself. Such a suspension would be no less than
the introduction of a public realm, a place in which, and through which, opposition
could occur without the structure of the command.
Colonized political speech, ensconced under the auspice of Euromodernity, ineluctably
raises the spectre of oppressive violence, as it aims violently to eliminate the Black subject. In this
respect, both the sight and site of Blackness becomes ground zero for ontological assault.
Blackness, in its somatic embodiment, signifies a deviation from the white norm—because it is
seen, it becomes unheard (the reverse is true in the case of Deafness: because it is unseen, it is
unheard). Yet, Blackness is also a site of existential inquiry. It is an ongoing formation of self and
so, to engage in decolonized political speech births a flourishing political life where political
worlds, of and for Blacks, manifest. Such Afro-worlds materialize when, as Gordon concludes,
there is an “introduction of a public realm,” marked by the cessation of oppressive violence, as
dissent supplants domination. This public realm ensures the sociology of decolonized political
speech, where intersubjectivity becomes the mainstay of social relations. It is in such a state of
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affairs that new ethical relations safeguard a relational meeting of wills and minds and where
speech, in its political inflection, becomes reconceptualized as a transmodern tone13—an
articulation of Fanon’s new humanism.
On Rotating Axes: Continuities Between B/black Speech
Petite political speech describes the multiplicitous threads of localized, particularized
forms of existential articulations, of doing politics. Petite political speech build worlds of
differentiations, of racial (Afro) particularity. Black political speech is itself plural in its
expression, meaning there are dual ways of sublimating and communicating Black political
speech. I contend, “black” speech, in its lower, common form, labels the vocabulary of
mainstream, stereotypical popular culture. It is the political speech of everyday discourse. By this
metric, black speech is quotidian action and as a result, it is often awash in the currents of sociopolitical vicissitudes; it may sometime be what, in the main, is termed social media activism—
hashtag activism, episodic protests, among other forms. Given its more quotidian nature, black
speech is occasionally technologized to meet the demands of everyday socio-political life.
Contemporary illustrations of this phenomenon are witnessed in the #BlackLivesMatter or
BlackTwitter movements, wherein the influence and intervention of technology on the question of
speech becomes patent. black speech exemplifies politics in its nascent, embryonic stage, its
political consciousness is not fully developed, but not fully absent either.
Its converse, “Black” speech, in its capitalized form, defines what Black subjects do
politically. It is not episodic, punctuated or discontinuous in its registers. Rather, it is rooted in
praxis, one that is ongoing in securing new epistemic territory. Black speech, in this respect, is

I will discuss later the larger implications of political speech’s transcendence, what I have dubbed, “transmodern
tone.”
13
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fully politicized and as such, its telos is one of radical transformation; it is the contending and
upending of Euromodern hegemony. It tectonically reshapes, or attempts to reshape, the geography
of the political world, redrawing new lines along spheres of social, ethical and ontological
existence. Black speech, its capitalized form, within the broad domain of political speech, signifies
the maturation of politics. The Haitian Revolution stands as a paragon of Black speech, for it
radically altered the new world, Black republicanism and freedom for humanity: “[i]ndependence
for Haiti was therefore an unfolding process, subject to the contingencies of a world being reshaped
and redefined in ways that neither the slaves nor the slave-owners, nor even the French
revolutionary governments, could have predicted” (Carolyn Fick, 2009: 177-8). Such radical acts
are future-oriented, whose axis rotates in perpetuity. The Haitian Constitution of 1805, its
concluding words, read: “We recommend it [the constitution] to our descendants and recommend
it to the friends of liberty” (Dubois and Garrigus 2006:196).
Black speech need not be revolutionary in the strict Haitian sense, but it should orient itself
toward radical transformation, be it through revolutionism or otherwise. The freedom rides of the
Southern Jim Crow era or the 1960s independence and decolonization movements of the AfroCaribbean are other historical enactments of Black speech. Ultimately, b/Black speech, its
twoness, identifies a gap, distancing each zone. What brings both together, what bridges these two
halves, is the concomitant interplay between black and Black speech with an orientation to
diasporic, transnational and globalist concerns. Historian Thomas O. Ott argued that black political
speech in its everyday moments allowed for the actualization of the Haitian Revolution, “it took
economic change and public opinion to transform antislavery ideas into active abolition
movements…Once ideas, economics, and public opinion laid the foundation of abolition, political
action followed” (1973: 20). This everyday black speech meant inflecting the intellectual appeals
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against slavery by enlightenment thinkers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Abbé Raynal, Denis
Diderot, among others, whose writings were read by Toussaint Louverture. Put differently,
everyday forms of speech in the African diaspora, such as patois, creole and the Harlem jive shifted
the linguistic ground around which Black people communicated. Reshaping linguistic frames
meant a reorientation to nodes of knowledge and power, but it also was a result of transnational
relations and engagements. The political purchase of such interactions, in contemporary terms,
could mean the anti-racist movement of #BlackLivesMatter, in conversation with Afro-diasporic
appeals, precipitated a radical dethroning and abolition of the (trans)national prison industrial
complex that have, for protracted periods, labored toward silencing Black political speech. In this
sense, b/Black speech are not epiphenomenal to each other, but rather, should be understood as
complimentary, co-constitutive halves of a whole. Therefore, the continuities between b/Black
speech hold transformative potential. In what follows, I will now turn to methods to sublate and
quell the revolutionary tenor endemic in Black political speech.
Muzzled Registers: Black Corporeality and Violent Speechlessness
Aristotle’s declaration that “man is by nature a political animal,” and what constitutes his
politicality is observed through speech, “man is the only animal who has the gift of speech”
(1253a3; 1253a10). Man’s social instinct, says Aristotle, brings them together to form a polity.
The nature of speech permits the creation and organization of such a state, thereby allowing for
the public administration of justice. Without speech, there can be no politics and sans the state,
there can be no conception of the just. Black speech, in its politicized dimensions, raises not only
implications for the formation of the Black self, but also, collectively, Black lifeworlds.
Rearticulated, this Aristotelian arithmetic makes pellucidly clear that an incalculable political loss
is borne; once speech is denied to man—he no longer is political, and thus fails to be that who he
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is: human. When speech is lost, what remains are mere sounds, cries or what Aristotle names
“voice”—which he adds belong to all animals. “[V]oice is but an indication of pleasure or pain,
and is therefore found in other animals” (1253a11-12). This latter conception takes Aristotle
further. The subtraction of speech in man leaves a sub-human remainder. The denial of speech
devolves one’s humanity, resulting in dehumanization.
Yet there is perhaps no clearer articulation of this stripping of speech than in the work of
African-American abolitionist, Frederick Douglass. He, in My Bondage and My Freedom,
explicated the conditions under which the black subject was reduced to an enslaved body, so much
so that political speech atrophied and what remained, in bare, skeletal renderings, was mere
voice—sound—in classic Aristotelian fashion. Douglass catalogued the corporeal brutality meted
out to slaves, a violence that ensured, in no uncertain terms, the mandate of black servitude, “the
slave must be brutalized to keep him as a slave…and this can be done only by shutting out the
light of education from their minds, and brutalizing their persons. The whip, the chain, the gag,
the thumb-screw, the bloodhound, the stocks, and all the other bloody paraphernalia of the slavesystem, are indispensably necessary to the relation of master and slave” (Douglass, 2003: 305).
This “relation of master and slave” understood the prevailing norm was the master’s—a decidedly
white, Euromodern norm. Here, the values of the slavocracy dominated, those values were
unyieldingly anti-black. To sustain them, the syntactical orientation of the such a system was
corporeal violence, or what Douglass labelled, “brutalizing their persons.” Brutality introduced
not only corporeal violence, but also an epistemic. Elsewhere, Douglass (2014: 58) maintained:
I was somewhat unmanageable when I first went there, but a few months of this
discipline tamed me. Mr. Covey succeeded in breaking me. I was broken in body,
soul, and spirit. My natural elasticity was crushed, my intellect languished, the
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disposition to read departed, the cheerful spark that lingered about my eye died; the
dark night of slavery closed in upon me; and behold a man transformed into a brute.
Douglass, prior to his arrival at Covey’s plantation, saw himself, through having acquired
the ability to read, as a political actor, one endowed with agency, limited though it may have been.
He cultivated intellect and admittedly, procured an appetite to read. He termed this state of
rebellious, resistant agency, “unmanageable” to his captors. Here, Douglass’s aspiration
articulated a political constitution of self—one defined by its actional thrust to fashion for himself
and his fellows, a world of liberty. Yet, Douglass conceded, at this juncture, Covey succeeded in
undoing him, “I was broken in body,” which doused the “spark” in his eye. Douglass seemingly
lost all sense of self, as his devolution proceeded as expected: from man to brute. Brutes, as the
Aristetolian model maintains, are without speech and possess merely voice. In this scenario,
political speech became party to the treaty of Euromodern rule, as whiteness bereft Blackness of
the condition of speech through corporeal violence.
We are left, then, with an ontological problematic: How can Blacks meaningfully engage
their given social world when they are viewed as inanimate objects within it—objects incapable
of projecting a worldview? In the subject-object relation, blackness is condemned to fixed
objectification. In the epigraph that introduces this chapter, Frederick Douglass, as he was set to
be auctioned on the slave bloc, discloses: “I have no language to express” the feelings of dread.
Yet, complementarily, Douglass also recalled, “We had no more voice in that decision than the
brutes among whom we were ranked. A single word from the white men was enough—against all
our wishes, prayers, and entreaties” (2014: 46). The brutality of making transactional fungibility
out of the lives of other human beings is a tragically violent affair. “Wishes, prayers and entreaties”
were censured. The words of the black slave were inessential, holding no existential weight.
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Corporeal violence not only prevented speech through somatic closure or bodily denial, but also
immaterialized it, where it—the body—no longer possessed social currency as it was subhuman
but instead “property.”
On two fronts, corporeal violence brings into sharp contrast the notion of Black ineffability.
Ineffability, in Douglass’ narrative, identifies an enslaved Afrocentric standard through which
political speech is denied and human beings are thereby rendered speechless. On the first,
ineffability, paradoxically, speaks at the level of the internal self. Political speechlessness,
Douglass painfully reminds, is itself a speechless phenomenon. Second, in a movement from
internal to external, Douglass observes the existential and political weight of a “single word from
the white men was enough” in spite of strenuous Black protestations or affective pleas. This “single
word from white men” was exactly what Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist Frantz Fanon refers when he
noted, “To speak means…above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization”
(2008: 8). Civilization begins, within this sphere of anti-black racism, on the tongue of whiteness.
The disavowal of Black political speech is an embrace of a decivilizing project, one absent of
politics, for both the Black self and her white other. To be sure, the oppressive speech of “white
men” is one concern, but a weightier worry is the radical deprivation that follows therein for
Blacks. This white avowal of anti-black racism negates its opposing Black disavowal and
protestation because of Euromodern domination. In such a colonized world, where speechlessness
become an Afro-normative paradigm, ineffability embodies black praxis. In such a non-relational
zone, political speech is denied and what remains are sounds or voice, understood fully as an
echoing din from the limitless caverns of entrapment. It is here that man is lost and what roams,
the fields of social relations, are propertied “brutes.”
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Fanon thunderously raises the question of centrality of truth to the enterprise of liberation.
He argues lies scaffold and contour the architecture of the colonial situation. Lies about who they
say we are (the colonized), particularly in relation to other lies about who they say they are (the
colonizers). “Truth is what hastens the dislocation of the colonial regime, what fosters the
emergence of the nation…In the colonial context there is no truthful behavior” (Wretched of the
Earth 2004: 14). Truth, of course, must be articulable in praxis, through words or deeds. Truth is
inevitably actionable. Truths do not speak for themselves. They must be uttered or given
expression. This emergent character of truth corrodes the white vesture of falsity. Such mendacity,
a replica of the—white—colonial other must give way to the truthfulness of being Black. To
engage decolonized political speech is to decenter speechlessness and labor toward social
interposition: “As people existing in continuous struggle for truth, we have to examine and
question old concepts, values and systems” (Biko, 1987: 92). Black Consciousness, as Steve Bantu
Biko defined it, partly became a self-articulation of the ontology of the Black in the face of white
corporeal terror. By articulating the racist states’ effort to render Blacks speechless subjects, Biko
(2002: 75-76) understood even if truth, cannot be undone, it may be constrained:
[I]n South Africa whiteness has always been associated with police brutality and
intimidation, early morning pass raids, general harassment in and out of
townships…Thus even young traffic policemen, people generally known for their
grace, occasionally find it proper to slap adult black people. It sometimes looks
obvious here that the great plan is to keep the black people thoroughly intimidated.
Intimidation, slaps, and brutality actualize the marching orders of white-inflicted corporeal
violence. To shut them up, to gag them, to make the conditions for political speech impossible is
to advance a racial war against the Black masses—a warfare against Black embodiment. Indeed,
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Biko’s own assassination by the Apartheid regime was an attempt of silencing and muting Black
political speech. In discussing its efficacy, Biko acceded to some degree, “blacks seem to me to
have been successfully cowed down by…brutality” (Biko, 2002: 76). Black Consciousness, in
response, situates truth at any or all costs, “You are either alive and proud or you are dead…And
your method of death can itself be a politicizing thing” (2002: 152). Biko locates political speech
as vital—a life source—to the configuration of Black political life. Yet, political speech, for Biko,
appears to transcend death; death does not dissolve political speech but could, instead, inflects it
differently. Corporeal violence in and on political life is itself a contingent and conditional
phenomenon. A relational account of speech opens up the possibility for the emergence of radical
ethics.
Other theorists, such as Martin Luther King Jr. (MLK) and Claudia Jones, meticulously
documented the presence of corporeal violence in service of racist and imperial regimes. MLK, in
Where Do We Go from Here, observed, “It was about three o’clock in the afternoon on a Monday
in June 1966…When we heard that [James] Meredith had been shot in the back only a day after
he had begun his Freedom March through Mississippi” (2010: 23). In other areas, he referred to
Black “people who had been brutalized in Selma” or when they “were leading marchers in the
suburbs of Chicago amid a rain of rocks and bottles…” Similarly, Afro-Caribbean activist and
journalist, Claudia Jones, catalogued the slew of anti-black violence waged against black
corporeality, “We can record many instances of the rise of anti-Negro violence, to a higher pitch
today. Only recently from South Carolina came reports of several vicious attacks on Negro citizens
exercising their constitutional right to vote” (2011: 38). Michelle Alexander later argued, in The
New Jim Crow, state violence still terrorizes Black communities within the United States, “Today,
ex-offenders live in constant fear of a different form of racial repression—racial profiling, police
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brutality, and revocation of parole. One investigative journalist described the situation this way:
‘Overwhelmingly, black people [in Mississippi] are scared of any form of contact with authorities
they saw as looking for excuses to reincarcerate them’” (Alexander, 2012: 160). Understood
holistically, these narratives, stitched across temporal lines, tell a familiar story: the employment
of corporeal violence to induce speechlessness on Blacks. In one sense, corporeal violence stands
as physicalist closure, to prevent audible subjects from speaking audibly. Yet, in another, when
Black subjects do speak, because such speech is considered anti-political, it stands as direct
opposition toward white normative political practices and thus, its hearing, or its capacity to be
heard, is sanctioned as a political violative act. In such an anti-public realm, the political narrows
and possibilities within this world are absent Black participation. Afro-existential registers now
become muzzled and speechlessness assumes an oppressively violent character.
On Epistemic Violence: Radical Deprivation & Black Ineffability
What does it mean to speak? What does speech, in and of itself, necessitate for its actualizing 14?
Deaf political speech responds ably to these inquiries. It suggests the act of speaking itself has
been collapsed into a reductive phonocentric shell: audibility. It deconstructs this model and mode
of speech so as to transform its linguistic scaffold to account for an expressible form attuned to a
distinctively visual vernacular: the eyes. Sign language, through its open communicability,
displaces the hardened episteme of exclusive audibility. Audism, as a result, is disjointed and
dislodged from political speech in the main and so, the existential articulations of Deaf people
stand not only as sign language but also as a human language.

I use the word “actualizing” instead of, say, “delivery.” Speech, I contend, is not mere oratory performance. It is
deeply moored in the motions of lived experience; it is relationally expressive.
14
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Thus, if Deaf subjects help decolonize the nature of speech, a movement away from the
early Aristotelian paradigm, Black subjects aid in decolonizing what it requires to be heard. This
transition from hearing to heard is certainly an interesting one. In a play of irony, hearing people
are worried about not being heard if Deaf people were heard. Yet, such a worry is parochial, at
best and solipsistic, at worst. But that hearing worry, so termed, is not shared by hegemons
committed to anti-black racism. The unease where Blacks are concerned is about the political
commitment of others to not hear them at any and all costs. Their Blackness precludes being heard.
Or, in a reverse orientation, the increased political volume that Blackness expresses deafens the
world’s commitment to white superiority. Yet, when Blacks assume a role in such a world, their
political voice is rendered speechless, as their voice lands, ironically enough, on “deaf ears.” To
be sure, Black political speech does not revolve on the axis of white recognition. The political
volume of Blackness concerns Afro-centric existence: What does it mean to be Black in a world
essaying to be anti-black? Blackness, in engaging the political, does so through intentionality. It is
about one’s situatedness in the world of social relations. Therefore, for the Black subject to speak
about her Afrocentricity, she is also speaking about others’ situatedness in that same world. And
so, while whiteness imagines a singular world where only the white speaks, Blackness in its
reciprocal relationality, understands a plural world where Blacks, whites, and others speak with
each other. It is this commitment to an interconnected, relational grammar that allows for an
increased political volume that the existential articulation of Blackness expresses.
Separately, the Deaf subject is unheard by not being seen as an agent of speech; the Black
subject is unheard by being seen. The former identifies audism and the latter racism, but they both
embody the arrant failure of intersubjective meetings such that politics ceases to be what it is—it
becomes, necessarily, depoliticized. The Black Deaf subject, however, intersects at both points of
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intersubjective erosion. Together, the Black Deaf subject struggles against what I dub “ethnoaudism.” Ethno-audism classifies a particularized category of Blackness, a Deaf one. Here, the
Black Deaf person experiences radical deprivation at two ends: blackness and deafness, both as
somatic realities that seek to overdetermine her humanity. Ethno-audism is both a form of racism
and audism. In the Black Deaf subject, ineffability emerges as radical deprivation grounded in
theory of absence. But what happens when ineffability manifests in non-Deaf Black subjectivity?
In what follows, I will explore how notions of ineffability and radical deprivation are tied to forms
of speechlessness imposed upon Blacks, a general effect of epistemic violence.
The linguistic archeology of ineffable cites the Latin effabilis meaning “speakable”; its
Latin prefix in denoting “not; opposite of.” Blackness, as absence, becomes ineffable, “notspeakable” in relation to its white other. Lewis Gordon, in Fear of Black Consciousness
(forthcoming), offers this penetrating analysis:
Racist societies promulgate states whose purpose is disempowerment. To lock
certain groups into the physicality of their bodies requires rendering impotent the
capacities of expression, particularly speech. In effect, such people cease to affect
their social world; they become the equivalent of sounds that are not heard. Silent,
they become inconsequential.
Here, Gordon provides an exposition of a physicalist closure, a somatic reductionism so
much so that what the white other sees, black skin, precludes what he or she hears, black speech.
This linkage between physicality and “the capacities of expression” illuminate a central question
at the heart of epistemology. What does it require to, as Gordon dubs it, “render” speechlessness?
Stated differently, what precedes or explains this “lock[ing] [of] certain groups into the physicality
of their bodies”? Elsewhere, Gordon discuses the trappings of what he dubs as epistemic closure
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that one’s “social role is all one needs for a plethora of other judgments. In effect, to know that
role is to know all that there is to know about the individual. In effect, there is no distinction
between him and his social role, which makes the individual an essential representative of the
entire group” (2000: 68). Epistemic closure acts as a closure of portals of knowledge. That one
need not know more, for (s)he knows enough about them. In the arena of political speech, there
exists an a priori judgement about what “they” would say, if, indeed, it is granted “they” have
anything of merit to say.
Against this backdrop, I posit a distortion of truth and an attack on knowledge itself—what
is to know, and who is to know—allow for the possibility where “racist societies promulgate states
whose purpose is disempowerment.” Certainly, as Euromodernity seizes this epistemic terrain then
such an act necessitates a white custodian of the episteme, one that gatekeeps and protects the
interests of whiteness. It within this anti-black reality that disempowerment and resultantly,
speechlessness materializes. Further, epistemic violence, I contend, makes two distinct turns: first,
there is an inward turn on itself, where knowledge becomes distorted and transfigured by white
mendacity, Euromodern falsity. Second, once this transmutation is completed, its internalization
becomes externalized on “certain groups,” or more specifically, non-white bodies. Such bodies are
collapsed into their phenotype (for Blacks that phenotype is racial, for women it becomes
gendered). Through this latter move, whereby epistemology is weaponized and repurposed for
racially-oppressive violent ends, Black corporeality is oppositionally aligned as standing
antagonistically to epistemology, as its presence, its mere existence, threatens the existing order of
knowing. In a word, black existence contradicts the falsity of white superiority.
Yet, in the pursuit of Euromodernity, what might it mean to isolate, quarantine, or eliminate
this Afro-embodied contradiction? This, I contend, is the work of anti-politics. As such, because
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blackness locates the truth of being Black, one not shrouded in inferiority, it does the work of
relocating the tectonic plates of knowledge, utilizing the intellectual resources of Africana
philosophy, to shifts the center of knowing. Epistemic violence, in its unchallenged state, positions
the black subject as being anti-political, because while they speak audibly, the content of their
words is considered outside the rational and epistemological parameters of the political and thus,
antagonistic to its foundational and orientating normative political principles and practices.
Gordon then concludes, “Restricting that rallies forces against the expansion of speech, power,
and, by extension, politics. That is why all racist societies eventually become anti-political ones”
(forthcoming). As Gordon makes clear, it is not corporeality of Blackness that creates anti-politics,
but rather its restricted communicability. Imposed speechlessness, affirms Gordon, makes
impotent the political altering of their social world. “Sounds,” notes Gordon, or in the Aristotelian
paradigm, “voice,” isolated, disempowers and sub-humanizes. This somaticism, what Gordon calls
a “lock” into “the physicality of their bodies,” functions as an existential muzzle, which animalizes
human beings, wherein all that remains, short of speech, is a languishing cry, the sort discussed by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Anna Julia Cooper15. Yet, as Gordon confirms, anti-black racism
impoverishes political speech in ways that tear relational tendons needed by the body politic for
its own maturation and well-being. By denying the fruits of the political, Blacks are forced outside
its precincts, and what results is the dying of politics and the costly effect, in human terms, are
speechless people due, in part, to epistemic violence.
Earlier, we discussed the importance of truth and its indispensability to liberation. Truth,
we observed, couples itself with political speech to allow for its more decolonized grammar.

Both Rousseau and Cooper understood “the cry” to be transcendental and universalizing, respectively. For Rousseau
it existed across the species of animality and for Cooper, across the human landscape.
15
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Biko’s Black Consciousness theory sediments truth in service to liberated consciousness, where
Biko contends the Black subject was formerly “reduced to an obliging shell,” or “a shadow of
man” (2002: 29). It is here, under the mendacity of white superiority, that the Black subject existed:
eclipsed and marred by and in a colonial penumbra—a white shadow, as it were. It is for this same
reason that Fanon finds power in truthful discourse, “Truth is that which hurries on the break-up
of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects
the natives, and ruins the foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behavior…”
(1963: 50). Both Fanon and Biko understood that what we “know” was governed by the falsity of
white epistemic violence, to claim, and in claiming, purporting to know, but to do so fictitiously
and injuriously.
It is precisely these falsities that Claudia Jones observed concerning the Euro-American
imperial context. What she would later name the half-logic of the Jim Crowism, as one producing
“half-slave and half-free” Blacks (2011: 27). MLK, too, noted that Jim Crow and its advocates
were purveyors of “half-truths and whole lies” (2010: 02). Chicana activist and feminist Gloria
Anzaldúa also exposed the untruths of whiteness, “The Gringo, locked into the fiction of white
superiority, seized complete political power, struggling Indians and Mexicans of their land while
their feet were still rooted in it.” Yet, the question raised by Anzaldúa becomes: What is the source
of this fiction and what are its ramifications? To these ends, she answers, “we were jerked out by
the roots, truncated, disemboweled, dispossessed, and separated from our identity and our
history…under the threat of Anglo terrorism” (Anzaldúa, 2007: 30). Epistemic violence operates,
as these theorists indicate, to distort truth and claim that distortion as fact and therefore, knowledge.
The effect, as Jones and Anzaldúa respectively suggest, leaves behind a “half” or “separated”
being. Fanon and MLK seem to go further, portending a negation of self altogether. Fanon
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diagnosed this as alienation, or what he dubs, “the zone of non-being.” MLK branded this nonbeingness as nobodyness: “Being a Negro…means being harried by day and haunted by night by
a nagging sense of nobodyness” (King, 2010: 127). He continues, “For years the Negro has been
taught that he is nobody…that his being has been stamped with an indelible imprint of inferiority”
(Ibid: 39). In this sense, then, the colonial logic follows that nobodies or nonbeings have, in
corporeal terms, nothing to say and in epistemic terms, what they say amounts to nothing. The
former explains an imposed inability to speak, the latter explains the imposed inability to hear.
Oppressive violence makes both conditions of dehumanized political speechlessness a grim but no
less extant reality.
The budding contradiction manifests, of course, when “nobodies” or “nonbeings” articulate
something, an existential viewpoint. Feminist discourse offer us a rich portrait of how these
falsities are manufactured (and yet contradicted through the truth of self-existence). Mary
Wollstonecraft, famed eighteenth-century English feminist, wryly raised a trite obstruction often
meted out to women who cared (and dared) to express themselves through reason, “From every
quarter have I heard exclamations against masculine women; but where are they to be found?”
(Wollstonecraft, 2004: 12). And so, a woman who utilizes reason plots—furtively, as it goes—to
be a man; yet, Mary Astell, on the other hand, asserts, “The World will hardly allow a Woman to
say anything well, unless as she borrows it from Men, or is assisted by them” (Astell, 1996: 23).
Joanna Russ echoes and corroborates Astell’s sentiments, as she maps the innumerable attempts
at suppressing women’s voices, especially in writing. Russ offers, for examination, many
compelling samples of what she labels the “denial of agency”: “What to do when a woman has
written something? The first line of defense is to deny that she wrote it. Since women cannot write,
someone else (a man) must have written it” (Russ, 2005: 20). Denial of female agency, from
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another angle, strikes the same masculinist, discordant chord critiqued by Wollstonecraft and
Astell, that is: “The man inside her wrote it” because, ostensibly, she was utilizing her “masculine
wit” (Ibid: 22). This attempt at discursive erasure—willful violence against and elimination of
modes of political communication—raises issues of access, licensure and inclusion for some and
conversely, denial, suppression and exclusion for others. This discursive erasure amounts to a
privatization of epistemic terrain: who is allowed to know and who is responsible for knowing. I
argue this privatization is begotten through violent means. Violence manifests when speech is
suspended. Lewis Gordon comments thus (forthcoming):
The initial logic of citizenship, if we return to the polis, from which politics came,
was one of negotiating conflict through communication and, thus, interaction…
Citizens do not always work things out, however, and the collapse into violence
would mean civil war, where opposing insides and outsides result. Discursive
opposition (speech) is then cast to the wayside, and the opposite of citizenship rules.
“Discursive opposition” (political speech) vitiates when conflict is pursued through violence rather
than open communicability. Therefore, because violence supplants a relationally communicative
telos, a further steps results, that is, oppressive violence; it, in a bid to sustain itself either along
corporeal or epistemic lines, seeks to perpetually sideline and atomize political speech. Therefore,
for speech to publicly appear, it must do so through Euromodern permitted means and ways. Those
deemed persona non grata (Blacks or women) in the public realm, their presence must be resolved
through Occidental (white) or masculine means. This explains Astell’s lamentation regarding
Anglo-paternalism and Russ’s and Wollstonecraft’s formulation that it is their immanent
manliness that women seek to unleash and nurture. Epistemic violence permits political speech to
be particularistically embodied. This issue finds transferability on the question of race.
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Fanon argued in Black Skin, White Masks that Black natives have labored through a process
of dislocation: an existential rupture, a separating from the Black self through an artificial grafting
onto his white other. Speech, he acknowledges, is a reliable mode for such socio-diagnosis. In
surgically dissecting the insides of the Black subject, Fanon (2008: 8-9) reports:
The problem that we confront…is this: The Negro of the Antilles will be
proportionately whiter—that is, he will come closer to being a real human being—
in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language…The colonized is elevated
above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural
standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle.
Fanon offers a racial take on Russ’ the man inside her critique. Here, Fanon seems to offer
us this racialized formula: the white inside the black. This, of course, presents an existential
dilemma, a contradiction of logics. For the Black man to believe he can have a word, a say and a
sway, he “knows” he must do so whitely, so to speak. Correspondingly, the black views whiteness
as the sole door to viable political life. He becomes speechless nevertheless because he is separated
from himself—a dislocation and therefore, cannot speak truthfully about his own situatedness. His
voice, his speech, is lost in the grammar of hegemonic whiteness. Further, there is another similar
yet distinct mode of erasing agency and rendering one speechless. Take, for instance, Fanon’s
defense of the consummate existence of Afro-Caribbean poet Aimé Césaire, who, in his brilliance,
was given plaudits by the white Frenchman, André Breton, for Césaire’s unprecedented use of the
French language:
[W]hat I am trying to say is that there is no reason why Breton should say of
Césaire, “Here is a black man who handles the French language as no white man
today can.” And, even though Breton may be stating a fact, I do not see why there
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should be any paradox, anything to underline, for in truth M. Aimé Césaire is a
native of Martinique and a university graduate.
Fanon raises the issue of racial exceptionality. Breton’s words appear laudatory, but in
effect, by pointing to a single exceptional case of Black accolade that surpasses its white
counterpart, the standard to be surpassed, seemingly, is a definitively white one—what makes it
exceptional is that a black did it. In other words, Fanon notes it is only a paradox if we accept the
linguistic norm of excellence to be white. Put bluntly, the issue here is simply this: the black did a
white man’s job better than a white could. Russ dubs this a denial of agency, though in its subtler
forms. This brings to the fore, the notion of epistemic violence because in an anti-black world there
cannot be any conceivable standard save a white one. The episteme, as a result, becomes truncated
and privatized. Its more militarized parameters silences through methods of exclusion and thus,
renders one politically speechless: unable to say or do anything beyond that which is Anglolegitimized. And so, the discursive limit mounts and speechless subjects are socially born.
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Part III
Deaf and Black Lifeworlds
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Chapter 5
Deaf Lifeworlds and Socio-political Emergence

“In this day and age, we live in a very
audio-centric world…Sound is like
power, control, social currency…Because
ASL doesn't have any sound to it, it
automatically holds no social currency.”
—Deaf Artist, Christine Sun Kim (2015)

In the epigraph that introduces this chapter, Deaf artist Christine Sun Kim identifies the nexus
between sound and social standing. Social standing, or broadly what she dubs as “social currency,”
is of crucial import because it dictates the very terms of living. These terms, she notes, allows for
the social purchase of an “audio-centric world.” The ramification of which results in the social
impoverishment of American Sign Language (ASL) as it lacks the economies of sound, or
alternatively, sound (communicative) economies. Therefore, ASL becomes bereft of power. Under
an audio-centric regime, it becomes an object of control and valuation. The question of sociality
does not void the question of politicality. For the social necessarily invokes the political. The social
question, insofar as it opens intersubjective concerns, raises the issue of ASL’s social standing and
(de)legitimacy in an audio-centric world, wherein Deaf bodies must contend and navigate. But the
political question goes a step further. At its rudiments, it asks what is ASL’s capacity to selfdetermine—to determine its own internal currency. This self-formative dimension fashions the
parameters of political agency and the subjectivation of Deaf personhood. That is, if the Deaf self
does not fashion itself, how can it stand in relation to the other? The social, under this view,
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activates the political. Absent the Deaf self, ipso facto, there cannot be any imaginings of a Deaf
future.
Certainly, the discordant reality of an audio-centric world invites considerations about the
conditions necessary for one’s appearance in it. If what’s audible is tied to what’s worldly, or of
and in the world, then the instantiation of a particular human being is inextricably tied therein.
This particular then collapses into the general. That is, to be a form of human being, becomes the
form of human being. In such a world, to be human is defined as one that audibly hears. The Greek
phono indicates “sound.” One who fully occupies the audio-centric world is thought as phonocentric. Phono-philosophical anthropology then captures the primordial condition under which the
human exist only in relation to his capacity to hear sound. Here, the facticity of audible hearing
predetermines the condition for humanity. What centers existence is consciousness of the phono.
Audibility becomes the unacknowledged quintessence of politics. The phono-philosophical
anthropological subject stabilizes existence in the audio-centric world. The Deaf subject radically
disrupts this coherence—for (s)he offers living in a world without sounds. Audism then functions
as a consequence of phono-philosophical anthropology—it marginalizes and subjugates on the
condition of hearing ability, or at least, the lack thereof. Audism totalizes the Deaf subject as one
existing problematically without the capacity to hear.
The embodied register of speech is of central concern as we navigate the political. For
politics, as I have made clear in previous pages, constitutes an actional doing, one that imprints on
our own sense of situatedness, that is: how we occupy the political world and the consequences
that are borne through such an occupation. Politics, in this discussion, is an act of intentional
shaping and grounding of lifeworlds. Lifeworld—Lebenswelt—allows for epistemological
inquiries into life as it is and could be. Lifeworlds are held together by the stabilizing force of
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existential movements. Politics, then, is an engagement of, and into, lifeworlds. Politics sediments
lifeworlds in such a way that social emergence becomes possible—where, as Husserl argues,
lifeworlds permit “everyday practical situational truths” to appear (Husserl, 1970: 132). Politics
directs lifeworld toward social emergence, wherein the humanistic impulse becomes the heartbeat
of the polity. Action, this doing, is necessarily political insofar as it grounds humanistic affairs.
As such, an embodied register of speech necessarily implicates actionality because it is a
way of articulating demands and one’s situatedness. The issue of a reconceptualized register begins
when lived experience informs and begins to reformulate a once fossilized episteme. Indeed, the
concept of reconceptualization begs an epistemological question. The term “concept”
etymologically locates its origins in the Latin conceptum meaning, “abstract…(a thing)
conceived.” Its verb form, its actional grammar, becomes “conceptualize,” where its Latin
conceptus denotes, “a collecting, gathering, conceiving.” Therefore, to reconceptualize—to
conceptualize anew—asks the question: what does it mean to gather, to collect, to conceive on
different, if not expanded, epistemic terms?
I contend here that such an epistemological expansion necessitates the actional, that is, the
political. And through augmenting that which we know, or claim to know, political speech, and
the particularized register through which that is articulated, be it Deaf speech or Black speech,
becomes reconceptualized. This reconceptualization is enriched through conceptus—the gathering
of living experience interlaced with our abstract knowing. In this chapter, the praxis of
differentiated existential articulations, of Deaf lifeworlds and Black ones, is on full showcase. I do
so through a series of in-depth interviews with subjects deemed and identified as hearing Black,
Deaf, and Black Deaf located across two geopolitical terrains: Kingston, Jamaica and Hartford,
Connecticut. These two sites offer a primary discourse from similarly identified communities that
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explains both the commonalities that bind diasporic peoples together, making claim to a central
register from which all peoples who share a common racial or Deaf identity, while, concurrently,
highlighting ways of situated departure. Ultimately, weaving together our theoretical
considerations with voiced lived experience sews a larger fabric of political speech—exploding
old, calcified epistemes and ushering new ones ever under the weight of constant contestation, as
well as forcing epistemic opening. In what follows, I thematize transcribed interviews and comb
through countless hours of interview responses with Deaf and Black subjects in order to excavate
my primary data from which I use to build black and Deaf lifeworlds. In other words, the
phenomenological signature of Black and Deaf praxis weaves these narratives, offering
opportunities for rich political theorizing.
The immediate consequence of re-conceptualizing registers, ineluctably, is that of
decolonial politics. What does a re-conceptualized register mean for questions of decolonized
registers? What becomes of the phono-philosophical anthropological ideal and its faux
universalism? In the end, we are left with the decolonial possibilities that attend political speech
as a necessary mode of humanization. This chapter concludes that the question of decoloniality is
partly a question of political speech and its emergence. That is, for one to remain a permanent
fixture in political life or emerge as such—as Deaf or Black, or conjointly, Black Deaf—she must
engage in political speech and correspondingly, be heard. Euroodernity’s undertone is both a
question of subdued and falsified claims about the universalization of all voices and also about
those sublimated as silenced subjects whose voices are peripheralized as existing outside civilized
discourse. Decolonial politics, at once, transmogrifies Euromodernity’s undertone to
transmodernity’s tone—deeply political tones—with the latter entailing that the pendulum of
political relevance swings in the direction of the colonized and oppressed. This transmodern tone
96 | P a g e

is relational and re-centers either the Greek maþelian, or the Africanist Akan iteration, dwamu,
which both understand speech as an eminently relational act of embodied meeting. In such a
meeting, the given categories of speech—its normalized registers be they gendered, racialized or
sexualized—are constantly contested. This new augmented reality necessarily situates decolonial
politics as ensuring political speech. It allows for portals for humanistic listening and political
articulation.
In my interviews of Afro-Jamaican Deaf subjects, the centrality of the phono-philosophical
anthropological construct, the “hearing deaf” archetype, situates itself as often primary care, a
nurturing care expressed through everyday acts of familial love: a doting mom, a sympathetic dad,
a loyal brother. Yet, the fragility of this “hearing deaf” archetype is such that valuing another
human being exists on terms of hearing another and of the hearing other. Jon,16 a Deaf male,
admits, “I was hearing; until about three [years old], I had hearing loss. My mother really tried to
train me to speak. So, I was learning to use my voice and sign at the same time.” For Jon, signing
may accompany oral speech but it cannot function on its own. It is always supplemental when in
relation to the hearing world. I asked Jon how he communicated with his family and the world, “I
used my voice. If they didn’t understand we would write or text. You know, sometimes we slow
down our speech to understand each other.” The audible voice always dictates the terms on which
Jon could function, so much so that, “When I tried to speak they [family/friends] would make sure
to correct me, and make sure my mouth is doing the right thing and that I am speaking correctly.”
Jon admits that he enjoys wearing his hearing aid as it’s a useful pedagogical tool that instructs
him on proper speech vocalization, “Sometimes with hearing aids, it helps me to improve how I

16

For the purposes of confidentiality, and in accordance with IRB regulations, I have assigned pseudonyms to each
subject in order to conceal their true identity.
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speak, improve my vocals.” The vocal voice, for Jon, allows him access not merely to the hearing
world, but rather to the world. Jon sees Deaf spaces, however localized, as marginal, too atomized
to dictate their own terms of living. He reminisced about lost opportunities, “At Edna Manley
School for Dance, I tried to apply there and many persons, they tell me that I can’t [dance]. And
that really disappointed me because I want to. I want to dance. I want to go there.” Ultimately, for
Jon, societal responses to his Deafness demanded too many existential concessions. He sacrificed
too much—or was forced to—concluding, “If I could hear again, if I could no longer be Deaf I
would take it.” At that point, our conversation concluded, but in the space between our thick,
punctuated silence, Jon quickly inserted, “I just want to add that even if I could hear again I would
still support the Deaf community. I would still sign and communicate with them because I grew
up in both worlds.”
Indeed, to grow up in both worlds, but to feel the unequal weight of one in relation to the
other, reveals that to be seen in the world is to be hearing. Jon’s voluntary shedding of his Deaf
skin is hardly voluntary. It represents the calcification of the ideal subject, the generalization of
the hearing subject as eminently venerated and the imposition of this idealized type on those
deemed non-ideal. Frantz Fanon discussed this very phenomenon in the opening words of Black
Skin, White Masks (2008: 8):
I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of language. That is why I find it
necessary to begin with this subject, which should provide us with one of the
elements in the colored man’s comprehension of the dimension of the other. For it
is implicit that to speak is to exist absolutely for the other. The black man has two
dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the white man.
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Embodied phonocentrism ensures the somatology of the Deaf subject is always inflected
in and through the physiology of the hearing tongue. Like the black man, the Deaf subject has two
dimensions: one with her fellows, the other with her hearing other. What unfolds, however, when
one’s self collapses and merely become a reflection of the other? That is, the self is never fully the
subject, but is reduced to unending objectification of itself. The question, as Fanon argues, is not
merely one of two worlds, of a Deaf world and a Hearing world, from which one peers through
the ontological distance; rather, he asks, “How can one then be deaf to that voice rolling down the
stages of history: ‘What matters is not to know the world but to change it’” (ibid). To change the
world is to contest and upend its taxonomies—taxonomies of hearing differentiations. Such a
change, an re-orientation to a new world, and therein, a new human, results in liberation for all
involved, not merely Deaf, but also hearing. It is, as Fanon identifies, “a new way of thinking” that
ushers in a free human being (2004: 239).
Important to consider, too, is that the question of language, that of speaking to the other,
is one saturated in discourses about power: “A man who has a language consequently possesses
the world expressed and implied by that language” (Fanon, 2008: 9). The extent to which the Deaf
subject contends he has a language—sign language—is the extent to which is he not merely in the
world, but of it. To possess the world is to view one’s world as capable of language that stands as
itself and by itself.
On the other hand, the normative phonocentric paradigm, which values the hearing subject,
understand the political economy of sound as a universal lingua franca. Those who cannot
exchange that political currency cannot make juridical or political purchases. Perhaps one fleeting
political purchase is that of justice claims. Dwayne, a middle-aged Jamaican Deaf man, expressed
his frustrations with accessing justice because of his lack of hearing status, “I remember once I
99 | P a g e

went to the police station, I had an issue [with] my family. I went to the police to try to report an
incident. When I arrived, they [the police] insisted on [orally] speaking to me. The police didn’t
want to listen to me.” Dwayne observed that for communication to take place, police officers
refused to engaged in any speech not audible. “The attitude [of law enforcement] seemed more
like Deafness has nothing to do with them. It was my problem. They don’t feel that they should be
interacting with deaf people.” Dwayne was not alone in his feelings of isolation and alienation.
Christopher, a high school student, shared similar sentiments, noting that whenever there are
conflicts between the hearing and the Deaf, the hearing man, a priori, assumes innocence and
criminality brands Deaf bodies, “If there is a fight between a hearing and Deaf person, when the
police arrive and they notice a Deaf person was a part of it, they side with [privilege] the hearing
person, rather than supporting the Deaf person, they will accuse the Deaf person wrongly.”
According to Christopher, the presumption of guilt universally accompanies Deafness. Dwayne
and Christopher see justice as an elusive political good, meant only for the non-Deaf. Indeed, the
logic made manifest in here is this: the hearing person will “make his voice heard” and insist on
his point of view while the Deaf man can easily be ignored and not listened to with impunity.
To speak in the language only of phonocentrism and through it, the valence of sound strikes
a chord of inevitability, where the sedimentation of what it means to be “human” becomes an
ontological reality. Through this ontological haze, the Deaf becomes human through an oralist
manifesto. H-Dirksen L. Bauman historicizes the relationship between speech and the rational
subject: “Historically, humans have been identified as the speaking animal; those who cannot
speak are seen as akin to humans in body but animals in mind, in this orientation, we see ourselves
as becoming human through speech” (2004: 242). One interviewee, Glen, was born profoundly
Deaf. He expressed that growing up, his mother constantly forced him to speak orally, partly out
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of maternal protective instincts: “My mother always wanted to force me to speak. And, I told her:
sign language is easier communication for me than trying to speak. I was born Deaf and so that’s
normal for me and so I told her she’s wrong to be forcing me to speak.” Glen’s refusal begins to
rupture the epistemic line that maps audible speech on the human body. Such a refusal interrogates
normative audio-centric life, as sign language stands as a decentering of phonocentrism and
foregrounds an intersubjective meeting of wills and minds, in ways that elevates a more relational,
humanistic approach to social signification. Deafness’ resignification of the human subject as not
only the oral subject, allows for a continuous contestation of the borders of humanness. It is here
that political speech manifests—it begins, as it so often does, with refusal. Glen’s insistence in the
embodied political speech of the Deaf builds Deaf worlds.
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Chapter 6
The Audist Contract

The existential reality of phono-philosophical anthropology, institutionalized as audism, is indeed
a curious one. Curious because it invokes such narrow appeals to sound in the construction of the
real human being. Brenda Brueggemann (1999: 11) formed this syllogism to concretely express
the audist raison d'être, “Language is human; speech is language; therefore deaf people are
inhuman and deafness is a problem.” She claims that this coupling of speech and rational humanity
allows for an ontological as well as epistemological crisis that she dubs, the “will to speech.” That
is, audibility expresses, in one degree or another, “the content of reason.” She contends that the
Enlightenment age and its discourse on rhetoric, valorizes oral speech, which is then sublimated
through human performativity as the will to speech: “This will to speech is both oppressor and
creator of deafness in its various forms as disability, as pathology” (Brueggemann 1991: 12).
Brueggemann’s analysis that “deaf people are inhuman” because of the historically inseverable
connection between speech and humanity, begs a larger genealogical question: which kind of
speech and communication are tied to defining the political and personhood? An examination of
social contract theory may prove useful to this analysis. Social contract theory, at its most basic
understanding, seeks to clarify the terms that would make obligations of citizens to the polis
legitimate or, in its critical mode, it can reveal the terms to which people seemed to have consented
through the political behavior that is allowed and treated as normal.
In The Sexual Contract, Carole Pateman employed contractarian theory to argue that
patriarchal power lead to sexual differences that subjected women as unequal and born to no
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natural freedom. She writes, “In the natural condition ‘all men are born free’ and are equal to each
other ‘individuals.’ This presupposition of contract doctrine generates a profound problem” (1988:
6). Assessing the Hobbesian contract and its diminution of women, Pateman interrogates: “How
can beings who lack the capacities to make contracts nevertheless be supposed always to enter this
contract?” (Ibid: 6). Ultimately, she concludes, “Modern patriarchy is fraternal in form and the
original contract is a fraternal pact” (77). The fraternal pact necessarily subjugates woman. Yet,
Pateman contends that women should voice their existence and assert themselves as part of the
larger political discourse: “Women must acknowledge the political fiction and speak the language
even as the terms of the original pact exclude them from the fraternal conversation” (221). This
makes it clear that if there were a hypothetical or stylized historical social contract not everyone
implicated was party to determining its content. Women’s political speech, purports Pateman,
begins when they reject the original terms of the fraternal contract and voice their own terms and
conditions—in this respect, Pateman calls for the individualization of women, to assert their
individuality as parties to freedom.
Charles Mills continues and adds to Pateman’s discourse of the sexual contract by making
claim to a racial contract, or the domination contract. Mill argues (2007: 110):
There is the historic fact, at least arguably, that the original contract theorists had
overt or tacit racial restrictions on who counted as a full “person” with equal rights.
Nonwhite ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ were generally seen as lesser beings covered
by a different set of normative rules, as manifested both in the actually color-coded
moral code obtaining and the racist socio-political institutions imposed on
nonwhites by Europeans in the modern period.
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This notwithstanding, Mills posits such an original contract can be amended, rectified even, toward
egalitarian ends and racial inclusion. He writes, “the obvious rejoinder to this criticism (even if its
validity is conceded) is that these racial exclusions, deplorable as they were, can be simply
eliminated from the theoretical apparatus, and are not a feature of the contemporary contract”
(ibid). Mills refers to this moral, political and epistemological rescue of the social contract as
subversive contractarianism, using the tenuous crutches of non-ideal to situate his discourse. I
won’t get into the thick weeds or merits of Mills claims here; rather, I only wish to say that Mills’
aesthetic renovation of the social contract privileges liberal conceits that reinforce the same modes
of domination he wishes to escape.
Along similar veins, social contract theorist Stacy Clifford Simplican theorizes about what
she dubs, The Capacity Contract. Simplican contends that the cognitive subject is given preeminence and so, cognitive functions are rendered a preconditional criterion in everyday political
life, particularly in discourses pertaining to citizenship and democratic participation. Utilizing both
democratic theory and social contract theory, Simplican problematizes the expectation and
criterion for cognitive capacity as licensure for citizenship, stating: “I argue that entrenched
anxieties about disability are not only aesthetic and existential but also political, as disability
reveals the deep discrepancy between the ways we conceptualize the demands of political
participation” (Simplican, 2015: 3). She continues, “my anxiety emerges from the discordance
between the ways we as democratic citizens idealize cognitive capacity as a trusted democratic
resource” (ibid). The consequence, she notes, is that those with intellectual disabilities are
“deprived of political standing” (ibid). Such a deprivation raises questions about one’s humanity
and thus, functionally excludes those deemed defective. Ultimately, she concludes, “People with
intellectual and developmental disability subvert idealized cognitive expectations as well as the
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fictive political subject from which they emerge” (Ibid). Intellectual disabilities deflate our
contemporary and historical conception of the cognitive subject. Simplican views the capacity
contract both as possessing the ability to embrace and exclude on the basis of marginalized
vulnerability. This argument concludes the capacity contract’s exclusionary tendencies need not
totalize its entire capacity but rather parts and pieces of it.
Assuredly, the issue of sex, race, or intellectual disability is not an issue of hearing capacity.
No doubt, the Deaf have a long, detailed history of being pathologized as “idiots” because of the
general (though not always evident) lack of ability to orally speak. The conflation and collapse of
oral speech and cognitive capacity engendered audism. This notwithstanding, Deafness is not
emblematic of intellectual disability. And so, I contend that neither the capacity contract, nor the
racial or sexual contract before it, explains the Deaf condition, or gives rise to the construction of
the phono-philosophical anthropology hearing subject. Put plainly, what explains, even partly,
Glen’s mother’s insistence on oral speech? Or Jon’s concession of wanting to wear, as it were,
hearing skin? In chapter two, I addressed the Aristotelian arithmetic that sees speech as central to
the creation of a polity; that is, speech affords the means of communicability, without which there
could be no shared values and norms among subjects. Communicability was here reduced to only
audibility. And so, ancient Greek philosophy anchors our modern notion of speech. In Leviathan,
Hobbesian social contract notes, “The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse,
into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words” (1972: 74). In no uncertain terms,
Hobbes assigns vocality to speech: sounds. If speech’s general usage is collapsed into verbality,
what of those whose use is non-verbal? Hobbes furnishes no answer. Naming—what he dubs
appellation—is a central function of the enterprise of speech; he discerns that acuity of thought is
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diminished on the “deaf and dumb,” whereas for the hearing subject this faculty is easily discerned
and manifested (Hobbes 1972: 75-6):
By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn
the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning
of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech
at all, (such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he set before his
eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure),
he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are
equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown
him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour
whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use
of words, when he observes that such equality was consequent, not to the length of
the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but only to this, that the
sides were straight, and the angles three, and that that was all, for which he named
it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all
triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms: Every
triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence
found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule;
and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and delivers us from all
labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and
now, to be true in all times and places.
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The Deaf subject cannot cogitate universal laws of facts because of what Hobbes perceives
to be their inability in naming, their supposed poverty in definitional reasoning. Thus, they are
condemned to the abyss of futile repetition—one of cyclical “new labor.” Hobbes’ analysis is given
further illumination through his citation, if not endorsement, of Greek logic: “The Greeks have but
one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not that thought there was no speech without reason,
but no reasoning without speech” (1972: 78). Under this rubric, could Deaf people reason sans
speech? Hobbes seems to say nay. Even in such an eventuality, this dichotomization in the
Hobbesian contract between the hearing and the Deaf connotes the limited political standing the
latter could command. Beyond reason as a fundamental basis for speech, Hobbes also thought
speech could ensure social consent. This social consent was pivotal; as long as it was so preserved,
it obviated any precipitous descent into war and strife and functioned as a prophylactic against the
dissolution of the state.
Here, the audist contract delimited zones of participation along binary terms: hearing and
Deaf. The former had the profit of speech, the latter enmired in the bankruptcy of its absence. The
audist contract was a gag on Deaf imagination and a lobotomization of Deaf reason. Under such a
regime, Deaf political participation was both a social and existential quagmire. The question of
Deaf invisibility became a question of Deaf inaudibility—inasmuch as being Deaf was to be made
politically inaudible thus rendering one unheard and therefore, speechless. Political speech,
logically, could only be granted to those who fit either the Aristotelian or Hobbesian paradigms.
This explains Glen’s mother’s insistence for vocalized speech, for she understood the normative
decrees that weighed heavily on her son’s beleaguered existence as a Deaf man.
Ultimately, I have catalogued the various ways in which Deaf political speech is said to be
deficient. I do this through offering a political history as to how speech is rigidly defined (speech
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as reason, speech as cognitive capacity, speech as social consent and of course, speech as
audibility). In all these imposed criteria of what constitutes speech, the Deaf subject becomes a
persona non grata—unwelcomed within critical arenas of political contestation. This depersonalizing of Deaf speech results in its depoliticization. If, as Hobbes argues, Deaf people are
incapable of critical thought or as Aristotle purports, their communicative inaudibility eliminates
them from governable consent, then Deaf speech is disqualified from what the Greeks dub the
Agora—the central public space of Greek political life. This is the space of jurisprudence, of lawmaking and too, a space of artistic and cosmological resonance and social celebration.
Yet such a disqualification from fecundity of political life becomes the basis on which the
phonocentric paradigm is built. For what grounds this ideal is a fractured, unbalanced relational
account. That is, political life becomes a possibility the extent to which one becomes a speaking
subject—whereby audibility (or phonocentrism) moors personhood. The question of the
phonocentric paradigm occasions a particular epistemological commitment to public life and its
demands. It mandates that one views the cognitive subject as one who hears and therefore,
vocalizes political participation. Resultingly, this phonocentric sensibility dictates the
requirements of normative life. In the living of political life, those demands are reified as audist
relations between hearing and Deaf lifeworlds. Audism, then, becomes subsumed by, and enslaved
to, a phono-philosophical anthropological normativity.
For some Deaf people, the issue of audism is manifested in the realm of science. As
discussed in chapter two, the medical model is often viewed with lens of culpability. This model,
says Deaf scholars, see deafness as a diagnosis, one with a pathological complex. To be “deaf”
was to be defective. One respondent, Dwayne, saw audiology, and its practitioners, as gatekeepers
of the hearing world. Dwayne identifies as culturally Deaf—he understands his Deafness not as
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pathology but one that is culturally situated. He sees Deafness not as a lack of hearing but of gain,
Deaf Gain; it is a community of interlocutors who partake in Deaf cultural mores. “I think they’re
trying to cure Deafness. Yeah, I think it’s a negative [thing] because it’s going to destroy our
community. We have a Deaf community that’s already there. And audiologists realize that we have
sign language. We have our own language. Why would you want to destroy it? Just leave it as it
is.” Dwayne sees audiology as evidencing scientific audism, “Audiologists tend to influence
parents to teach their Deaf children to learn how to speak but we think that sign language will
better their development.” For Dwayne, and other Deaf people who underwrite his particular
sentiments, this larger phonocentric paradigm leads to Deaf children being conscripted into rituals
of oralism—of forced speech.
Indeed, the phenomenon of a forced speech refers beyond oralism, for it indexes that
moment speech is foreclosed and therefore forced on the subject as a disciplinary ritual, in such a
way as to silence her. Consider this experience from Marica, a 30-something female Deaf
advocate, as she recalls her relationship with audism:
I have experienced audism. It’s interesting. In my childhood home and my current
home, I’ve never felt audism, until I go out into the [hearing] community, into the
workplace, into the Downtown [marketplace]. I remember when I was growing up
[and attending] school. We were all Deaf students and the teachers were hearing.
And my teacher was talking with another hearing teacher. And we would be
fascinated with that conversation and we could tell, they didn’t want to know. And
we are here [watching you], trying to understand why are you talking? I felt kind
of insulted. I felt like they are taking advantage of us. They were talking and we
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couldn’t understand them. They oppressed us; maybe it wasn’t intentional.
Communication is accessibility. That’s one example of audism.
Marcia explained that the issue was less about what the teacher was saying, but rather that using
her voice—“talking”— in a Deaf space functionally collapsed her Deaf world and “audified” it.
This “audification” of Deaf spaces lends itself to Deaf erasure. It is this precise sense of invisibility
that fostered an existential inaudibility, or what I have dubbed here and elsewhere, a rendering of
speechlessness. As it were, Marcia’s hands were tied—her horizon of possibilities dwarfed, her
scope of vision truncated. Under such conditions, Marcia’s educator depoliticized her speech. Her
visual vernacular17 was peripheralized—pushed toward the outward space of irrelevance and
denial. Conversely, this raises the question of political speech and the terms essential for its
recognition. I argue Deaf Can epistemology allows for this turn toward freedom.

17

This term, Visual Vernacular (VV), in its more recent iteration, comes to represent forms of theatrical ASL/Deaf
Poetry through embodied means. I use it here to suggest a remonstration in the political dramatization of struggle—
the struggle to be heard by the virtue of being seen on the existential stage.
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Part IV
Toward “Deaf Can” Epistemology
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Chapter 7
Nicole’s Story

Nicole is an elderly Deaf woman. She became Deaf at nine months old. Nicole explained that she
suffered blunt trauma to her ears when she fell as a baby and never recovered her hearing. When
asked what problems she faced living as a Deaf woman, she recounts:
We don’t get opportunities to advance our education. For example, we want to
become teachers and get a teaching degree and they [society] have all kinds of
excuses as to why we are not able to it. And, I tried fighting for my dream, but I
have been cautioned to be careful about doing so. I have accepted that even though
I feel very strongly about it. I don’t think it’s fair that hearing people have the
opportunity to advance their education and become teachers and we’re not given
that opportunity.
Nicole’s admissions echoed Samuel’s narrative with striking similarity. Samuel, a 20-something
Deaf male, who, in our interview, wore a T-Shirt with the words “Deaf Can” imprinted on its
frontside. Naturally, I asked Samuel to explain the significance of his shirt:
My first experience with going to school, I experienced persons saying, ‘I can’t.’
And I said, ‘but I can.’ So anyway, I went to Kingston and there I saw an idea for
a small shop. So, I got together with a team of other Deaf people and we set up the
‘Deaf Can’ coffee shop and so we managed it. We want to advertise more publicity
about Deaf businesses.
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Deaf political agency is always truncated under the audist blade. The telos of the audist contract is
Deaf erasure; its slogan, I can’t, reifies the political manifesto of phono-philosophical
anthropology. Ultimately, I can’t abbreviate the audist norm: I can’t speak. For the audist contract
delimits possibilities for those who are labelled deaf. The audist project depoliticizes Deaf subjects
merely because their political speech pierces the mantle of phonocentric normativity. The lived,
Deaf experiences of Nicole and Sam, and the presumption of incapacity that accompany them,
make clear Euromodernity’s undertone.
The paternalism that undergirds our modern and contemporary undertone sees Deaf
collective interests as that which need hearing guardianship. During the 1930s, Jamaica
criminalized Deaf citizens operating motor vehicles. During this national discussion, a hearing
person offered a response in March of 1938 within the pages of the Daily Gleaner, Jamaica’s oldest
newspaper; in it, the author opined thusly:
I should like to say also that I entirely approve of the new rule which lays it down
that no man suffering from ‘total deafness’ shall be allowed a license to drive. In
fact I regard it as a piece of effrontery on the part of any totally deaf person to go
the Licensing Authority to get a license…I suspect that when any totally deaf
person has hitherto applied for a license—of any human being totally deaf in
Jamaica has ever done so—I suspect, I say, that he has not been granted one.
Nevertheless he now knows that at any rate it is useless for him to make application.
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The above discussion makes it clear that an assertion of Deaf rights is conceived as “Deaf
effrontery.” For Deaf political actors are, tout court, violative of principle of public appearance.
Deafness within the constraints of the public imagination—indeed, the public square—must know
its place as existing outside its margins. It is a liminal space of alterity, always standing outside
normative political life and movements toward its inclusion raises the armed response of hearing
balkanization, where the hardening of lines of political separation becomes manifestly enacted.
Such an enactment is realized through the juridical instruments that serve as strictures against
public engagement and broadly, political speech.
Beginning in the 1980s, Deaf advocacy began on the issue of granting driving licensure. It
took seventy-five years before conditional driving licensing was granted, since initially prohibited
in 1930. But the instruments required for conditional driving was difficult to procure for the vast
majority of Deaf people and so, many were still outlawed on the nation’s roads. 2010 became a
banner year, as Deaf licensing was unqualifiedly offered. During this time of Deaf advocacy,
moments before victory, The Gleaner reported the following:
25-year-old Kamar Groves, who said he learned to drive at 15, spoke of frustrations
encountered at the [driving] examination depot. ‘We are human. If you block the
deaf from driving, it is more like discrimination for us,’ said Groves, who recently
sought information from the Island Traffic Authority (ITA)—the body responsible
for issuing licences.
Kamar’s appeal to humanism instantiates Deaf political speech as it demands inclusion and
participation in public life. Yet, the protest of “we are human,” an invocation of Deaf capability,
evidences this “Deaf Can” epistemology. It is instructive here that the Old English derivative of
the word can translates to cunnan, meaning “know, have power to, be able”. This word
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etymological root has broad linguistic connection to the Germanic Kunnan, as well as the Old
Norse Kenna, all respectively denotive of “to be mentally able, to have learned… to know, make
known.” Invariably, Deaf Can as an epistemological practice marries knowledge with
(cap)ability—birthing action. Deaf political speech is rooted in praxis, in the ability to make
known, to disclose that which has been privatized and silenced. Deaf Can is an act of refusal; it is
a movement of resistance. It seeks to inform, to change the audist script of incapacity and a denial
of its conscription of Deaf masses into cradles of dependency and guardianship. On the other hand,
its obverse proves no less revolutionary, as Deaf Can is not merely reactive to the constrains of
audism but it is equally, if not moreso, proactive. It is political speech in direction of constructing
Deaf subjectivity as visually articulated by the Deaf community. In a word, it is the Deaf speaking
to herself. At this juncture, political speech is projected interiorly, as an inward turn that occasions
internal monologue.
It is apparent too that Deaf Can is transnational and correspondingly begets transcultural
appeal. It is not just a movement within the Deaf-Caribbean precincts. As I interview both Black
and white Deaf subjects in Hartford, Connecticut I found a continuity in thought and similarity of
ideas on this account. For example, Jennifer identifies as a white Deaf woman. When asked to
explain the Deaf Can philosophy, she argued: “Some [hearing] people tell the Deaf they ‘can’t’
but it it’s often good people, who want to help—or what we call ‘save the deaf,’ which is an old
term that we use. It means they think that the Deaf person can’t take care of themselves. They can’t
write; they are illiterate. They are equivalent to someone with a developmental, intellectual
disability.” Indeed, to “save the deaf” from themselves understands deafness both as a threat to its
own existence and the existence of others. Save The Deaf Syndrome is akin, in many respects, to
the White Savior Syndrome wherein the black is always in a dependent relation with the white. In
115 | P a g e

such a scenario, the object-subject relation denigrates, as the black permanently occupies the
object-relation. Her subjective standpoint decomposes leaving only the white, active perspective.
The Save the Deaf Syndrome so too implodes Deaf subjectivity, where its relation to her hearing
other is always objectified. It is, as Jennifer acknowledges, executed via the death fang of
generosity.
The Happy Slave finds black “joy” in his white enslavement; the Saved Deaf finds “safety”
in his hearing guardianship. It is a certain death of self through misconstrued affect. Fabian
expands on Jennifer’s insights. Fabian is a young, black Deaf person. When asked to give an
account of “Deaf Can,” he catalogues the following:
Deaf people say ‘Deaf Can’ because for many, many years hearing people heavily
oppressed Deaf people; they say, ‘You can’t work; you can’t do this; you can’t do
that; can’t! can’t! can’t!’ A lot of Deaf people have skills. We have mechanics,
sewing, teachers. Lots of skills and I see some Deaf people working for the
government. For example, my mom, she works for the government. She is Deaf.
She can do it. We have a lot of capabilities. I don’t see what is stopping us. We
want to inform people, we can work just like you can. We can do the same jobs you
can. We have legs and we have arms, a body. There is only one part—our ear—
we just can’t hear. But we can still do all that stuff and that’s why we say we CAN,
except hear. One time, I went to a grocery store. I wanted to get a job. A stock clerk
job and they said, ‘You are Deaf! And you want to work? How CAN you hear?’ I
was shocked! I could write on a paper. I can write. I can read. But that’s the worst
one. It’s audism.
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What is immediately revelatory about Fabian’s account is the connective shift he identifies and
locates between Deaf Can’t paternalism and the violence of an audist ontology. Here, audism
suspends Fabian’s livelihood, thwarts his survival and negates his personhood. It is a world of
destruction; both the externality and internality of decay and dissolution is the audist standard. The
only mode of survival in his employer’s world is to be that which he is not: hearing. It is Sisyphean
in scope—unreachable, perpetually futile. Yet, such are the terms of political articulation. Deaf
Can epistemology reorients the conditions of political speech. It contests the given categories; it
abnormalizes normality (through an insistence upon political speech and its listening). For audism
situates itself as a given and consented reality. Its mendacity lies not in its normativity, for it is
normative, as a matter of fact. Rather, it readily demonstrates the arrant falsity that audist
normativity is a weal—it is a boon to the constitution of Deafness; it “saves” the Deaf. The Deaf
Can episteme actualizes that which is known and as a result, materialize and leverage political
goods via Deaf praxis—Deaf politics proper—to undo the shackled arms of imposed
speechlessness. Deaf Can voices Deaf freedom.
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Chapter 8
“Deafinitely” Decolonial
The question of decolonial politics points to power nodes of coloniality. The Deaf world, as limned
by the accounts of Deaf people, resists the imposition of audism. Deaf praxis, in this sense, is one
anchored in agonal struggle and disavowal. The Deaf world is not merely a reconstruction of itself,
but rather, in its turn toward humanism—an account of the human being such that (s)he is
relational, ethical and liberated—it reconstructs the normative ideal for being human. Audism
lodges itself within the crevices of social and political normative practices. Frantz Fanon
understands the process of decolonial to be that which “infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new
generation of men, with a new language and new humanity” (Fanon, 2004: 02). This new language
brings to the fore, a new humanity. Sign Language displaces the dominant linguistic frame that
understands speech as that which is entirely limited to phonocentrism. For this new language, as
Fanon describes, can only resonates and sediments itself within a new human—one who rejects
the Manichean divide in favor of a humanistic ethos that treats politics as a domain for equitable
participation and freed existential expression. It is in fidelity to this principle that Owen Wrigley
comments, “a visually linguistic modality . . . [that] threaten[s][existing] crucial anchors of
language and social meaning” (1996: 85). This social meaning disrupts the Manicheanism of
oppressor and oppressed or, as the case may be: deaf and hearing and as a result, replaces such
fractured sociality with one built by intersubjective practices, creating possibilities for liberated
futures.
Marcus, an African American Deaf man in his mid-twenties, explains he was deaf at birth.
He, like many Deaf people, was born Deaf. For Marcus, Deafness was not alterity—it was a world
foreign only to those who did not share in it. When asked to reflect on his experience with audist
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practices, he explained: “One time I went to a grocery store trying to get a job. A stock clerk job.
And they [the hearing managers] said: ‘you’re Deaf! And, you want to work? How can you hear
if someone wants help?’ I was shocked. I can write on a paper. I can write. I can read. That’s
audism.” Marcus’ experience reveals externally-imposed cycles of woundedness and moreover, it
exposes the paternalism that often attends the inner-linings of coloniality. Here, Marcus was
classically positioned to justify his own existence to partake in economies of self-preservation. He,
in other words, had to justify Deafness in a hearing world, while at the time, recognizing that such
foreclosure preceded the very justification. Marcus, despite any justification, still could not appear
as a Deaf subject in a hearing space. Political speech was denied to Marcus because he could not
hear it.
Wrigley sets into motion, the situatedness of audist discourses around speech and their
atrophying effect on Deaf existence, “We (a dominant unnamed ‘we’ of a hearing normative
frame) learn to perceive speech—and its congenital root, hearing—as synonymous with language;
we then diligently eradicate contrary evidence and those might bear it” (1996: 74). Colonialism is
process of violent elimination. Wrigley gives credence to this outlook as he compares the
medicalization of deafness as a precursor to the pathologizing of its culturally formative self, that
is: “capital D” Deafness. Yet, critical to this discussion is the centrality of political speech for the
Deaf. Sign language occasions the particularization of political speech such that it manifests as
uniquely Deaf political speech. I submit, then, that the march toward decolonizing Deaf spaces
begins with a linguistic emancipatory modality. This linguistic emancipatory modality is
understood not only through the instrument of language in and of itself, but also through its
signification and consequently, the expression of Deafness as identity-laden, or what existentialists
names being-in-the-world. We witness this within Marcus’ discourse about himself, “First of all,
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I am very proud to be Deaf. But society sees you, on the outside, you are walking into a place, they
see you as black. Now, if I sign, now you’re Deaf—not Black! But, if a Deaf community gets
together, we are all Deaf—period!” [Emphasis mine]. Marcus brings to the fore, this intersection
of race (specifically, blackness) and deafness. This ethno-audism that Marcus identifies, evinces
the imposition of colonialism at two radical ends: race and hearing status. For Marcus, his Deafness
in public spaces supervenes over and above his Blackness. In other words, even if his Blackness
were to give him a political voice, his Deafness would nevertheless suspend it. As Marcus’
experience makes plain, political speech decolonized is multi-directionally situated, as it accounts
not only for a singular colonization (a freed Deafness or a freed Blackness) but also one that
cauterizes all colonized epistemes.
Sign language qua political speech threatens and dissembles normative, hegemonic
registers. It reformulates linguistic registers to make valuable political purchases as it concerns
appearance and participation in the polis. The Deaf person insists on speaking and through that
insistence, using sign language, registers political legitimacy. What results necessarily is a Deaf
humanism. Marcus’ announcement that he is “very proud to be Deaf” remedies what Frantz Fanon
dubs existential dislocation. He does not hear himself as a hearing person in deaf body, rather he
sees himself as Deaf person in a hearing world. This latter understanding begins to shift and forge
for himself, a Deaf world where sign language, as political speech, engenders Deaf futures.
Political speech reconceptualized, transforms the colonial situation into a decolonial one.
Having examined the question of the imposed colonization of Deafness—that is, the
Manicheanism of deaf against hearing, broken against whole, bad against good—I will now shift
focus to decolonizing Anglo-Deaf speech in and of itself. Marcus’ experience certainly raises the
issue of Deaf speech in a hearing world, however, in what follows, Wyatt, a Black Deaf man, raises
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the question of (racialized) deaf speech in a Deaf world. Wyatt is 50-something man who originally
hails from Nigeria and holds a doctorate in education. He immigrated to the United States in his
teenage years and subsequently, enrolled in the nation’s most renowned Deaf academy, Gallaudet
University. During his time at Gallaudet, and the many years following, Wyatt acutely understands
his positionality as both Black and Deaf. In our face-to-face interview, I asked Wyatt how
identifies: Black or Deaf first, or alternatively, if he is both Deaf and Black foremost. Wyatt
responds thusly:
Based on everything I’ve seen in this country. I cannot say I am Deaf first. Because
in the Deaf world, I am not accepted. But within the African Deaf world, I am. In
the African Deaf World, I talk, I sign, I am me. They allow me to be who I am.
They accepted me. They show me that they are my brothers and sisters, we are a
multi-black [Deaf] African world. I get more respect, more welcome, more
recognition as a human being. But when I am among Deaf whites, I am relegated
to the corner. For instance, at Gallaudet I joined a fraternity. Three of us who are
Black joined a white fraternity. I didn’t have one [white] friend from the fraternit y
and you say I am your brother? How can I say I am Deaf first? You asked me to
join [the fraternity], I joined. And then, because I am a Black Deaf, you pushed me
aside. That’s not brotherhood. I cannot say I am Deaf first when I am not accepted
in the general white Deaf World.
Wyatt’s blistering response situates him and other Blacks in what he considers to be a
rigidly white Deaf world. Jennifer, a white 50-something woman, responds markedly different
from Wyatt. When asked about Black-white Deaf relations, she observed: “Deaf people don’t see
Black color. We see people as people. We see Deafness first, not color. I think hearing Blacks help
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us, because they see us as minority like themselves. So minorities tend to help each other.” This
disjuncture between Wyatt and Jennifer, a disjuncture of positionality, of lived experiences and of
sensibilities, perhaps stands as a microcosm of the Black Deaf and white Deaf divide. Jennifer, a
white Deaf woman, sees her Deafness as an uncontestable unifying force among all Deaf people,
without regard to race. Wyatt, contrastingly, understands his Blackness as precluding and refuting
this faux universalism that Jennifer (and other white Deaf people) espouses. Wyatt’s critique of
this universalizing Deaf world that sees and therefore, “hears” all voices betrays the actuality of
Black Deaf praxis. For Wyatt the Deaf world becomes, ironically, deaf (to Black Deaf political
speech). Here, Wyatt reveals that political speech must undergo internal decolonization before it
can be an agent of external liberation.
Revealingly, Wyatt’s account indicates it is not that he necessarily choses to be “Black
first,” rather, as his response makes clear, it is a “choice” that has been given him. While Jennifer
chooses, as an active expression of agency, to be Deaf first, Wyatt is forced to be black and only
black. In this sense, his Blackness devolves into blackness, a pathology—a reduction of his
ontology into a singular somatic reality. Wyatt, consequently, is rendered speechless within the
Deaf world itself. In chapter 2, I identified this malady, loosely, as color-deafness (juxtaposed to
color-blindness)—to be deaf to cries of racial consciousness. In speaking more about this
racialized Deaf divide, Wyatt asserts:
I still believe that Gallaudet is more a white world, to me as a Black Deaf man, than
more of a Deaf world. Okay, Gallaudet is the center of Deaf World. I applied to a
job at Gallaudet. I didn’t get it. I knew that if I were white, I wouldn’t need to apply;
I would have gotten it. How can I say I belong to your world when I am not
accepted? …From what I have observed, I would say Black (hearing/Deaf)
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community share the same experience of being in a white world. For us, we share
our deafness with the white Deaf. But for the Black community, we have nothing
in community with the whites. I like whites. I have many white friends. But we
need to understand there are many things we don’t share. I go to work with whites,
but after that we all go home. How many of these Deaf whites ever asked me to
join them for a beer? How many? How many of them ever asked to come visit me?
How many asks me how my family is doing? But we spend eight hours every day
in the same place!
This conception of Deaf worlds as artificial white worlds for Black Deaf people is hardly
new. A Deaf world, he says, listens by seeing him as Deaf. Instead, such a world silences by seeing
him as black. For this reason, in this whitened Deaf world, the facticity of his deafness ceases to
be an ontological reality, or a social identity, rather it manifests as a vexed, if not discounted,
marker of shared personhood. Through Wyatt’s given censures and basic denials in white Deaf
spaces, what remains is a Deaf community that acculturates whiteness. In fact, Wyatt contends the
white Deaf world envisions itself as more white than Deaf and for this reason, the Black Deaf
stands in greater solidarity with his Black hearing fellows. To be sure, Wyatt’s disclosure about
Black (Deaf) rejections in a white (Deaf) world raises a basic yet fundamental question: how are
socio-economic conditions, particularly, job discrimination, a political question? More to the issue,
how is economic materialism, or more pointedly, its strangulation, a denial of political speech? A
short rejoinder is as follows. I have discussed earlier in this chapter, the social organically invokes
the intersubjective. The social is a world of human relations. Embedded within the social is the
political. The political, defined here, is actional—it is a doing. Yet, it is also a directed doing, an
actional framing that affects (and possibly, transforms) human relations. Therefore, economic
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questions, under this metric, are intrinsically political ones. Economic denials affect the viability
of Black or Deaf worlds, their material conditions and broadly, their political futures. This insight,
of course, is a clear departure from the Arendtian model that demands a surgical incision dividing
the social and political as separately autonomous. It follows, then, that Wyatt’s economic life
necessarily speaks to his political life. By foreclosing economic expressions, one has stymied its
political accent. Ultimately, political speech is denied and what results is a certain speechlessness.
The period of European exploration and conquest of the New World ushers in the modern
period. Modernity, by other definitions, is the era of enlightenment, industry and revolution.
Modernity raises fundamental questions (and problems) about the value and meaning of the human
being. Given the centrality of slavery, the Atlantic slave trade, ethno-genocide, and
(neo)colonialism, race has come to define the modern and contemporary imagination. Race was
and is the fodder of Euromodernity’s appetite. Euromodernity signifies the crisis of morality and
poverty of epistemology through, though not limited by, rank racialization. Euromodernity, of
course, is not condemned to a historical period. As such, it remains, by any measure, a hegemonic
attitude. Euromodernity’s undertone, situates political speech as an enterprise of equal accessibility
without regard to race, class, or other social identifies. Yet, Euromodernity’s undertone is
eminently hegemonic. Its racialized speech masquerades as universalism and so, in its mendacity,
it denies its apparatus of silencing and speechlessness. And so, its undertone is one of false parity.
This project advocates a movement from Euromodernity’s undertone, where the political speech
of the colonized are suppressed, to a transmodern tone—one that is wholly relational, an embodied
meeting of minds and wills, where existential articulations are heard and political futures are
birthed and sustained. The transmodern tone tends toward a Rousseauian generality, an
actualization of the common good. It becomes decolonial because it transforms the colonial
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context and creates, as a consequence, freedom. The imposed speechlessness on Deaf subjects
through audist regimes, as explored earlier, is a pre-modern phenomenon, evidenced by early
Aristotelian discourse. Yet, the racialization of Black Deaf bodies by white Deaf spaces raises a
distinctively modern and contemporary problem. As such, Deaf speech, in toto, must be
decolonized within—among the Deaf—for political speech to emerge for Black Deaf people not
only in hearing precincts but also Deaf ones. This requires, at its core, a relational ethos—a
reimaging and a reconceptualizing of what it means to engage in political speech and the humanity
expressed therein.
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Part V
Political Action
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Chapter 9
Depoliticized Political Actors and Euromodernity’s Faux Universalism
The first language of man,
the most universal and most
energetic of all languages, in
short, the only language he
needed, before there was a
necessity of persuading
assembled multitudes, was
the cry of nature.
— Jean-Jacques Rousseau

The epigraph expresses the primordial position of language, as it contours and constructs the sociopolitical situation of humanness. In it, Rousseau argues that sentiment, the ability to feel and
express pity, stands as a universal signifier, one that binds, to the extent it would, the loose
appendages of the human constitution. Yet, perhaps most strikingly, what Rousseau posits is that
a communicative condition defines a human condition. That, regardless of its affective purchase,
as it is the case for Rousseau (and different for other thinkers), to be human is to express a condition
of that humanness. An expression of that human condition is never singular but always tending
toward the plural, to another—to the other. Inherent in such communicative practices is an
intersubjective telos. In this project, I have argued that such is the nature of speech. It, akin to (and
in many respects, dissimilar from) Rousseau’s cry of nature, is a language of expressive political
negotiation of one’s (pre)given position within the social world. It becomes a contending with our
historically-contingent selves. Admittedly, Rousseau’s cry of nature was the pre-political speech
of the pre-social man. Yet, even in such a state, the cry could communicate to another elements of
one’s experience. Though not a perfect parallel, political speech is an articulation of and about our
situatedness in the world of politics. Indeed, political speech, as I have argued, expresses not
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merely a rhetorical or linguistic movement, a congealing of speech as merely what is spoken (or
written, for that matter). It gestures toward more—an existential movement, one that accounts for
a building of a political world and a remaking of socio-political values. Because it is an existential
articulation, it means speech is actional as it is discursive. Political speech is communicative
negotiation of ethical, social, and political norms. The making and remaking of those norms
constitute the principal position for imagining a future world. But who may be regarded as political
agents to enact political speech? In what follows, I offer a discussion of the de-politicization of
political actors and thus, the generating of the conditions for imposed speechlessness.
Depoliticized Actors
Privatizing political speech represents a disinvestment in the futurity of those denied its fruits. And
so, a distinctively political problem arises when political speech becomes closed and hegemonized
as it is curtailed, captured, and entrapped within the vernacular of oppressive power. This
realization is understood under two rubrics: the first, political speech becomes accessible to an
exclusive group and the second, its expression and its modality are narrowed to exclude other
legitimate modes. In the first, political speech sheds its generality, it becomes de-generalized. On
explicating the essence of general will, Rousseau asserts, “As long as a certain number of men
consider themselves to be a single body, they have but one will, which relates to the common
security and to the general welfare” (2002: 227). Political speech becomes isolated and
quarantined; it is secluded from the common interest of the people—it stands as expressing and
privileging the will of a few. Such an isolation validates listening to some people while silencing
others. Here, private interests now adjudicate all affairs. In this sense, political speech is denied to
some by being unheard. I argued this denial becomes applicable to many groups but my focus here
lies primarily with two: Black and Deaf communities. Through this de-generality, of displacing
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public interests with private ones, political speech becomes depoliticized. The process of
depoliticization occurs along two fronts: manufacturing apolitical subjects, subjects deemed
outside the political because they are concretely understood as sub-human and fashioning antipolitical subjects, subjects deemed antagonistic to politics proper and therefore dehumanized,
devolved as either animality or entity (thingification), or both. In the first category lies Deaf
subjects, who, by being denied political speech, are said to be apolitical. This denial is effectuated
through pathologization of Deaf bodies. Deafness, in turn, is intended to be scoured and stripped
of its politicality and what reputedly results is mere “deafness,” a defective, medicalized
reductionism—a deviation from normal hearing bodies. This is evidenced through the valorized
hegemonic, phonocentric precepts espoused by the likes of Alexander Graham Bell, Hobbes,
Aristotle and others.
Adam Cohen explicates historical pathologization of deafness: “[Alexander Graham] Bell,
who was the son of one deaf woman and the husband of another, was studying eugenic solutions
to the problem of deafness. In a paper presented to the National Academy of Sciences, ‘Upon the
Formation of a Deaf Variety of the Human Race,’ he expressed his fear that if the deaf reproduced
unchecked they would produce a ‘defective race of human beings’ that would be a ‘great calamity
to the world’” (Cohen, 2017: 111). Political defectivity then became the basis for denial. If such
subjects were not full-fledged human beings, their capacity to engage in politics became, as it
were, handicapped. Indeed, to “engage” politics meant that deaf people had to be hearing and
equally, phonocentric. This phonocentrizing of the political precluded those outside the phonopolitical world.
The Black subject is similarly situated. Her category was explained by its supposed
defectivity. The black became defective in a white world. Like the deaf subject, the black body
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became the center of Western pathologizing. But, unlike the deaf subject, such a pathologizing of
the black body, an epidermalizing of black existence, blackness stood, in a surgically defined
Manicheanism, as black infirmity to salutary white existence. This infirmity had to be excised as
its presence was found cancerous to the Euro body politic. In this sense, blackness was weaponized
as antagonistic to the project of politics; black existence was viewed as warfare against Eurocivilization, or more properly, civilization, writ large. Black inclusion, and by extension, black
agency stood as socio-political terror. It became excluded from the public—a domain of existence
wherein political contestation could occur, changing the nodes of power and recalibrating the
engines of political society. It was actively excluded from the public, which required
problematizing Black speech by framing it as unintelligible, as departing from the domain of
reason itself; but also, it was framed as ahistorical, without historical precedent and therefore of
no discernible contemporary value. These traits, understood collectively, framed black political
speech as deleterious to the (white) public imagination and consciousness.
Defective—but not physiologically deformed—subjects, black people, had to be curtailed
and sometimes, violently removed. “If a man asserts that another man, because of his race, is not
good enough to have a job equal to his, or to eat a lunch counter next to him, or to have access to
certain hotels, or to attend school with him, or to live next door to him, he is by implication
affirming that that man does not deserve to exist. He does not deserve to exists because his
existence is corrupt and defective” (MLK, 2010: 74). Surely, if whiteness’ raison d'etre avows,
as MLK suggests, that Blacks do “not deserve to exist” because of his “defective” color, such a
manifesto is one of racial genocide: the elimination of Black people—not merely their curing or
salvaging because, they are, in anti-black logic, an incurable lot. Black politics is treated as antipolitics. Black subjects, then, are understood as anti-political.
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Political speech, in this anti-black world, is enslaved by a racial logic. Political speech
becomes racialized; it transmogrifies as whiteness. Blacks are denied political speech because of
their incapacity to engaged a whitened politics as the register of Black speech is irreconcilable
with white supremacy. I contend processes of ensuring black speechlessness are rooted in
Euromodernity: The Occidental racialization of modern and contemporary existence, particularly
on the question of knowledge. Euromoderntiy represents a decadent attitude to intersubjective
living, within this, a rank refusal to listen. Therefore, the existence of Black and Deaf communities
and their reduction to speechless subjects, subjects denied political speech via its capitulation to
an anti-human hegemonic ethos, implicates (and assails) the enterprise of politics. This raises
questions about political subjectivity: Who may be legitimately deemed a political actor? And,
what political valence emerges from such a category? What’s its political purchase, or more
simply, why should we care?
I have thus argued that politics dictates the contours of the human. If political subjectivity,
one acting as a political agent and appears as such, is fashioned along very particularistic lines (of
either the phono or the Euro), then only a phonocentric subject can appear in a phono-political
world; likewise, only a Eurocentric subject can appear in a Euro-political world—creating both
apolitical and anti-political signifiers. The ultimate implication, then, is a politics that is closed to
manifold intersubjective relations. Such a closure amounts to the asphyxiation of political
discourse, where humanistic space constricts, tightens even, perpetually narrowing itself to
complete dissolution. Politics, in such a scenario, becomes despoiled, stripped of its relationality,
and what engenders, consequentially, is a form of de-politics. Depoliticized political actors, both
in the case of Black (and white) and Deaf (and hearing) subjects—as the denial of political speech
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undoes its enslavers in the end—means the polity, the public space of political engagement, stands
in precarity: of a (certain) uncertain existence.
These processes of foreclosure, rituals of denials, and modes of silencing manifest as the
colonizing of political speech under and through a particular oppressive epistemological attitude.
Indeed, what does it mean to make knowledge subservient to racializing interests, so much so that
existential articulations are arrested? To arrest, I have argued, is a necessarily violent process
because it seeks to subjugate that which is inherent: political speech. Here is Fanon, in Alienation
and Freedom, “The colonized people are presented ideologically as a people arrested in their
evolution, impervious to reason, incapable of directing their own affairs, requiring the permanent
presence of an external ruling power” (Fanon, 2018: 654). Certainly, if we understand political
speech as a formulation of a possible future, its denial, in Fanonian terms, amounts to an arrested
evolution—a devolution of intersubjective relations, a devolution of Black and Deaf worlds. For
these reasons, I have argued that political speech so utilized has been cast under the spell of
coloniality and what manifests is the coloniality of political speech. The coloniality of political
speech is a violent process of denial; it is a muzzling of existential registers. It mechanizes
existence, one where an external power decides its projected future and recorded past. In the Deaf
world, the coloniality of political speech is manifested through the historically brutal institution of
oralism, whereby the fingers of the Deaf were sometimes beaten into hearing compliance: do not
use sign language. Albert Ballin, a Deaf writer who wrote in 1930, his iconic release, The Deaf
Mute Howls, described the oralist justification as such (Ballin, 1998: 26):
The pure oralists are those so-called experts who claim that all the deaf children
can be taught to articulate correctly and speak good English, without the aid of the
sign language. It is their pet theory that the sign language is a handicap to the deaf
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child…Oralists in their efforts to suppress the use of signs practically bind the arms
of the child, thereby gagging it, so it may not express itself naturally.
This binding, a gagging, is a common trope of coloniality’s arresting raison d'être. Such an arrest,
a bind, a gag, is executed through force and results in violence—violence to and violence against
bodies, ontologies and a certain persona non grata existence. The coloniality of political speech
is an undue imposition, “to articulate correctly” Deaf worlds through hearing registers. It assumes
an advanced state of being, one that teaches the lesser form (of being human), how to be (human).
“Oralism further implies a strict and rigid rejection of any use of sign language. Thus oralism is as
much an ideology as it is a method, and one with a distinct teleology” (Wrigley 1996: 16). A
teleology in service to the phono.
It is precisely these reasons that led to the imposed speechlessness of Blacks. The
contemporary world is constantly aghast by the reoccurring sights of Black silencing. Whether the
2014 Ferguson Uprising, where Black protestations of state and carceral violence against Black
communities were met with the jackboots of state oppression; the strongman tactics of the National
Guard to the 1989 Virginia Beach protests; or, the penalizing fist of imperial capitalism against
Black athletes’ protestive kneeling on sports fields, Black political speech has historically been
met by the imposed state of Black speechlessness. Fanon diagnosed the socio-genetic makeup of
colonialism, one with a pulsating vein of (and for) violence, “The colonial regime is a regime
instituted by violence It is always by force that the colonial regime is established. It is against the
will of the people that other peoples are more advanced” (Fanon, 2018: 654). Because the
coloniality of political speech induces speechlessness, such an inducement is fostered and achieved
through a violent rending of lives and wills. Within this colonized milieu, whiteness speaks for
(not with) blackness, hearingness for (not with) Deafness. It dictates the possibility of black
133 | P a g e

existence. As I have posited, the coloniality of political speech is a directedness of wills, an
imposed declaration of ontological limits and heights: I am what you contend me to be. And so,
the axis of power gravitates around this singular contention.
Faux Universalism
The coloniality of political speech operates under the auspices of Euromodernity. To be sure,
deafness and its exclusion predates the Euromodern epoch. Yet, Euromodernity perpetuated and
sustained the audist practices of antiquity. Hobbes, for example, writing within the Euromodern
epoch, contended that Deaf people are non-rational beings because they cannot engage in
appellation—the act of naming, which is a characteristically rational faculty. Hobbes argued the
Deaf cannot name because they are without words. Audism found refuge and purchase within the
normative strictures of Euromodernity. Lewis Gordon describes Euromodernity along these lines
of argumentation (L. Gordon, 2018: 335):
Race, as its philosophical anthropology, made Europeans white and modern into
European. The result was Euromodernity. Euromodernity demands more than
kinds of customs, laws, and languages to belong to the future; it also avers kinds of
people. This mark of Euromodernity meant, as Fanon also observed, a single edict
to a newly formed set of conquered and colonized peoples: become white. In effect,
this meant that such groups were to disappear, which also meant an eliminated
future and, as a consequence, an illegitimate present.
Race centers and directs the Euromodern compass. The telos of anti-black racism is the
diminution of blackness as a lesser form of race, one not quite fully human, subhuman or dehuman.
Its “corrective” is a Eurocentrism of an avowed enlightenment. It is both the westernization of
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reason and the rationalization of the West. Yet, as Gordon indicates, its sine qua non is the
elimination of a Black future. I contended the coloniality of political speech enacts that
disappearance by aborting pregnant moments of Black political speech. If one cannot do (labor, or
act), how can she hope to imagine, or even more concretely, how can she build? Euromodernity’s
undertone encompasses both an attitude of eviscerated futures in Black and Deaf directions. For
the Deaf, the undertone, i.e. the attitude, is pre-Euromodern, for the Black it is Euromodern.
Sylvia Wynter offers a critique of the emergence of African American Studies as an
exemplification of the liberal ideal, one whose directed impulse was a supposed universal appeal,
when in reality it substituted black particularism with the more palatable, but less radically altering,
liberal universalism (Wynter, 2006: 108):
Black Arts and Black Aesthetic Movements…like Black Studies as a whole, were
to find their original transgressive intentions defused, their energies rechanneled as
they came to be defined (and in many cases, actively to define themselves so) in
new ‘multicultural terms’ as African-American Studies; as such, this field appeared
as but one of the many diverse ‘Ethnic Studies’ that now served to re-verify the
very thesis of Liberal universalism against which the challenges of all three
movements had been directed in the first place.
In a similar vein, I argued that a faux universalism attends Euromodernity’s movements.
These movements contend that all are heard (and allowed to be) with equal measure. These
universalist appeals ornament the public domain. They become lodged within the sinews of the
juridical: Equal justice under law, touts the Supreme Court; the famed factoid of “rule of law”
affords institutional legitimacy by marketing equal treatment as commodity purchased by all and
sundry. Against this backdrop of Liberal universalism, Black political speech, in its radical origins,
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is framed as disruptive, uncivil and undemocratic. The politics of respectability manifests. And so,
state resistance—in its bid to maintain law and order—legitimizes Euromodernity’s shielded
violence, wherein its imposed Afro-speechlessness is repackaged as exaggerated, racial
hullabaloo, one without a scintilla of truth and one “propagated” by the radical left. This, in effect,
becomes a cloaking of Black and Deaf deprivation as social normalcy and therefore, such
deprivations become desensitized in the public imagination. There is an overrepresentation of
Euromodernity’s manifesto as universal. Yet, as the existential reality of Black and Deaf bears
witness, such subjects routinely fall outside its universalist parameters. Euromodernity’s hushed
movements, its undertone, is an attempt at falsification; it is a project of concealment.
I have argued, as a consequence, in lieu of Euromodernity’s undertone, a transmodern tone
must be resituated as the normative anchor for human relations. Transmodern tone because it goes
beyond (Euro)modernity. It is a transcendental movement forward—toward new horizons. It is a
renewed and repositioned orientation, a resituatedness of self and other. Euromodernity begins
with situating the self within—within the universal, within the limits of the social contract, within
Euro-American rationality. Indeed, as Lewis Gordon mentions, Euromodernity positions itself as
white and therefore, within the bounds of civilization and within the spatio-temporal domains of
the future. Transmodernity tectonically shifts this paradigm, realigns and relocates boundaries
through necessary disruption. Transmodernity becomes, then, not located within, but rather
outside. It pluralizes the universal and births, instead, a pluriverse of possible positionalities.
Pluriveralism becomes its anchor. By situating itself as being outside, it is constantly contesting
borders, boundaries and barriers, including its own. The outside never congeals; it is ever pulling,
stretching and remaking.
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The implications of a progression into transmodernity are many. First, transmodernity
requires what Maldonado-Torres (2007) dubs political and epistemic interventions. Such
interventions reorient ways of living, of doing, of being. It is for these reasons, I have argued for
a reconceptualization of speech beyond its more iconic sonorous and phonocentric definitional
core. Agreeing with the Aristotelian premise that speech is foundational to the precinct of politics,
speech—in its formulaic iteration—becomes understood as an audiblized essence, which, alas,
allows for critical losses to politics. Those loses are liberatory, in nature (as exemplified by the
lived experience of the Deaf). I argued for a movement beyond its more Greco-Roman origins,
one that marries Africana praxis and epistemological claims in enriching political practice.
African, particularly, from the Akan peoples, as well its original Greco-Roman formation,
practiced speech as a relational act, one deeply steeped in actionality. Particularly for the Akan
people, located in West Africa, speech was understood as dwamu, a public domain where sociopolitical issues were addressed, it was an arena of consensus, of debate, or dissent, broadly, of
relational engagement. The dwamu held similar (though not identical) functions as the Greek
agora. But both were sites of socio-political contestations, of vivified relational struggle. Speech,
was, under these rubrics, reimagined as a meeting ground that allowed for subject-object
appearance.
Speech reimagined, reconceptualized as a meeting, of wills and minds, allows for a new
ethical disposition, one where human beings are met as human beings. For these reasons, truth
sediments this enterprise of meeting, or relating. In this sense, speech understood as a way of
situating one’s self in the world, becomes not foreclosed to particularistic modalities of existential
articulations, captive to one modality (say, the phonocentric) over and against another. Rather, a
relational orientation to speech suspends decadent normative practices, as it allows for an
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appearance (though not exclusively) of the queer, of the non-normative. It is here sign language,
as Deaf political speech, manifests; Deaf culture and Deaf norms may germinate. Similarly, Black
political speech, in all its diverse formulations, becomes articulable, claiming political spaces for
the erection of Black worlds. Transmodernity stands as the ethical portal to enter such a world. On
this score, transmodernity’s pluriversalism inaugurates what Fanon once dubbed, a new
humanism, exploding emaciated epistemes and proffering new, more humanistic ways of relating
to self and other. Such a modus operandi is practiced not preached, lived not abstracted. For these
reasons, its ethical root becomes a tone, stitched within the fabric of normalcy; it rejects liminality
and embraces those living quotidian, outside lives.
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Chapter 10
The Plurality of Political Speech

Political speech denotes the communicative means through which human beings engage
themselves and others through partaking in the political world. It is expressly a revelatory project.
It embodies norms of disclosure, a revelation of self and the world, through dialogic apparatuses.
As such, it is immanently relational. Yet, political speech offers diversity of dimensions, ways of
categorizing itself across multiple moments and movements. Take for instance, political speech at
its primal base. While there are efforts to arrest political speech, to make some subjects speechless,
as is the expressed rationale of Euromodernity’s undertone, political speech is not entirely
suppressed; it is not exhaustively denied. Nor is it necessarily always corrupt, hegemonized or
colonized. Deaf political speech, speech among the Deaf and within Deaf lifeworlds, illuminates
moments of political speech conforming to principles of liberatory intersubjectivity. In other
words, the Deaf, generally, have lived into the politicized act of making other Deaf subjects heard.
Deaf political speech within Deaf worlds is an instance of what I named petite political speech—
political speech on a more particularistic, fractional dimension. To be sure, this does not suggest
petite political speech is less than, or is of an anemic stature. It is only descriptive, localizing
political speech, mapping its coordinates, within the ethno-domains of diverse communities:
Black, Deaf, Latinx, inter alia. Petite political speech lends itself to the specificities of a particular,
distinct social identity. It is the localization of these cultural specificities (race, gender, sexuality,
etc.) that makes it less generalizable.
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Petite political speech differentiates itself against its broader, intermixed, or collectivized
(in the strictest sense) variant, what I have previously dubbed political speech writ large. On this
more expanded ethno-sphere, global in many respects, intersubjectivity fractures, relationality
solipsizes, as people engage the world as it is: uneven, unbalanced and unstable—it means norms
vary in their liberatory or as it is, non-liberatory expressions. Political speech squarely collides
against hegemonic attitudes, rendering it wholly captive to colonizing epistemes. It then dons the
vestures of Euro-American imperialism and New World colonialism. Political speech writ large
simply replicates a colonialist posture—it reifies as the coloniality of political speech.
At this juncture, it behooves clarification that petite political speech, properly understood,
is not an attempt to romanticize or idealize localized quadrants of communicative acts. Black
political speech hardly implies there exists no fractures or failures in the communicative process,
that relational ethics never undergo periodic suspensions. No. Unquestionably, not all types of
Black people, those occupying differentiated intersectional spaces, are heard. We inarguably
witnessed this grim reality in chapter 4, where Deaf political speech (petite in its dimension)
revealed cracks in its exterior. Many Black Deaf subjects were unheard within the Deaf world. For
this reason, audism became insufficient to wholly diagnose processes of dehumanization. That is,
Black Deaf subjects professed it was not merely on the condition of their blackness that
peripheralized them to a liminal space, a space of expunged agency. It was a dual result of antiblack racism coupled with a hardened audism. In other words, Deaf political speech was,
episodically, Eurocentric in its actualization and Black political speech was, more often than not,
phonocentric in its translation. To locate the intersectional position of being both Black and Deaf,
I argued that ethno-audism functioned in dual concert to render Black Deaf subjects speechless.
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This notwithstanding, Black political speech and Deaf political speech signified
transgressive acts, as sustained moments that evidence Black and Deaf subjects as speaking
subjects. Sign language, a language with a visual vernacular, was performatively transgressive
against a hegemonized phonocentrism. It problematized and destabilized the episteme of the phono
as the “universal” orientation to communicative humanness. Sign language, a human register of
embodied site and bodied sight, exploded conventional norms about “hearing”—for one had to see
(Deaf) voice and not, in a literal sense, hear it. In a phenomenological move, one must suspend the
natural attitude toward the notion of “voice” to allow for a demonstrable, evidentiary experience
of what it truly is, or at least, could be. When considered phenomenologically, voice became
imbued with an added dimension: visuality. The visual voice constituted and communicated Deaf
existence. For these reasons, Deaf political speech embodied a radical act of transgressive
expansion or enlarging of the category of speech. Similarly, Black political speech deracializes
and denaturalizes “sight” as a colored phenomenon. The Black subject is unheard by being seen,
her speech is eclipsed on the basis of her illicit appearance. Blacks had to transform the racialized
ocular, a plane of somaticized hierarchization. “Racism makes productive use of this look, using
learned visual cues to demarcate and organize human kinds” [emphasis mine] (Alcoff, 2006: 198).
It is precisely the gaze, “this look” that racially stratifies personhood.
Many, Linda Alcoff most notably, have identified the perils of an engrained
ocularcentrism: “A further danger of an ocularcentric epistemology follows from the fact that
vision itself is all too often thought to operate as a solitary means to knowledge” (ibid). I have
argued that Black political speech challenges an ocularcentric approach to politics by
deconstructing and reconstructing how we see, and therefore, altering what we know. This
approach does not espouse the failed scripts of racial eliminativism. Enacting black political
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speech does not advance a color-blind sensibility, in fact it militates against it. Black political
speech disarms Euromodern racialization, or more pointedly, it violently contests anti-black racism
through transgression, intervention and rearticulation. The latter, especially, re-announces
differentiated humanistic forms of political practice and participation. Concerning the former,
Black political speech as transgressing Euromodern norms, I am underscoring one of the ways that
anti-Blackness functions; that is, when Black people are seen as Black subjects, a closing off of
the ears begins, unless the Black person enacts cues that distance or diminish the significance of
their Blackness. Without doubt, in a world that polices and penalizes endemically Black
protestations, their very existence stands as deviance and serves as resistance. This means that
through racialized subjects, political speech is sometimes confronted through an embodied
vernacular, for when one’s mere physical presence is taken to “speak for itself,” this creates an
obstacle for others to intentionally listen to the content of one’s words. In other concrete terms,
African cosmological practices, an expression of Black lifeworlds, were routinely outlawed
stretching from and to every colonially controlled (and enslaved) island within the Caribbean.
Nevertheless, such rituals were religiously practiced and conjured in the shroud of night. Afrocosmology aided Haitian revolutionalism (Clinton: 2011). African cosmological practices hardly
exhausted instances of Black political speech, linguistic practices too, qua creole, sometimes
branded as “patois,” stood as inconvertible truths (Gordon 2014). These templates were among the
first existential articulations within the New World, imagining and building black futurity.
The political valence of petite political speech is important. Accordingly, a larger question
looms, what of black political speech with a visual frame and deaf political speech with
phonocentric influences? If ethno-audism verifies the existence of dehumanizing impulses bidirectionally, along lines of both Blackness and Deafness, it follows that these worlds must align
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or, minimally, intersect as evidenced by the lived experience of those who are Afro-Deaf. I have
argued that, for the Afro-Deaf subject, two distinct worlds converge. But such a convergence is
not contrived nor artificially induced. Drawing on creolizing theory from Jane Anna Gordon, I
contend that petite political speech presents itself as fecund ground for creolization, for illicit
blending. Gordon summarizes creolization as explicating the sociability of lived experiences (J.
Gordon, 2014: 177):
creolization has referred very explicitly to illicit blending or to those that
contradicted and betrayed the project of forging a Manichean racial order in the
heavily mixed, transnational movements that shaped the planation societies of the
New Worlds on both sides of the Atlantic…what is now termed creolization refers
to instances of such symbolic creativity among communities that included those
thought incapable of it.
This “symbolic creativity” proffers pregnant moments of unpredictable political
intercourse, where worlds collide, birthing new wonders and generative ways of being. It is a
process of renegotiating social existence, as political actors struggle with extant political realities
enmeshed within colonized relations (Chevannes 2018). Processes of creolization are not
deliberate or scripted but emerge organically from intermixing socio-political milieus emanating
from the political force of intersubjectivized relations. I have postulated Black political speech, in
the form of an African American hearing vernacular, and Deaf political speech, in the form of
American Sign Language (ASL)—understood by some Afro-Deaf subjects as a Euro-racialized
discourse—produces, nonetheless, a creolized variant: Black American Sign Language (BASL).
Take for example, the word “trippin’” (denoting, irrational, over-aggerated behavior). This lexicon
exists within non-Deaf/hearing African American vernacular, but does not constitute a word/sign
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within ASL. However, trippin’, employed as a discursive rearticulation, exists within BASL, a
creolization of Black and Deaf political speech. This notwithstanding, some within the mainstream
ASL community, view BASL as an illegitimate, profane mixture of hearing and Deaf worlds; of
Black and white worlds. But therein lies its promise: one of an expansive decipherability. Here,
the creolizing of language reminds us of the forged, contingent and open nature of language
development, if it is being used in contexts that are dynamic, changing and fluid. And so, by
identifying its expansive decipherability, it is less that any one linguistic product is universally
decipherable, it is that we are reminded of the made quality of language so that we can embrace a
more constructive attitude toward language and speech. If we are actually committed to speaking
with/hearing people, we are amenable to realizing that language can be a primarily visual medium
and will want to hear language being used to advance different aims.
Creolizing political speech denotes the illicit blending of petite political speech from
differentiated worlds. Progressively, creolizing political speech globalizes discourses by
liberalizing, expanding petite political speech from its more localized, particularized sectors. It
instantiates, as matter of political survival, Rousseauian generality. Rousseau explains, “the
general will is always right and always tends to the public good” (2002: 172). The public good is
the common good, the good of all. Its teleology gravitates toward the people’s general welfare.
The political cosmos, if you will, consists of many existential worlds: Deaf, Black, queer,
indigenous, gendered, among others and all of the combinations thereof. Petite political speech
operates as particularized humanistic engagement. Within each world, there is a coherence of a
more localized generality. Simply stated, petite political speech is the speech of general wills that
are smaller than the society itself. Yet, the political world is not, at its core, entrapped in the stasis
of division, bifurcation or compartmentalization (though some would attempt to make a project of
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that). It is instead a plane of plural human relationality. Petite political speech only accounts for
relations within, it is intra-related. Creolizing political speech stands as a multiplication of
relational nodes, its telos shifts toward inter-relations. Creolization offers political speech a
globalist signature, wherein intersubjectivity becomes its ethical mooring. There is a certain degree
of legibility and comprehensibility that attend the project of creolizing political speech. In the end,
creolizing political speech encompasses the fluidity of movements among multiple existential
registers in negotiating the multi-layered terrains of our social world (Chevannes 2018). Thus, it
liberates by opening once foreclosed facets of political life for the colonized.
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Conclusion:
Liberation through Political Speech—Limits and Possibilities

Ultimately, throughout this project, I have raised the spectre of speech as a political problem, that
is, rather than it being a means through which politics is undertaken, a priori commitments about
who can participate determine who will be heard as speaking. Such speech is political precisely
because it is a problem around and about power. Power to determine, or even problematically,
power to overdetermine. This discussion theorizes from a primarily Aristotelian position: the
indispensability of speech to politics. This is not to say that all that is political is necessarily speech.
Consider, say, capital. The question of capital, in a Marxist sense, raises profound political
questions. However, it is not my contention that capital functions as political speech and even if it
does, my concern here orbits around the condition of the human being and her political existence.
Moreover, orthodox conservative jurisprudence, within the American context, constitutionalizes
certain expenditures—money in politics—as protected speech. At the outset, this project defined
politics as a form of doing—an actional impressing upon—which effects human affairs. Its ability
to “effect” invokes claims about power and its possession, distribution, and impact on the social
world. Yet, in demarcating what is not political speech, I do not intend to exhaustively demarcate
all that constitutes said speech, as doing so needlessly manufactures a vexed a priori condition.
Suffice to say, the minimum threshold of political speech begins with an existential inquiry. It is,
in part, a meditation about life and its living.
I have posited that political speech writ large, in its colonized variant, raises considerable
problems. Part of what constitutes power is defining who will be able to play a significant role in
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making consequential decisions. However, the powerful do not specify which classes of
individuals can be heard but they draw on the physical features of these individuals to imagine
who can belong. Those who can belong become those who share the physical features of those
who have already been selected as possible decision-makers. In so doing, these become
hegemonic. Political speech, correspondingly, advances critical inquiries into projects of freedom
and unfreedom. Political speech functions as rituals of (re)negotiations, of situating one’s self
within the social world. It is the contesting, intervening, and shaping of pre-given, ready-made
values (Simone de Beauvoir 1948). Yet, that intervention must begin with an assertion, or with a
question: who am I? It is this questioning that closes the book of Fanon’s tour de force, Black Skin,
White Masks; there, he similarly contends: “O my body, make of me always a man who questions!”
(2008: 181). To question—to assert—implicates a philosophical anthropology, and a critique of
self, posed both as an interrogation of and declaration about lived experience. Decolonized
political speech actualizes that interrogation and enacts rituals of renegotiation: in waking up, in
showing up, in standing up, rising up, and in speaking up. It is an ideology about the up-ness of
the human being, or what Rastafarianism regards as the philosophy of upliftment. This mobilizing
ethic of up-ness was echoed by Caribbean pan-Africanist, Marcus Garvey when he exhorted: “Up
you mighty race,” meaning speak up. This critical uprising and raising of consciousness are the
teleological threads of political speech proper. Its act of transgressive disruption and
destabilization through situating the truth of lived experience, the evidentiary claim of Blackness’
humanness and the veracity of Deafness’ non-defectiveness, is violent. Violence, as Fanon
observed, is a cleansing force, one aimed at purification through truthful discourse, truthful
relations, and truthful living. Throughout this work, I have proposed that decolonized political
speech is an articulation of critical consciousness. These existential articulations, then, serve as the
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brick and mortar for building a political future once denied. Under these conditions of
intersubjective relations, liberation becomes possible and political life remains an open site of
ongoing contestation, where disputes are deliberated, carefully considered, and addressed.
This project is not without limitations. I have identified the question of political speech as
engaged in or denied among individual and groups of human beings. This project situates the
existential actions and phenomenological movements of the human being. It is the signification of
self that has oriented its theoretical inquiry. Yet, the question of speaking does not limit itself,
arguably, to an absolute anthropological pursuit. Indeed, the sociology of institutional bodies
become similarly implicated. For example, what of social institutions or larger social bodies?
Specifically, what of the state? To what extent does the state have the capacity to engage in political
speech? How might the sociology of international relations alter, or render moot, the question of
political speech? These questions sit outside the scope of this project, though they may be
meaningful issues that lie at the heart of societal relations. What’s more, even at the level of the
anthropological, the classification and application of political speech to the human subject, what
remains unaccounted for is the impact of systems of technologies in intermediating political
speech. What is the role of a technologized speech within the political domain? How do we make
sense of political speech in a digitized world? Is social media a bust or boon to political speech’s
liberatory end? Finally, this dissertation did not address larger legal questions about
constitutionalized free speech. Scholars of public and constitutional law may find reasonably
wanting the absence of the juridical as a specific intervening theoretical standpoint from which to
evaluate the concept of political speech.
These limitations notwithstanding, the project offers rich avenues to meaningfully rejoin
some, if not all, of these pressing issues. First, I aim to connect the themes I have articulated here
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to forms of identity that are not limited to race and disability. To explore registers of gender and
sexuality, I will ask what must we make of the androcentric and heterocentric registers that co-opt
means of existential articulation? How does this cooptation implicate feminist and queer theory,
as we explicate the dynamism of the gendered or the queer subject? What, then, becomes
articulable as embodied womanist political speech or queer political speech? These questions
necessitate, through phenomenological motifs, the queering, broadly understood, of the epistemic
grounds on which political speech rests where queering means availing oneself to spaces, attitudes,
or orientations of projecting horizons, whereby alternatives, differentiations, and asymmetries
come squarely into focus. The convergence of queering of political speech with its already extant
creolizing possibilities offers new ways to enter the field of politics from the vantage point of
communicative practice.
Finally, I intend to consider conceptions of the polity, beyond democratic considerations,
through which decolonized political speech might find its best political appraisal. My focus will
include an analysis of the commune and the public, or conjointly, the public commune, as a means
of situating political speech because doing so could illuminate limitations inherent in a democratic
paradigm in the securing and fostering of political speech, while probing for more liberatory
alternatives. In the end, what will remain a perennial inquiry at the center of political theory is:
Who gets a say and, by extension, a sway in political life? In order to investigate the latter, we
must first suspend normative considerations on the former and begin to critique the presumed
modality of existential articulations.
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Appendix

Investigator: Jane Anna Gordon, Associate Professor, Political Science (email:
jane.gordon@uconn.edu)
Researcher: Derefe Chevannes, PhD Candidate (email: derefe.chevannes@uconn.edu)
Study: Modernity’s Undertone: Toward A Reconceptualization of Political Speech

Questionnaire

(Phase One: To Be Conducted In Jamaica)
1. Is sign language “speech” or is it “sign”? Why?
2. How do you define the term “speech”?
3. Why do you think it’s important to “speak” or to engage in “speech”?
4. What do you think are the limitations of “speech” or “speaking”?
5. What are the consequences of limiting different forms of speech?
6. What do you want hearing people to know about sign language?
7. Do you speak with your hands or your eyes? Or both?
8. Is silence, speech?
9. How would you describe “deaf speech”?
10. When you hear the word “politics” what comes to mind?
11. What do you think is the importance of “politics” in society?
12. Do deaf people have a different attitude or orientation toward politics than hearing
people?
13. How would you define the concept “political speech”?
14. Have you, or any other deaf person you know, experienced or forced to indulge in
oralism?
15. If any, what are some hearing privileges you can identify?
16. In your mind, how do hearing people view or understand JSL?
17. What is your relationship to and with JSL?
18. Have you experienced audism? If so, and if possible, could you provide one example
that impacted you deeply?
19. In your experience, how is it that the hearing world attempts to silence deaf people?
20. How can deaf people, in your mind, resist any attempts to silence them?
150 | P a g e

21. What do you believe is the consequence of Deaf communities being silenced?
22. How do you engage in political speech, if at all?
23. Is JSL or ASL a political language?
24. Are deaf people political (less or more so than hearing people)?
25. How do deaf people engage in politics that is markedly different than how hearing
people engage in politics?
26. If it exists, what is deaf politics? Is there hearing politics?
27. How do you define deafness?
28. How do you define hearingness?
29. Do you consider yourself culturally Deaf? Why? Why not?
30. If you are familiar with these concepts: If so, what’s your opinion on “Deafhood,”
“Deaf Gain,” “Deafnicity,” “Deaf Way”?
31. What’s your view on audiology and cochlear implants?
32. How does Jamaica’s history of colonialism, if at all, affect deaf speech or deaf
communities?
33. In the American Deaf tradition, the “Deaf President Now!” movement is an example
of Deaf revolutionary protest against hearing paternalism and audism. Can you think
of a similar revolutionary protest or movement in the Jamaican Deaf community?
Phase 2: (To be Conducted in the United States Exclusively)
34. How do you identify, racially?
35. How does your race affect how you engage in politics?
36. How does your race affect how you engage in speech?
37. How does your race affect how you engage in political speech?
38. What does it mean to be black and deaf?
39. What’s the difference in how black deaf people speak, compared to how white deaf
people speak?
40. Are white deaf people heard more than black deaf people either in the hearing world or
in the deaf world?
41. Do you feel silenced by white deaf speech?
42. Is ASL (American Sign Language) white deaf speech or black deaf speech? Or both?
43. Have you experienced the hearing world being unresponsive to deaf people’s
concerns? If so, how?
44. Have you experienced the white deaf world being unresponsive to black deaf people’s
concerns?
45. [If applicable], As a white deaf person, how do you view BSL (Black Sign
Language)?
46. As a black deaf person, how do you view BSL (Black Sign Language)?
47. Is BSL black deaf (American) speech?
48. How does the White deaf world view black deaf speech?
49. Should black and white deaf speech be different?
50. What does it mean to be black and deaf? How does one affect the other?
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51. What’s your experience of being white and deaf? How does one affect the other?
52. How does racism deny you a political voice?
53. Does anti-black racism affect what you do and say? If so, how?
54. Why do you think it’s important for black deaf people to protest?
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